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HEADQUARTERS  
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
1st Marine Division, (Rein) FMP  
APO, San Francisco, California 96602

3/WGH/alj  
5750  
04 April 1967

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division

Via: Commanding Officer, Seventh Marines  
Commanding General, Task Force X-Ray

Subj: ✓ Command Chronology; month of March 1967

Ref: (a) Marine Corps Order 5750.2A

Encl: ✓(1) Overlay indicating unit positions as of 312400H March 1967 (NIF)  
✓(2) Revised Task Organization of 3rd Bn, (Rein), 7th Marines Op Order 1-67

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Command Chronology for the month of March 1967 is submitted. A Commander's Narrative of Significant Events is included.

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

3rd Bn. 7th Mar. Log No  
302-67 Copy # *1 of 35*  
SER: 06-67

7th Mar S&C Log Nr.  
0271-67 Copy # *1 of 10*

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3rd Bn/7th MAR  
CMD CHRON  
1967

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## Command Chronology, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, March 1967

1. Organizational Data

- a. Location: DUC PHO, RVN
- b. Period Covered: 1-31 March 1967
- c. Commanding Officer, Staff and Chief Subordinates:
- |                       |  |
|-----------------------|--|
| Commanding Officer    | LTCOL E.J. BRONARS                       |
| Executive Officer     | MAJOR R.C. RICE                          |
| Adjutant              | 2dLT W.E. KELLER, JR.                    |
| Personnel Officer     | 2dLT K.J. WILKERSON                      |
| S-2                   | 2dLT E.J. POLASEK                        |
| S-3                   | MAJOR F.V. WHITE, JR. 1 Mar-5 Mar 1967   |
|                       | MAJOR B. JORDAN 6 Mar-31 Mar 1967        |
| ALO                   | CAPT L.R. GIBSON                         |
| S-4                   | CAPT A.L. ORR                            |
| Supply O              | 2dLT E.C. RATHBUN                        |
| MPO                   | 2dLT J.A. WILSON                         |
| Bn Surgeon            | LT R.F. MC CAULEY (MC) USN               |
| Bn Chaplain           | LTJG D.W. PEDERSON (ChC) USN             |
| CommO                 | CAPT C.W. ROSS 1 Mar-27 Mar 1967         |
| Civil Affairs O (S-5) | 2dLT J.B. FLYNN                          |
| H&S Co.               | 2dLT D.R. RICHARDS                       |
| Co. I                 | CAPT R.M. CLARK                          |
| Co. K                 | CAPT D.D. DORR 1 Mar-10 Mar 1967         |
|                       | 1stLT G.W. JONES 11 Mar-31 Mar 1967      |
| Co. L                 | CAPT L.J. CULMER 1 Mar-18 Mar 1967       |
|                       | 1stLT J.M. PLATT, JR. 19 Mar-31 Mar 1967 |
| Co. M                 | CAPT K.W. JOHNSON 1 Mar-27 Mar 1967      |
|                       | CAPT C.W. ROSS 28 Mar-31 Mar 1967        |
- d. Attachments: Enclosure (2) lists all attachments and all units assigned in direct support of the battalion.
- e. Average Monthly Strength During Period:
- |      |               |     |             |
|------|---------------|-----|-------------|
| USMC | 31 Officers   | USN | 3 Officers  |
|      | 1075 Enlisted |     | 46 Enlisted |

2. Sequential Listing of Significant Events, Especially as they relate to:

- a. Personnel. The total number of personnel on hand within 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines as of 31 March 1967 was 1192. The total effective strength on 31 March was 1129. During the month of March 125 new personnel were joined to this organization; 142 were dropped from the rolls. 63 personnel rotated; 148 personnel were wounded in action; 10 personnel were killed in action; 56 personnel were evacuated as non-battle casualties--25 of these were returned to duty by 31 March 1967.
- b. Administration. No unusual or significant problem areas were encountered.
- c. Intelligence.

(1) By 28 March recurring intelligence reports indicated that several major enemy units, including the 1st, 2nd, and 22nd Viet Cong Regiments, were deployed in the mountain region west of DUC PHO District for the purpose of attacking installations in the NUI DANG-NUI LAU area. From enemy contacts in BINH DINH province, the

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1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) reported an exfiltration of units of the 22nd VC Regiment northeast across the I Corps-II Corps boundary into the DUC PHO area. Reconnaissance sightings and small unit contacts with uniformed VC within the DUC PHO area indicated an increased presence of Main Force/NVA-personnel.

(2) An attack on the 3/7 CP on 24 March also tended to confirm the presence of units other than local force and guerrilla units; an estimated 250 rounds of 60 and 82mm mortar, and 57 and 75mm recoilless rifle fire were received. The proximity of reported locations of the 95th Bn of the 2nd VC Regiment to discovered VC firing positions indicated that the attack was probably conducted by that unit or elements of that unit. Interrogation of Chieu Hoi ralliers, former hamlet guerrillas also revealed that the attack may have been conducted by the 83rd VC battalion. Prior to the attack during the daylight hours on 23 March, a reconnaissance unit at BS 772394, observing areas west of Highway One, reported a noticeable lack of normal Vietnamese activity.

(3) No significant intelligence could be obtained from the interrogation conducted by DUC PHO District officials of 1800 refugees from the hamlet areas vicinity BS 755380, despite the fact that USMC units which conducted operations in that area encountered moderate-to-heavy contact. Documents and supplies captured in that area identified a significant medical aid capability and support the contention that these hamlet areas are utilized by VC forces for the treatment of their wounded and sick personnel.

(4) The contents of documents captured during March will be translated and analyzed in conjunction with ITT reports in an effort to develop strength figures of guerrilla units and to categorize them according to hamlets and villages. A blacklist will also be published. To date, the translation of documents has indicated the following:

(a) From personal letters-that morale is low.  
 (b) From official documents-that the VC are low on mine and boobytrap material due to the deliberate destruction of dud mortar and artillery rounds by friendly patrols and friendly units conducting search and destroy operations; that the VC are recruiting young men and women for the Youth Association; that the VC are exaggerating reports of USMC casualties.

(c) From personal records-that two VC killed by USMC forces were officials in the local VC village infrastructure.

(d) Documents captured did not indicate the presence of NVA units. The C-219th Local Force company and the 120th company, however were confirmed.

(5) Captured weapons and equipment were generally in fair-to-good condition; abundance of captured ammunition and the large volume of fire encountered during contacts with the enemy established the fact that ammunition resupply is no problem. The DUC PHO District Army Advisor is compiling a list of weapon serial numbers issued to PF units and the names of PF soldiers. In the future VC KIA and captured weapons will be checked against these lists to determine possible VC influence in the PF units.

(6) The District Operational Intelligence Center (DOIC) was established and became operational on 15 March. All results of enemy contacts and sightings are passed to the DOIC to process all intelligence from Vietnamese sources in an effort to make more intelligent evaluations. In addition, ITT reports are utilized in conjunction with captured documents to establish the validity and reliability of Vietnamese sources.

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(7) Periodic checks indicate that the Vietnamese are convinced USMC presence in the DUC PHO area will continue and that greater and greater security will result.

(8) One significant report from detainees indicated the presence on 13 March at BS 864339 of 50 Vietnamese who spoke with a northern dialect and wore yellow stars on their shirts. This report has not been confirmed by an independent source.

(9) Reports from higher authority, National Police and other sources have indicated that the coastline of the DUC PHO area used extensively by VC forces to infiltrate military supplies from the area. All intelligence sources are aware of REI's relating to these reports and surveillance of the coastal beaches is maintained by ground and aerial observers.

d. Training. During March, formal training consisted of 1) Classroom instructions on the nomenclature and functioning of the M-16E1 rifle; familiarization firing of the M-16E1 rifle. By 31 March, approximately 90 percent of personnel in the battalion had received the required instruction on the M-16E1. Battalion supply anticipated issuing the weapons to the battalion commencing on 1 April, to be completed by 7 April. 2) Orientation and indoctrination lectures to newly assigned personnel.

e. Special Operations. Operation DESOTO continued through March. Frequent company and platoon size sweeps were conducted; extensive small unit patrols and ambushes continued.

f. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, or other Special types of warfare. None

g. Command and Control. During March, 3rd Bn, 7th Marines was under the operational control of Task Force A-Ray and under the administrative control of the 7th Marines. The battalion passed OPCOM of Co. F, 2nd Bn, 7th Marines to its parent organization, and assumed OPCOM of Co. G, 2nd Bn, 7th Marines at 290845 March. LTCOL M.J. BROMARS was in command throughout the month.

h. Close Combat. The battalion was in contact with the enemy throughout the reporting period.

i. Fire Support. Battery I, 3rd Bn 11th Marines continued to deliver timely and accurate indirect fire in support of the battalion during March. A substantial increase in artillery firepower resulted on 25 March with the addition of one platoon of 155mm (towed) howitzers from Battery K, 4th Bn, 11th Marines and one platoon of 107mm mortars from Whiskey Battery, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines. Both additions to the artillery capability are located at NUI DANG.

Ammunition expenditures for the month of March were as follows:

	105mm HOWITZER	107mm(HOWITZER)	155mm HOWITZER	NGF
HE	8875	324	251	3,819
WP	1231	25	19	76
ILLUM	632	39	16	4
HE(FUSE VI)	356			152

Battery I fired a total of 346 missions, 298 of which were observed. They resulted in 26 VC KIA(Conf) 74 VC KIA(Prob), 17 VC KIA(Prob) and extensive structural damage to fortified hamlets in the DUC PHO area. On 24 March, despite heavy incoming enemy mortar and recoilless rifle fire, the battery delivered effective counter-battery fire on suspected VC firing positions within 3 minutes of the attack.

Naval gunfire support continued to be used extensively throughout the battalion area of responsibility in support of maneuvering elements and ground and air observers. Ships supporting the battalion during March were the U.S.S. Turner Joy (DD951), U.S.S. Ozburn (DD846), U.S.S. Fechteler (DD 870) and the U.S.S. White River (LSMR 530).

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### 1. Logistics

(1) During March, the resupply of combat essential items to rifle companies continued without significant problems. The rate of supply delivery to the DUC PHO LSA during March decreased from the February rate; coordinated operations with the 1st BN, 5th Marines and the Special Landing Force required a greater build-up of supplies during February as these units were also resupplied from the DUC PHO LSA. By 31 March, days of supply in terms of one battalion were:

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>DAYS OF SUPPLY</u>
I	10
II	6
III	20
IV	10
V	5

FLSE-Bravo continued to be responsible for accountability of supply dumps. 3rd Shore Party Co. continued to provide helicopter support teams to the rifle companies. The control and movement of supplies and equipment from the LSF and from the QUANG BINH LSA to NUI DANH.

(2) On 21 March and 26 March 3/7 units provided security for engineer road reconnaissance from the coast 1 beach south of NUI DANH (GS 849391) to NUI DANH. The initial engineer evaluation indicated that a fair-weather road from vicinity GS 8030 west-northwest to the NUI DANH base camp area would be constructed without significant difficulty. Sites for six bridges were considered along the route, but improving or existing spans or constructing by-passes apparently would present no serious problem. The 1st Engineer Battalion submitted a detailed report to higher headquarters.

(3) The following supplies and equipment were lost during the Viet Cong mortar and recoilless rifle attack against the 3/7 CP on 24 March; 40,000 gallons of kerosene; 23,000 gallons of JP-4, 7,000 gallons of aviation gasoline, one complete tactical fuel dispensing system and one pallet of white star parachute flares. 12 tents were also damaged.

### A. Air Defense-None

#### 1. Close Air Support

Fixed-wing aircraft strikes continued to be used extensively during the month of March. Fixed-wing aircraft conducted preparation and supporting strikes when requested. The nature of targets continued to be cancelled VC forces and VC fortified positions. Close air support aircraft were controlled by forward air controllers, aerial observers and tactical air controllers airborne. Maj 11, Maj 12, and Maj 13 provided the fixed wing support and flew a total of 270 attack missions: a decrease of 50 percent of the total missions flown during February. 23 missions were flown by aerial observers and ops ops aircraft in support of operations. Additional detail relative to close air support missions in support of Operation BERSO-10 are covered in paragraph 3.

### B. Civil Affairs/Military Government/Community Relations/Pacification

(1) On 13 and 14 March 3/7 conducted operations west of DUC PHO to provide security for refugees by locating the 1st LOI (2) hamlet complex vicinity GS 763390. Approximately 2,000 refugees from DUC PHO District were permitted to return to the contested hamlet area to recover personal belongings. Many Vietnamese, under Marine protection, were also permitted to leave Viet Cong control in that area and return to the refuge of DUC PHO District. Additional details are provided in paragraph 3.

(2) On 20 March, work began on 50 additional refugee units in the refuge.

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village near DUC Pao District headquarters. The construction of two fish ponds in the village is supervised by Revolutionary Development Cadre. The ponds will be stocked with prolific Holbrooks fish.

(3) Material distributed to DUC Pao villages during March included: 135 pounds of clothing, 500 pounds of powdered milk, 800 pounds of rice, 400 sheets of tin roofing, 60 bags of cement, 2 carpentry kits, 1 masonry kit, 130 pounds of soap and 192 bottles of oral antiseptic.

(4) A new DUC Pao Joint Coordinating Committee was formed during March. The committee consists of representatives of both USMC civil affairs teams and DUC Pao District officials. It was founded to coordinate the efforts of 3/7 and the citizens of DUC Pao in local civil affairs projects; it also serves as a forum to discuss problems.

### 3. Command's Narrative of Significant Events

a. Third 5th Marines continued Operation DASO in the DUC Pao area by conducting daily search and destroy operations while maintaining and improving the base camp/LSA area at 031600Z and positions of MUI Da. A coordinated operation with the Special Landing Force, 1st and 5th Marines and participants from 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions units was terminated at 031600Z March. Throughout the reporting period, contact with smaller guerrilla and elements of local forces/MIL Force VC units continued. During March contacts with smaller, fragmented VC units and fled USMC objective areas were more frequent while contacts with VC who defended hamlets from prepared positions were fewer than in February. By 31 March approximately 75 per cent of the hamlets in the assigned area of responsibility had been covered by ground forces conducting search and destroy operations. Only the southwestern portion of this area west of Grid Line 85 and south of Grid Line 33, and a northeastern portion east of Grid Line 82 and north of the SWM 12, 01 had not been searched by 3/7 units. Those areas were objectives of the Special Landing Force during February and intelligence did not support conducting priority operations in the southwest and northeast. Most enemy casualties during February resulted from small unit actions. Reconnaissance units operating in the hills to the west, and other ground and aerial observers continued to report frequent enemy movement; whenever possible supporting arms were directed against such targets with good results. Fleeting targets of opportunity based on intelligence largely supplied by reports from the DUC Pao District Chief were selectively engaged with MIL fires, radar controlled aerial bombing (A-10), and aircraft strikes. Coordinated combat operations and local civic action with Vietnamese district forces were more frequent as liaison with the district headquarters continued to improve.

Cumulative casualties for Operation DASO through 312400Z were:

USMC	VC
MIA 56	MIA (Conf) 336
DOW 8	MIA (Prob) 652
WFA 542	LA (Prob) 137
	Detainees 171

### 4. Significant activities are described chronologically.

(1) On 2 March, 06 L and Co 1277 executed a helicopter assault to a landing zone on the beach at SS 87057 to begin a thorough search and destroy operation of the coastal hamlets north of MUI Da and south of MUI CUN (hill 103). Utilizing airborne and ground ps-war broadcasts, the units commenced a 2-company sweep toward MUI CUN; this VC stronghold and observation post was seized on 3 March while pressing an assault on VC positions at the eastern base of the

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hill along the sea coast, Co L killed three hamlet guerillas at BS 853401 and captured 20 detainees; all were young males of military age who wore black pajamas, and were discovered hiding in natural caves, crevices and among rocks along the waters edge; two M-16 rifles, one Mossin-Nagant rifle, 7.62 ammunition and several ChiCom grenades were captured. While continuing in a deliberate sweep of VC hiding places in and around BUI CUA, Co L killed two more VC at BS 853399 and captured an M-1 rifle and equipment. Co A, providing observation and blocking forces west of BUI CUA discovered a rice cache during a routine search of a masonry structure at BS 842386. The rice was stored in 8 caskets, four 55-gallon drums and gunny sacks. Co F, which later occupied position on BUI CUA continued search and destroy operations in the hamlets south of BUI CUA and on 5 March engaged an estimated platoon of VC who wore khaki uniforms and helmets and who were armed with 7.2 rifles. Before the enemy broke contact, elements of Co. F killed 2 VC KIA (Conf) and 7 VC KIA (Prob) in a trenchline at BS 849304.

(2) At 051400H, a maneuvering fire team of a squad (Rain) patrol of Co I surprised a group of VC in a trenchline at BS 841323. The fire team and squad assaulted the VC positions killing six VC KIA (Conf) with 7.62mm and hand grenades before the remaining VC broke contact and fled into brush areas.

(3) A two-company sweep of the VIAM SAUOC (1) and (2) hamlet complex vicinity BS 8330 resulted in 8 VC KIA (Conf), and 5 VC KIA (Prob) on 10 March, elements of Co K sweeping westward at BS 831366 received approximately 300 rounds of small arms fire from an estimated 20 VC in fortified positions. Co K engaged the VC force and pressed the assault through the position killing 3 VC KIA (Conf) and 5 VC KIA (Prob). The lead element of Co M, moving northward toward Co K's surprised 5 VC exiting from a bunker at BS 832301, killing 5 VC KIA (Conf), capturing 10 ChiCom grenades, documents and one U.S. Carbine.

(4) At 110045, a squad patrol of Co L flanked a VC sniper position wounded and capturing his M-1 rifle. The VC was a hamlet guerilla from THANH BINH (1), vicinity BS 847380.

(5) On 14 and 15 March, Co M, Co K and Co F 2/7 participated in an operation in the VIAM LAC hamlet complex in grid squares BS 7338 and BS 7639; DUC PHO District 2nd units participated. Requested by the District Chief, the operation permitted over 2,000 refugees to recover personal belongings such as foodstuffs and draft animals from their former homes in these contested hamlet areas. 3rd units established security along a route from the village complex to DUC PHO District headquarters. Security was established around the village complexes to allow the villagers freedom of movement and to deny the goods, rice and cattle to the VC. It became apparent that GVA/AS had indeed made a good deal of progress toward gaining the support and confidence of the people in the DUC PHO area as a result of the operation. Toward the end of each day's security mission VC forces began to harass the moving column of refugees, but attempts failed as USMC units engaged the VC forces with both small arms and supporting arms.

(6) On 16 March while conducting S&D operations eastward in the BINH LUU hamlet complex in grid squares BS 7736, 7737, and 7837, Co F 1/27 came under heavy automatic weapons fire from an undetermined number of VC. Moving east into the hamlet area at BS 741375 with Co K supporting from positions on the highroad to the northwest, Co F received fire from BS 781309 and BS 775373. Co F engaged the VC with a heavy volume of small arms fire and called in approximately 200 rounds of artillery on target areas while directing Un-1B suppressive fires and fixed-wing air strikes. Two VC automatic weapons positions were destroyed and 9 VC KIA (Conf) by aircraft at BS 781369. Medical evacuation helicopters received slight battle damage.

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damage. Co F killed 7 VC KIA(Prob) in the action. USMC casualties totaled 7 KIA, 1 DOW, and 5 WIA (EVACUATED). Co K moving south into the hamlet at BS 777373 killed one VC KIA(Conf) and two VC KIA(Prob) while sweeping the area, to the rear of Co F units.

(7) At 240050 March, the 3/7 CP and LSA at NUI DAMG came under attack from 60mm and 82mm mortars and 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles; incoming rounds totaled between 200 and 250. Previously planned counter-mortar and counter-battery concentrations were fired at observed muzzle flashes within minutes of the attack. Two gun pits of Battery I received direct hits; the Tactical Fuel Dispensing System, and mogas and aviation gasoline dumps in the LSA were destroyed by fire. Fixed-wing strikes and artillery fire were directed on VC firing positions and escape routes after the attack; a deliberate search of areas having been used to locate enemy supporting arms positions was made on 24 March; thirty-six 75mm AR canisters and firing positions for both recoilless rifles and 82mm mortars were found. These positions had been thoroughly covered during counter-battery fires. Information from Provincial Reconnaissance Units indicated the VC were armed with automatic weapons, local villagers were forced to bear ammunition, and twelve recoilless rifles were used in the attack.

(8) Acting on an intelligence report from DUC PHO District that stated a small VC unit was hiding in a canefield at BS 831349, elements of Co G searched the area killing one VC KIA(Conf), detaining one VC, and capturing one U.S. carbine.

(9) At 271420H March, the U.S.S. Ozbourn (DD 846) lying offshore north of NUI OUA received approximately 18 rounds of recoilless rifle fire from VC positions at BS 835427. Supporting arms were brought to bear on the VC positions. There was no damage to the destroyer.

(10) On 27 March, Co K conducted a search and destroy operation of DONG THUAN, vicinity of BS 845354; the Vietnamese village chief and national police representatives accompanied Co K on the operation. Co G/2/7 established blocking positions to the west and both ground and airborne psywar broadcasts were made; villagers were warned that USMC forces had surrounded the hamlet and that they were to remain in the area near their houses. When VC suspects were seen slipping into the water (DAM LAM BINH) vicinity of BS 839350, they were warned again by fire and loudspeaker. While screening the DONG THUAN villagers, initially, Co K apprehended 3 detainees. Continuing its sweep, Co K apprehended 13 suspected VC hiding in a bunker at BS 842351. Moving southeast, searching the bank of the promontory, 3 more suspects were detained. UE-IE helicopters supporting the operation by observation, noted approximately 30 VC hiding in the shallow water and swamp area at BS 845340. They were observed under water breathing through bamboo and camouflaged with the moss; they also used sampans for hiding places. The helicopters strafed the VC in and under the water to force them toward shore. After each strafing run some VC returned to shore and were captured by Co K. This process continued until all the VC were either killed or captured. As a result, 23 VC were killed and a total of 30 VC flushed from their concealed positions. The preliminary interrogation of 49 detainees apprehended from the action resulted in identifying 8 hamlet guerillas, 5 hamlet political cadre and 36 civil dependents. All males captured or killed were of military age, well-fed and in excellent physical condition.

(11) On 30 March Co G/2/7, moving to establish night positions at BS 767370 during a search and destroy operation west of NUI DAMG, received a heavy volume of small arms fire from approximately 30 VC in concealed positions at BS 766364. The leading elements of Co G engaged the VC at hand grenade range, killing

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ing 4 VC (Cont) and 5 VC KIA (Prob). While searching area after the VC broke contact and fled into the foliage, Co G captured one M-1 rifle, one U.S. Carbine, one BAR, cartridge belts, ammunition, miscellaneous items of equipment and numerous documents. Artillery and fixed-wing strikes were directed on likely VC escape routes.

(12) At 301905Z March, Co G/2/7, utilizing fixed-wing strikes in support of its movement to nighttime positions following the action described in para (11) above, suffered four KIA and 19 WIA when an attack aircraft, controlled by a FAC, dropped rocket ordnance on its position.

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Annex A (Task Organization) to Op Order 1-67 (Revised)

Time Zone: Hotel

3RD BN (Rein), 7TH MARINES

H&S Co(-)  
 4th Sect, 81mm Mort Plt, H&S Co.  
 2nd Bn, 7th Marines  
 Det, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines (ARTY Ln)  
 Det, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines (NGF Ln)  
 Det, Hq Bn  
 Det, 9th ITF, FMF  
 Det, 7th CIT, FMF  
 Det, Civafns Unit (AA)  
 Sqd, MP Co.  
 Det, MASS 3  
 Det, 7th Comm Bn (RR Tm)  
 Det, Scout Sniper Plt, 7th Marines  
 Ctr Plt (Rein), Co D, 1st Med Bn  
 Co C(-), 1st SP Bn  
 2nd Plt(-); C Co, 1st Engr Bn  
 LSA, FLSG-BRAVO  
 3rd Plt, B Co, 1st Antitank Bn

LT RICHARDS

Co I (REIN)

AC Tm  
 Det, H&S, C Co, 1st SP Bn  
 PO Tm, Btry I, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines  
 PO Tm, 81mm Mort Plt, H&S Co  
 Tm, 2nd Plt, C Co, 1st Engr Bn  
 3rd Sect, 81mm Mort Plt, H&S Co  
 2nd Sect, 106RR Plt, H&S Co.  
 Det, Hq Btry, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines (NGF Spot Tm)

CAPT CLARK

Co K (REIN)

AC Tm  
 Det, H&S, C Co., 1st SP Bn  
 PO Tm, 81mm Mort Plt, H&S  
 PO Tm, Btry I, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines  
 Tm, 2nd Plt, C Co, 1st Engr Bn  
 Det, Hq Btry, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines  
 (NGF Spot Tm)

LT JONES

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Enclosure (2)

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CONF

Co L (REIN)

Det, HST C Co, 1st SP Bn

PAC Tm

FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plt, H&S Co

FO Tm, Btry I, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines

EM, 2nd Plt C Co, 1st Engr Bn

Det, Hq Btry, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines

(AGF Spot Tm)

Light Sect, 3rd Plt, B Co, 1st Anti-tank Bn

Co M (REIN)

PAC Tm

Det, HST C Co, 1st OP Bn

FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plt, H&S

FO Tm, Btry I, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines

EM, 2nd Plt, C Co, 1st Engr Bn

Co G, 2ND BN, 7TH MARINES

Det, HST C Co 1st SP Bn

FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plt, H&S z/7

FO Tm, Btry A, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines

EM, 2nd Plt, C Co, 1st Engr Bn

Btry I, 3RD BN, 11TH MARINES

Btry I

Plt, Btry K, 4th Bn, 11th Marines

Plt, Whiskey Btry, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines

Co D(-), Det, 1st Recon Bn

1st Plt (Rein) A Co, 1st Tank Bn

1st PLATE

CAPT CROSS

CAPT WILSON

CAPT MORGAN

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