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2 DEC 1966~~SECRET~~ - Unclassified upon removal of basic correspondenceSECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG, 3rdMarDiv ltr 3/MRS/das 5750.1
Ser: 003B256-66 dtd 20 September 1966From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)Subj: Command Chronology of the 3rd Marine Division for
the month of August 1966 (U)

1. Forwarded.

W. E. Barrineau
W. E. BARRINEAU
By direction

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Ser 00137966

10 Oct 66

00137966

~~SECRET~~ - Unclassified upon removal of basic correspondence

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG, 3dMarDiv ltr 3/MRS /das 5750.1 Ser: 003B256-66
of 20Sep66

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology of the 3d Marine Division for the month of August
1966 (U)

1. Forwarded.

J. R. Chaisson
J. R. CHAISSON
By direction

Copy to:
CG, 3dMarDiv (Rein) FMP

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3D MARINE DIVISION FMF (-) (REIN)



COMMAND CHRONOLOGY for the month of AUGUST 1966

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco 96602

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3/MRS/das
5750.1
Ser: 003B256-66
20 September 1966

~~_____~~ (Unclassified when enclosure (1) is removed)

From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology of the 3d Marine Division for the month of August 1966 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) CG FMFPAC msg 251942Z Aug 1965

Encl: (1) 3d Marine Division Command Chronology for the period 1-31 August 1966 with supporting documents
(2) List of supporting documents

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosures (1) and (2) are submitted.

2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

J. B. Sweeney
J. B. SWEENEY
Chief of Staff

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ORGANIZATION DATA

THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR THE PERIOD 1 AUGUST 1966 TO 31 AUGUST 1966

SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 1966

FROM THE DIVISION COMMAND POST BUNKER (AT 957751)

DANANG, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

COMMANDING GENERAL

MAJOR GENERAL WOOD B. KYLE, U. S. MARINE CORPS

ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER

BRIGADIER GENERAL LOWELL E. ENGLISH, U. S. MARINE CORPS

CHIEF OF STAFF

COLONEL JOHN B. SWEENEY, USMC

GENERAL STAFF

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1 COLONEL JOHN P. LANIGAN, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2 COLONEL THOMAS M. HORNE, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3 COLONEL WILLIAM F. DOEHLER, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4 COLONEL ROBERT M. RICHARDS, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5 LIEUTENANT COLONEL EDWARD H. MACKEL, USMC (1-3 AUGUST)
COLONEL EDWARD R. MCCARTHY, USMC (4-31 AUGUST)

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, COMPTROLLER, LIEUTENANT COLONEL ARTHUR T. HILL, USMC

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Headquarters Battalion	Col Robert M. JENKINS, USMC
1st Marine Regiment	Col Bryan B. MITCHELL, USMC (1-18 August) Col Donald L. MALLORY, USMC (19-31 August)
3d Marine Regiment	Col Harold A. HAYES, Jr. USMC (1-18 August) Col Edward E. HAMMERBECK, USMC (19-31 August)
4th Marine Regiment	Col Alexander D. CEREGHINO, USMC
9th Marine Regiment	Col Drew J. BARRETT, Jr. USMC
12th Marine Regiment	Col Benjamin S. READ, USMC
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion	LtCol William D. POMEROY, USMC (1-5 August) Maj Walter W. DAMEWOOD, USMC (6-31 August)
3d Anti-Tank Battalion	Maj Eddie R. LARSON, USMC (1-16 August) Maj Karl E. SHARFF, USMC (17 August) Maj Donald E. NEWTON, USMC (18-31 August)
3d Engineer Battalion	Maj Charles D. WOOD, USMC
3d Medical Battalion	Cdr John T. VINCENT (MC), USN
3d Motor Transport Battalion	LtCol Freddie J. BAKER, USMC (1-5 August) LtCol Edwin W. KILLIAN, USMC (6-23 August) Maj Richard F. ARMSTRONG, USMC (24-31 August)
3d Reconnaissance Battalion	Maj Gary WILDER, USMC
3d Shore Party Battalion	Maj Thomas W. JONES, USMC
3d Tank Battalion	LtCol Milton L. RAPHAEL, USMC (1-2 August) Maj James G. DOSS, USMC (3-31 August)

Enclosure (1)

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AVERAGE STRENGTH DURING AUGUST

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
HqBn	185	1312
1st Mar	118	3040
3d Mar	134	3335
4th Mar	130	3153
9th Mar	116	2963
12th Mar	187	2287
1st AmTrac Bn	30	491
3d AT Bn	22	337
3d Engr Bn	31	760
3d Med Bn	47	344
3d MT Bn	18	242
3d Recon Bn	17	345
3d SP Bn	23	366
3d TK Bn	<u>41</u>	<u>528</u>
TOTAL	1099	19503

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PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION1. Personnel and Administration

a. Casualties sustained during the month included: 65 KIA, 518 WIA, 10 DOW, and 22 NHI.

b. During the period, 86 officers and 1669 enlisted personnel joined the Division. In addition, 98 officers and 1546 enlisted personnel were transferred by service records.

c. Awards presented: 30 Silver Stars, 8 Legion of Merit Medals, 104 Bronze Stars, 88 Navy Commendation Medals, 16 Secretary of the Navy Commendation For Achievement Awards, 523 Purple Hearts, and 12 Vietnamese Crosses of Gallantry. Recommendations for medals included: 26 Silver Stars, 17 Legion of Merit Medals, 2 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 1 Navy and Marine Corps Medal, 103 Bronze Stars, 3 Air Medals, 92 Navy Commendation Medals, 12 Secretary of the Navy Commendation For Achievement Awards, and 70 Vietnamese Crosses of Gallantry.

d. Discharges: 3 Hardship Discharges approved, 2 Unfitness Discharges disapproved, 3 Unfitness Discharges pending, and 2 Unsuitable Discharges approved.

2. Field Exchanges. An exchange branch was established at Dong Ha stocked with health and comfort items.

3. Special Services

a. A portable boxing ring has been purchased for use by Division units on a temporary loan basis.

b. GED testing remains suspended. The law aptitude test was administered to four officers. Two USAFI end of course examinations were administered during the month.

c. The Hill 327 Amphitheater opened 14 August. Over 3000 persons attended the opening. Excellent entertainment was provided by the 3d Marine Division Band. Mr. Arthur Godfrey was present at the opening and made a brief speech. On 15 August Arthur Godfrey visited the 3d Medical Bn and the 3d Engineer Mine Warfare School. At the 3d Medical Bn he was escorted through the wards, where he spoke with the patients. At the Mine Warfare School, he was shown through the Demonstration Area and allowed to detonate a captured VC mine.

d. The number of personnel who participated in the R&R program was as follows:

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<u>PLACE VISITED</u>	<u>NO. OF PERSONNEL</u>
Okinawa	378
Hong Kong	108
Bangkok	248
Taipei	158
Tokyo	237
Manila	55
Singapore	67
Penang	25
Kuala Lumpur	55
Hawaii	51
TOTAL	<u>1382</u>

e. A total of 7824 radiograms were sent and received, and 597 phone patches were placed from the Division MARS station during the month of August. Approximately 50 radio phone patches to the United States were placed for patients at the 3d Medical Battalion during the month.

4. Information Services

a. The section continued press coverage of the 3d Marine Division activities, releasing 124 news and feature releases through the Force Information Office, III Marine Amphibious Force. Also a total of 3,902 hometown releases were sent to the Fleet Home Town News Center, Great Lakes, Ill.

b. The most significant operational coverage during the month of August was for Operations Allegheny, Macon, Prairie and Pawnee.

c. Other coverage during the month included the Arthur Godfrey visit, civil affairs programs, human interest stories, unique incidents throughout the 3d Marine Division and personal experiences of Marines involved in combat against the Viet Cong.

d. A total of 1126 minutes and 5 seconds of tape recorded air time was produced by the Radio-TV Section during August. This breaks down to 258 minutes and 5 seconds from 35 recorded features, and 868 minutes from 217 hometown recorded interviews.

5. Postal

a. Postal facilities were established at Dong Ha to provide postal services for organizations concerned.

b. The Directory Section readdressed and forwarded approximately 1,461 pounds of airmail and 22,657 pounds of all other classes of mail, for a total of 24,118 pounds processed during the 31 day period covered by this report.

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c. The following figures represent pounds of U. S. mail this command received and dispatched during August 1966:

<u>AREA</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>DISPATCHED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Danang	650,961	277,835	928,796
Phu Bai	<u>31,886</u>	<u>31,659</u>	<u>63,545</u>
Total	682,847	309,494	992,341

d. During August 1966, air letter mail was not received at Danang on August 2nd and 25th. Phu Bai area did not receive air letter mail on August 1, 4, 8, 10, 12, 16, 22, 24, 25, and 31st. However, this mail was received along with the next day's mail in all cases.

e. The Rewrap Section of the Division Post Office handled 239 parcels, which were damaged to the extent that further handling would result in loss of contents unless rewrapped. Minor repairs were made to numerous other parcels which required only temporary reinforcement to permit further dispatch to the addressee.

6. Band

a. During the month the band provided music for 5 change of command ceremonies, 2 honor guards, and 3 awards presentations.

b. The band played 9 concerts at military installations and gave a concert on 21 August for patients aboard the hospital ship USS REPOSE.

c. Participated in 5 Civil Affairs concerts and 4 County Fairs.

d. The band participated in a variety show on 14 August with Arthur Godfrey as Host.

7. Division Clubs

a. One additional enlisted club was opened during the month.

b. The following items were purchased on Okinawa for the clubs system:

1 Motor Vehicle, 1963 Plymouth Sedan, from salvage
 1 Truck Engine, 1963 Chevrolet
 2 Refrigerators
 2 Tape Recorders

c. Repairs to all inoperable coolers were completed during the month.

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8. Provost Marshal

a. Military Policemen accompanied the Vietnamese National Police, CAC, and QCs on a joint sweep of Hoa Phat Village and Hoa Phat Loop Village.

b. Joint patrols with the National Police operated at the Danang Air Base, Da Son, and Hoa Phat.

INTELLIGENCE

1. Operation BUCKS. This operation was conducted in the south east portion of the Danang TAOR vicinity of (BT 0867). Intelligence information indicated the presence of the Q.16 Local Force Company operating in this area. Operation BUCKS was conducted during the period 02-08Aug. During the course of the operation no large enemy units were encountered and enemy activity was limited primarily to sniper type harassment fire. Total enemy losses during the operation were 4 VC KIA (Conf), 1 KIA (Prob) and 17 VCS.
2. Operation WILCOX. This operation was conducted by elements of the 9th Marines in southern portion of the Danang TAOR vicinity of (AT 9861). Intelligence information indicated the presence of VC Main Force and Local Force units in this area. Operation WILCOX was conducted during the period 11-12 August 1966. During the course of the operation no large enemy units were encountered. Total enemy losses during operation WILCOX were 1 KIA (Conf), 2 KIA (Prob), 7 VCC and 12 VCS.
3. Operation SWANNEE. This operation was a Naval River Survey, conducted in the southern portion of the TAOR from the South China Sea (BT 2157) west to vicinity (AT 8447). Intelligence information indicated possible harassment by local force units including the R 20 Battalion operating in this vicinity. Operation SWANNEE was conducted during the period 14 to 21 August. During the course of the operation no large enemy units were encountered. Indications were that the enemy had no intention of interfering with the Survey as most enemy contacts occurred in areas adjacent to the river. Total enemy losses during the operation were 63 KIA (Conf), 3 KIA (Prob), 2 VCC, 21 VCS and 1 weapon captured.
4. Operation OTTAWA. This operation was conducted in the area east of the Phu Bai TAOR vicinity (YD 9614). Intelligence information gained from an agent report indicated that two U. S. Army advisors who were captured on 12 August were being held in the hamlet of Lam Bo (YD 961143). Operation OTTAWA was conducted during the period 20-22 August 1966. During the course of the operation no large enemy units were encountered and the rescue of the advisors was unsuccessful. Total enemy losses during the operation were 2 KIA (Conf), 1 KIA (Prob) and 6 VCS.
5. Operation ALLEGHENY. This operation was conducted in the southwest portion of the Danang TAOR. Intelligence information received from Recon Teams indicated the presence of an enemy base area and possibly a battalion size force in the area. A NVA rallier on 10 June stated that the Danang City 402d Sapper Battalion was located in this vicinity (AT 8060). Operation ALLEGHENY was conducted during the period 20 to 29 August. During the course of the operation, contact with the enemy was sporadic with the largest contact being made with a reinforced platoon size unit. Multiple large and well developed base areas were discovered. Captured documents, weapons and equipment including a scale "mock up" of a 105 Howitzer tends to confirm the presence of a well

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trained highly disciplined Main Force Sapper unit composed of both NVA and VC troops. Total VC losses during the operation were 113 KIA (Conf), 210 KIA (Prob), and 5 weapons captured.

6. Operation PAWNEE. This operation was conducted in the Phu Loc area vicinity (ZD 1000). Agent reports indicated the presence of elements of the 95B NVA Regiment and elements of the 810th Local Force Battalion in this vicinity. Operation PAWNEE was conducted during the period 26 August to 6 September 1966. During the course of the operation no large enemy units were encountered, which tends to substantiate the withdrawal of these enemy units prior to or during the operation. Total enemy losses during the operation were 9 enemy KIA (Conf), 6 enemy KIA (Prob), 5 VCS, and 1 weapon captured.

7. The 3rd Interrogation-Translation Team supported Operation BUCKS from 3 to 6 August. Support was also given to three County Fair Operations; 1/3 County Fair on 4-5 August, 1/9 County Fair on 11 August and 1/3 County Fair on 16 August. The team supported a 2/1 operation on 22-23 August and a 1/1 operation on 30 August. During the month the team interrogated 300 Viet Cong Suspects of which 219 had Viet Cong associations.

8. The Document Translation Section of the 3rd Interpreter Team reviewed 37 batches of documents with 232 total documents.

9. The 3rd Counterintelligence Team conducted 86 interrogations of Viet Cong or Viet Cong suspects during the month. Immediate reaction to information obtained during interrogation of a confirmed Viet Cong along with his willingness to cooperate with Marines, led to the killing of 2 Viet Cong and capture of 10. Members of the Team participated in one County Fair Operation and one search and clear operation. Four special inquiries were made and the Team is continuing surveillance of the Danang Air Force Base Perimeter.

10. Total enemy losses inflicted by Marines for the month of August exclusive of designated operations were 175 KIA (Conf), 94 KIA (Prob) and 16 Viet Cong captured.

OPERATIONS

1. General. A total of 8,697 offensive actions were conducted during the month of August, resulting in 674 contacts with the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese. Weather conditions were generally favorable for the conduct of offensive operations throughout the division area of operations with the exception of heavy late afternoon and evening rains in the northern portion of Quang Tri Province. The Division conducted eight major operations during the month. These were operations MACON, BUCKS, PRAIRIE, WILSON, SWANNEE, ALLEGHENY, OTTAWA and PAWNEE. Of these MACON, PAWNEE and PRAIRIE are continuing into the month of September. A brief summary of the major operations follows:

a. MACON. Operation MACON is a multi-battalion "Search and Destroy" operation being conducted in the Hu Hoa-Baren area of Quang Nam, with the mission of destroying enemy forces, facilities and influence in that area. The operation has been conducted from 4 July through 31 August and is continuing into September 1966. The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, commanded by Major F. J. MACLEAN is the participating unit and the 9th Marines commanded by Colonel Drew J. BARRETT is the control Headquarters. Enemy contact was sporadic during August with no major engagements. The results through 31 August were:

Friendly Casualties:	<u>KIA</u> 13	<u>WIA</u> 62	
Enemy Casualties:	<u>KIA(Conf)</u> 217	<u>KIA(Prob)</u> 336	<u>VCC</u> 2
Weapons Captured:	10		

b. BUCKS. A "Search and Clear Operation" in vicinity of BT 0867 to clear VC elements remaining in the area. The area was cordoned off and infantry units including a Company of the 51st ARVN Regt conducted a sweep from 2-8 August 1966. Incidents consisted mainly of discovering punji pits, (booby trapped), caves, and mines which were all destroyed. Final results were:

Friendly Casualties:	<u>KIA</u> 2	<u>WIA</u> 4	
Enemy Casualties:	<u>KIA(Conf)</u> 4	<u>KIA(Prob)</u> 1	<u>VCS</u> 17

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c. PRAIRIE. PRAIRIE is a "Recon in Force Operation" in the same area as Operation HASTINGS, vicinity YD 1258. The operation commenced when HASTINGS secured on 3 August 1966 and is continuing. During the conduct of the operation by the 4th Marine Regiment in the area of Dong Ha, Cam Lo, Quang Tri Province, frequent small unit contacts were made with North Vietnamese Army Units. Combined USMC / ARVN Tank Infantry Operations were conducted to clear areas along route 9 and north from Cam Lo to the Con Thien outpost vicinity YD 113706. The NVA mortar and infantry attacks on night defensive positions experienced during HASTINGS continued but the frequency of such attacks diminished considerably. One such attack on 1/4 while defending Cam Lo during the night of 25-26 August was extremely costly to the NVA in casualties to personnel, (73 KIA) and equipment captured, (approximately 40 weapons). Final results were:

Friendly Casualties:	<u>KIA</u> 37	<u>WIA</u> 135		
Enemy Casualties:	<u>KIA(Conf)</u> 213	<u>KIA(Prob)</u> 316	<u>VCC</u> 1	<u>RETURNEE</u> 1
Weapons Captured:	72			

d. WILCOX. WILCOX a "Clearing Operation" during 11-12 August, vicinity AT 9861, Quang Nam Province met with only harrassing small arms fire. 1st and 9th Marine Regiments provided blocking forces, and 2 Companies swept the area. Final results were:

Friendly Casualties:	<u>WIA</u> 2			
Enemy Casualties:	<u>KIA(Conf)</u> 1	<u>KIA(Prob)</u> 2	<u>VCC</u> 7	<u>VCS</u> 12

e. SWANNEE. This operation conducted between 14-21 August provided security for a Naval River Survey of the river Coa Da, Hoi An, Cau Lau, Dien Binh, Ky Lam, Thu Bon, from the South China Sea vicinity BT 2157 to the An Hoa Industrial Complex vicinity AT 845473. Units of the 1st and 9th Marine Regiments conducted clearing operations in an area approximately 1 km from the banks of the river as the survey progressed. Enemy contact was light and the VC did not make an effort to stop the survey. Final results were:

Friendly Casualties:	<u>KIA</u> 5	<u>WIA</u> 13		
Enemy Casualties:	<u>KIA(Conf)</u> 63	<u>KIA(Prob)</u> 3	<u>VCC</u> 2	<u>VCS</u> 21
Weapons Captured:	1			

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f. ALLEGHENY. This operation, a combination "Recon in Force" and "Search and Destroy" vicinity AT 8361 was conducted during the period 20-29 August 1966 by 2/3. Recon personnel familiar with the area assisted infantry units in locating VC base camps and training area. Contact was sporadic with the VC mortaring USMC positions and in one instance, an estimated VC platoon attacked a platoon of G/2/3. When the VC base camp was cleared and destroyed, units involved returned to their positions ~~over~~ land conducting "Search and Destroy" along the north bank of the river Vu Gia. Final results were:

Friendly Casualties: KIA WIA
 7 59

Enemy Casualties: KIA(Conf) KIA(Prob)
 113 210

g. OTTAWA. Conducted between 20-22 August in Thua Thien Province vicinity YD 9614 was an attempt to recover two U. S. Army Advisors the VC had captured and were exhibiting in different villages in the area. Marine units searched two villages which had been reported as possible locations of the Advisors, but attempts to locate the missing personnel were unsuccessful. Final results were:

Friendly Casualties: WIA
 2

Enemy Casualties: KIA(Conf) KIA(Prob) VCS
 2 1 6

h. PAWNEE. A "Search and Clear" in the Phu Loc area vicinity ZD 1000, Thua Thien Province, commenced on 26 August and is continuing. It is designed to clear the area north of the Danang TAOR, and secure Highway 1, the main road between Danang and Phu Bai TAOR's. Contact was extremely light, and final results were:

Friendly Casualties: WIA
 1

Enemy Casualties(Aug): KIA(Conf) KIA(Prob) VCS
 2 2 5

Weapons Captured: 1

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~~SECRET~~TRAINING1. SCHOOLSa. IN COUNTRY SCHOOLS

		<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
USMACV/USAID/JUSPAO Advisor	Saigon	3	
Mine Warfare and Booby Traps	3d Engr Bn		1629
Field Fortification	3d Engr Bn		127
Vietnamese Language	III MAF		10

b. OFF SHORE SCHOOLS

CRYPTO/Comm Security	Yokosuka	1	4
RPS Custodian	Yokosuka	12	
Motion Picture Operator	Yokosuka		11
Basic Infantry Wpns Repair	Okinawa		9
Basic Ammo Technician	Okinawa		4
Vietnamese Language	Okinawa		7
Nuclear Wpns Refresher	Okinawa	1	2
Field Radio	Okinawa		5
NCO Leadership	Okinawa		8
Fixed Plant Teletype	Philippine Islands		2

2. INTRA DIVISION TRAINING

a. Number of personnel firing Hoa Cam range during Aug 1966 - 1287.

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COMBAT AIR SUPPORT~~SECRET~~1. Significant Events:

a. Operation HASTINGS continued into August with peak activity on 1 August. On this date, MAG-16 aircraft lifted 955 troops and 60.6 tons of cargo. Fixed wing support included 10 F-4 and 8 A-4 sorties flown by MAG-11 and MAG-12 aircraft with expenditure of 22 tons of ordnance. Operation HASTINGS concluded on 3 August with MAG-16 aircraft lifting 188 troops and 10.7 tons of cargo. Eight A-4's of MAG-12 and 4 F-4's of MAG-11 attacked VC positions with a BDA of 15 structures destroyed and two secondary explosions. Average daily helo support for Operation HASTINGS consisted of the following: 16 UH-34's, 5 UH-1E's and 3 CH-37's.

b. Operation HASTINGS transitioned into Operation PRAIRIE which continued through the remainder of the month with an average daily helo support of 8 UH-34's and 6 UH-1E's. Fixed wing aircraft flew a total of 1,029 sorties, expended 35,938 tons of ordnance with a BDA of 46 structures destroyed, 6 VC KBA (Confirmed), 174 VC KBA (Probable) and 4 secondary explosions.

c. On 8 August during late afternoon 4 CH-46's, 8 UH-34's and 8 UH-1E's from MAG-16 attempted to rescue a beleaguered recon team operating to the west of Cam Lo as an element of the PRAIRIE effort. During the rescue attempt, intense enemy fire inflicted varying degrees of damage to all but 1 UH-34 of the flight. In addition a CH-46 crewman was killed. Partial retrieval of the recon personnel was accomplished but some personnel remained in the area as night fell. Rescue/relief efforts continued into the night and during the early morning hours of 9 August a VMO-2 UH-1E launched on an emergency ammo resupply but did not reach the area. As the UH-1E was unloading in the zone intense enemy fire damaged the aircraft to the extent that it could not be flown out. Additionally, the crew chief and gunner were wounded. The crew then stripped all guns and ammo from the aircraft and remained with the recon unit until all were lifted out at first light.

d. Operation SWANNEE was conducted between 14 and 21 August with MAG-16 aircraft providing reaction force lift capabilities. Fixed wing and helicopter gunship cover were provided during the daylight hours of the river survey operation.

e. On 18 August a recon patrol from 3d Recon Battalion lost radio contact with its parent unit. On 19 August a recon platoon was helo lifted into area where contact was lost. The platoon ran into heavy VC contact and a company from 2d Bn, 3d Marines was helo lifted into same area by MAG-16 CH-46's. As the situation developed, a battalion command group and two additional companies were lifted into the area and Operation ALLEGHENY came into being. These lifts were accomplished without operational incident

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despite an unfavorable combination of LZ elevation (2,500 feet) and rough terrain. A total of 26,000 pounds of resupply was air dropped by US Army CV-2's and USAF C-123's. Two MAG-16 helos were additionally on standby for resupply and Med-Evac purposes. The Operation concluded on 29 August.

f. On 26 August Operation PAWNEE kicked off with MAG-16 aircraft lifting a battalion (-) into 3 separate landing zones. Fixed wing aircraft provided LZ prep and helo escort. Operation PAWNEE continued into September.

2. New Developments. None

3. Problem Areas. No new problems were encountered during the month of August.

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COMBINED ACTION COMPANIES

1. General. The status of Combined Action Companies as of 31 August was as follows:

a. Total USMC assigned	271
b. Total USN assigned	21
c. Total PF assigned	611
d. Total Combined Action Companies	1
e. Total Combined Action Platoons	24
f. Total Combined Action Units Pending Integration within 30 days	4
(1) Companies	4
(2) Platoons	5

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FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER1. Significant Events

a. Liaison was effected through the Marine Liaison Officer, Quang Nam Special Sector to establish an adjusted Fire Control Line (FCL) in conjunction with the expansion of this Division's TAOR.

b. An agreement with Quang Nam Special Sector was reaffirmed concerning the establishment of Reconnaissance Zone 7 (RZ beyond Western boundary of TAOR) as a free fire area for Marine Artillery and Airstrikes.

2. Targetings

a. Arc Light. 42 Targets were nominated for strike. Seven strikes were made, all in Quang Tri Province.

b. TPQ-10 Missions. 1473 targets were generated for attack by TPQ-10.

c. Naval Gunfire Support. Four DD type ships were available for a total of seven days support. These ships fired 51 missions in support of Division Units.

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~~SECRET~~PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. During the period of the report the Psychological Operations objective was exploitation of the indication of low morale of the enemy. This was covered by leaflet drops, aerial and ground broadcasts. All arc light missions were followed with leaflet drops.

2. The following represents a cross-section of leaflet distribution:

a. Chieu Hoi leaflets and Safe Conduct passes were distributed in:

- (1) An Trach (1) in 9th Marines area.
- (2) Support of operation PRAIRIE with 4th Marines.
- (3) 3d Marines western boundary area along Route 14.
- (4) Dong Tien (1), (2), and (3), Dong Lien and Tay Bang An areas of the 1st Marines.

b. Leaflets with the general theme of explaining the presence of Marines in SVN and requesting cooperation and information were distributed:

- (1) Along road from Viem Tay (3) south to intersection of Routes 1 and 14 in 1st Marines area.
- (2) Supporting Operation PAWNEE in 4th Marines area.

c. Recapitulation:

<u>Theme</u>	<u>No. of Leaflets</u>
(1) Chieu Hoi	500,000
(2) Safe Conduct Passes	537,000
(3) Arc Light	5,000,000
(4) Varied Themes	936,000

3. There were 19 hours of aerial and 17 hours of ground broadcasts. These broadcasts generally covered the same subject matter as that of the leaflets, reinforcing and expanding on the themes, and were located in the same approximate geographic locations.

4. There was no feed-back reported during the period.

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~~SECRET~~COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS1. Significant Events

a. Four radar technicians were provided to FLSG "A" to assist in the Resistor Modification Program for Division Battlefield Surveillance Radar sets AN/TPS-21. This program is now approximately 50% completed.

b. Requests were submitted to the Defense Communication Agency for validation of additional telephone and teletype circuits from 3d Marine Division to Dong Ha combat base. Two of these circuits are now in operation.

c. Significant quantities of new FM radio equipment were received and the following quantities of authorized items are now on hand.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>OH</u>	<u>AUTH</u>
AN/PRC-25	1598	1669
AN/GRC-125	213	272
AN/MRC-109	101	121
AN/MRC-110	36	44
AN/GRM-55	0	88
AN/VRM-1	47	71
AN/GRA-39A	519	559
MK-456	112	72

d. Approximately 50 TP-6 type telephone sets were installed throughout the Division CP area.

2. Problem Areas

a. The new vehicular radio sets AN/MRC-109 and AN/MRC-110 are still on administrative deadline.

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LOGISTICS~~SECRET~~1. Significant Events

a. At the close of this period there were 84 separate items on the Red Ball program. This is an increase of 4 items over the last report.

b. FMFPac changed the criteria for Red Ball items. Basically it limits Red Ball items to those which replace or repair an item of combat essential equipment included in the listing contained in FMFPac O 4000.13B. Because crypto equipment, chain saws, mud hog pumps and field ranges are not included in the listing but are considered critical to this command, we requested FMFPac to retain these items on Red Ball.

c. A test of acceptability and utility of Wash and Dri Towelettes was conducted earlier this year. These towelettes are similar to the ones utilized by commercial airlines. Test results determined their acceptability and III MAF was notified. Estimated usage will be 528,629 per month.

d. The standard Marine Corps barber kit was modified to include one pair of electric clippers. All units were notified and local purchase requirements were placed.

e. The quarterly reconciliation of obligations held for 3d Marine Division units at FSA C2 and FSA C1 was completed during the month. Close supervision by 3d Marine Division was utilized to insure that the purpose of a reconciliation was achieved.

f. The 3d Marine Division Embarkation Officer coordinated the debarkation of BLT 2/26 and the embarkation of BLT 3/3. The debarkation and embarkation took place over three embark/debark points, the Bridge Ramp Cargo Facility, Danang East Ferry Landing and Red Beach. A total of 1641 personnel, 31,923 square feet of vehicles and 110,540 cubic feet of cargo was debarked from 270800H to 280715H August 1966. A total of 1122 personnel, 21,472 square feet of vehicles, and 173,083 cubic feet of cargo was embarked. Embarkation terminated at 301905H August 1966.

g. During this period the following logistical support was provided the 3d Marine Division:

- (1) 80 LCU loads of supplies from Danang to Phu Bai.
- (2) 16 LCU loads of supplies from Danang to Dong Ha.
- (3) 161 USAF C-123 lifts of supplies flown from Danang to An Hoa.
- (4) 57 USAF C-123 lifts of supplies flown from Danang to Dong Ha.

Enclosure (1)
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h. During the period covered 5 Rough Rider convoys traveled between Danang and Phu Bai, and returned. One Rough Rider traveled between Danang and An Hoa, and returned. One Rough Rider traveled between Danang and the hamlet of Trakieu, and returned.

i. The Ballistic Drive Modification Team from MCSC, Barstow completed its work on the 14 tanks, M48A3 requiring modification.

j. A liaison visit was made by a team from MCSA, Philadelphia. The purpose of the visit was to analyze ordnance spare parts shortages and to recommend changes to expedite the supply of parts.

k. A technical inspection team from MCSC, Barstow arrived at 3d Marine Division on 31 August 1966. The purpose of the inspection was to provide the repair centers with specific information concerning equipment conditions and planning data related to repair parts support and man hour requirements for the overhaul/repair of equipment to be returned during FY-67 and 68.

l. During the period the following major Ordnance items were damaged by enemy action:

- (1) 5 tanks, M48A3 damaged by mines.
- (2) 1 tank, M48A3 damaged by satchel charge - probable Code X.
- (3) 1 vehicle tracked, retriever, M51 destroyed by enemy AT fire.
- (4) 7 LVTP5 damaged by mines - 4 with ruptured hulls, Code X.
- (5) 1 LVTR1 damaged by mine.

2. New Developments

a. Force Logistic Command instituted a special handling system for certain items in short supply in an attempt to alleviate the shortages. To aid them in this endeavor each 3d Marine Division unit submitted a listing of 25 items for this program.

b. A request was made to Commanding General, III MAF that FSA C2 stop passing priority O5 requisitions as of 1 September and priority O2 requisitions as of 1 January 1967. No reply has been received. The basic reason behind this request was to ensure that the units with the greatest need receive the assets received in country. Under the present system of passing high priority requisitions this is not happening.

3. Problem Areas

Enclosure (1)

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a. Shortage of various items continued to plague the 3d Marine Division. SLIT cards (used for requisitioning) are in short supply; however, a shipment of 10,000 was received on 30 August. Pneumatic mattresses are in short supply.

b. The Division Supply Management Team visited all units in Phu Bai area except 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. General discrepancies noted as follows:

- (1) Procedures used to reconcile with customers are inadequate.
- (2) Quantities on requisition in excess of requirements.
- (3) Excess stock on hand.
- (4) Quantities on hand with unfilled demands.
- (5) Improper use of Outstanding Obligation Card.

Detailed reports were submitted to the commands concerned for corrective action.

4. Special Operations

a. During this period Operation HASTINGS was concluded. One 4.2 Mortar Battery, 1 Infantry Battalion and 1 Infantry Company and 600 S/T of cargo were airlifted in support of this operation.

Enclosure (1)

CIVIL AFFAIRS1. Highlights

a. Disaster Relief. About 1330 17 August 1966 an F8U aircraft while taking off from the south end of Danang airfield crashed in Khu Truong (4) Hamlet (BT 012733), Hoa Cuong Village, Hoa Vang District. The aircraft came to rest near the center of the hamlet and, shortly after, a 1000 pound bomb exploded, destroying 74 masonry houses, killing 34 civilians, and injuring 7 civilians.

(1) The 1st MP Battalion and units from the Air Force and NSA took initial action at about 1400, collecting and evacuating dead and injured plus providing food, water, shelter and blankets for the homeless. The 1st MAW commenced paying solatium to NOK on 18 August. 5000\$VN was paid for each death and varying amounts for injured. The 11th ARVN CA Company distributed GVN claims sheets. On 18 August the 3d Marine Division G-5 assumed control in the disaster area. MCB-11 and 3d Shore Party Battalion commenced clearing the area and rebuilding homes on 19 August. As of 1 September, 1966, foundations had been poured for 66 new structures. Sixteen had completed tin roofs and wooden sides and 50 still await completion. 840 bags of cement and 1480 sheets of roofing for this project were furnished by USAID. 73,000 board feet of lumber was purchased by III MAF. Four weeks supply of USAID-furnished rice, bulgar wheat, rolled wheat, salt, milk and cooking oil are being distributed to each family. Necessary clothing was also delivered. 1st MP Battalion furnished night security for this project and the 29th C. A. Company provided supervisory personnel on the scene. Estimated completion date for this project is 10 September 1966. The people as well as District and Province officials have expressed their appreciation and gratitude for the Marine Corps effort.

b. Refugees

(1) The resettlement of Dai Loc refugees into An My (3) hamlet (925608) Loc Chanh Village commenced with a planning conference on 2 August 1966. Participants were 2/3 command and CA personnel, Dai Loc sub-sector advisor, representatives from the 29th C. A. Company and the 10th ARVN Psy/Ops Bn. Detailed plans were laid this date for labor, transportation, commodities, Psy/Ops, security and overall time phasing. On 4 August 140 refugees were transported to An My (3) and began actual clearing and construction under the aggressive supervision of the An My (3) Hamlet Chief. Villagers have been transported daily by 2/3 for construction. By 6 August keen enthusiasm for this project had swept through the Dai Loc refugee camps. The attitude of these war victims has become increasingly favorable as reconstruction of this entire hamlet nears completion. Standard structures, using 12 sheets of tin and 200 lineal feet of 2X4 and 2X6 lumber are being built entirely by the refugees. As of 1 September 1966 85 houses had been finished and work is progressing on the remaining 15. Heads and wells have been planned for the hamlet and a CAC is located

Enclosure (1)

nearby. To date 20 carpenter kits, 1500 sheets of roofing, 700 pounds of nails and 20,000 L.F. of lumber have been used. The Quang Nam Province Chief, Dr Chi, plus other Province and District officials have sighted this project and the reaction has been most favorable.

(2) Hoan My Hamlet (AT 928579), Loc Hung Village. At approximately 0105 on 24 August 1966 VC burned 70 houses leaving approximately 720 people homeless. Many of these were former refugees from Ky Tan Village who had sought refuge from the VC by moving into Hoan My last spring. The following USAID materials were delivered to Dai Loc District Headquarters and distributed to Hoan My hamlet officials.

25-26 August 1966

10 Tents, G.P.
120 Blankets
100 Bags Bulgar Wheat
60 Bags Corn
10 Cases Powdered Milk

c. Commodity Requisitioning. During August the emphasis on requisitioning of materials to be used in C. A. projects shifted from U. S. to GVN channels. This will encourage proper functioning of the legally constituted government from province to hamlet level. Requisitions submitted through local governments will be monitored by US personnel to ensure complete action.

2. Projects

a. Monthly self help recapitulation

- (1) Four aid stations painted.
- (2) Two bridges repaired; one bridge built.
- (3) One culvert installed.
- (4) One bulletin board erected.
- (5) One marketplace opened.
- (6) One head.
- (7) Two schools opened; one set of school furniture completed.

b. Monthly recapitulation of self help construction materials furnished:

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1,395 bags of cement
 50 truck loads usable dunnage
 1,300 pounds of nails
 3,080 sheets roofing

c. English Language classes

108 classes
 113 hours
 2,622 people instructed

d. Monthly Recap of Civic Action

(1) Medical Assistance

No. Female Adults assisted	11,116
No. Male Adults assisted	7,049
No. Children under 18 assisted	41,576
Total persons assisted	59,741

(2) Dental Assistance

No. of examinations	2,740
No. of extractions	1,547
No. of fillings	84
Total procedures	4,371

(3) Personal Assistance

No. pounds of food distributed	45,002
No. persons receiving food	31,674
No. pounds clothing distributed	4,480
No. Persons receiving clothing	4,196
No. bars soap distributed	17,144
No. Persons receiving soap	16,875

(4) Evacuation Assistance

No. Adults evacuated	51
No. Children under 18 evacuated	37

(5) Contacts with local officials 107

Enclosure (1)

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DIVISION SURGEON1. Significant Activities

a. During the month of August encephalitis cases continued to be diagnosed. In the 3d MarDiv 22 cases were diagnosed in July and 5 cases in August. DivBul 6230 was promulgated to advise personnel of the command of prophylactic measures.

b. Input deficits and rotational losses of specialty corpsmen NEC 8483 necessitated urgent request to FMFPac for input of this enlisted specialty.

c. Operation HASTINGS terminated in early August. Statistical data concerning battle and nonbattle casualties formed the basis of a confidential report to CG, 3d MarDiv. The total casualties (battle, nonbattle and KIA) represented 19.3% of the ground troops involved. Of these ground troops 7.9% were battle casualties, 9% were nonbattle casualties and 2.1% were KIA. Casualties who became DOW were 0.7%. This last mentioned is a remarkable achievement.

d. During August 3 cases of clinically diagnosed Bubonic plague were diagnosed in Hoa Vinh village by physicians who cared for patients during the recent epidemic in May and June 1966. No other cases in indigenous personnel were diagnosed.

e. Action was initiated to improve the timeliness in reporting admissions to the Sick List and favorable approval was obtained from FMFPac.

f. Improvements in the Medical Evacuation System were culminated in August. Action was begun through III MAF in July to have the 1st MarDiv establish its own out of country casualty evacuation system thereby relieving the 3d MarDiv of all out of country evacuation. This accomplishment resulted in an increase in available beds for holding patients at the 3d MarDiv. These beds would otherwise have been set aside and committed to casualties from the 1st MarDiv who required triage, hospitalization, and administrative processing prior to evacuation. In addition, a system of evacuation utilizing the USAF AeroMedical Evacuation Squadron Detachment 4 in Danang was established for casualties from Dong Ha.

g. A survey was conducted of all units to determine the adequacy of refrigeration units at the Aid Station for storage of biologicals and deterioratable medical supplies.

h. A survey was conducted to ascertain current status of sterilizers in Battalion Aid Stations.

Enclosure (1)

1. Medical and Dental Support.

(1) The 3d Medical Battalion submits detailed reports to the Division relative to medical support.

(2) Medical logistic reports are submitted to the Division from the Medical Supply Section of FLSG-A.

(3) Commanding Officer, 3d Dental Company submits detailed reports to the Division relative to dental support.

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~~SECRET~~DIVISION CHAPLAIN

1. General. The month of August began with 31 chaplains attached to units of the Division. Four of the units were OPCON, Third Marine Division and ADCOM, First Marine Division. Chaplains MCGURIE, RADASKY, KARY, SCANLON, MCHORSE, LOEFFLER and CORY were rotated to CONUS during the month. Chaplains RAGLAND, STEWART, BRUNER and RICARD reported from CONUS for duty with the Third Marine Division. Chaplains DOFFIN and DORSEY reported for duty with the First Marine Division, OPCON, Third Marine Division. Reassignments were as follows:

Chaplain HUBBLE to Headquarters Battalion
 Chaplain ONDC to A Company, Third Medical Battalion
 Chaplain SIMS to Second Battalion, Fourth Marines
 Chaplain BARTHOLOMEW to Third Shore Party Battalion/Third Reconnaissance Battalion
 Chaplain BEACH to Third Battalion, Fourth Marines
 Chaplain MCDERMOTT to First Battalion, Ninth Marines
 Chaplain COLLINS to Second Battalion, Ninth Marines

2. Significant Activities

a. The Second Battalion, Seventh Marines came under OPCON of the Third Marine Division in the last days of the month of August. Chaplain MCPARTLAND departed with the Third Battalion, Third Marines for Okinawa and Chaplain BOLLES arrived in-country with the Second Battalion, Twenty-Sixth Marines. The month of August ended with thirty-one chaplains serving with the Third Marine Division.

b. The Division Chaplain conducted 340 Sunday Divine Services during August with an attendance of 8,958 and 397 week day services with an attendance of 5,547.

c. Chaplain MCGONIGAL, attached to FMFPac Forward is presently working with personnel of the Division conducting a survey on Personal Response projects.

d. The Supporting Arms Chapel was dedicated on 6 August with Chaplains MORTON, MAGUIRE and HEDWALL participating.

e. Chaplains participated in operations as follows:

PRAIRIE - Chaplains POWELL, ALMASY, SIMS and ASHER
 ALLEGHENY - Chaplain AHRNSBRAK
 PAWNEE - Chaplain BEACH

Enclosure (1)

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3D MARINE DIVISION
 Command Chronology
 1 August to 31 August 1966
 List of Supporting Documents

1. ✓ Div SitReps
2. ✓ Div Journal
3. ✓ Div FSCC Journal
4. ✓ Battle and Non Battle Casualties, Daily Report
5. ✓ VIP Visits to 3dMarDiv
- ~~6. ✓ Div HistReps~~ *See FMFDAC & HISTREP*
7. ✓ Orders - Plans issued in July. *(Frags 413-66 (Opn SWANLISE)) only*
8. ✓ Civil Affairs
9. ✓ Photographs
10. ✓ Command Directory

UNIT COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

11. ✓ HqBn, 3dMarDiv
 12. ✓ 1st Mar Regt
 13. ✓ 3d Mar Regt
 14. ✓ 4th Mar Regt
 15. ✓ 9th Mar Regt
 16. ✓ 12th Mar Regt
 17. ✓ 1st AmTracBn
 18. ✓ 3d AT Bn
 19. ✓ 3d Engr Bn
 20. ✓ 3d Med Bn
 21. ✓ 3d MT Bn
 22. ✓ 3d Recon Bn
 23. ✓ 3d SP Bn
 24. ✓ 3d Tank Bn
25. ✓ 11 Aug 66 2680534 - Railroad Protection
26. ✓ 11 Aug 66 311975 - Extension of Pounce Area to Lang Co Bridge
27. ✓ 11 Aug 66 111315 - SPECIAL SITREP Opn WILCOX #1

DOWNGRADED UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
 FROM ENCLOSURE (1)

- 2100/2

DRAFTER SP/JBH/dnc
 SEC (4-3) PHONE SHOVE 3
 GWC 21

CCN

836

IMMEDIATE 131319Z AUG 66

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: THIRD MARDIV
 INFO: CG III MAF
 CG FIRST MAW
 COMUSMACV
 COMNAVFORV
 COMNAVSUPACT DNG
 CTF 115
 CTF 116
 CTF 115.1
 CO I CORPS ADV GRP
 CO FLC

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FRAG ORDER 423-66 (OPERATION SWANNICE)

- A. MAPS: AMS SERIES L-701, SHEETS 6640 I, II, III AND IV
 B. THIRD MARDIV OP O 343-65
 C. DIV O P 02000.2D (3D MARDIV COI)

TIME ZONE: HOTEL

TASK ORGANIZATION:

FIRST MARINES (-)(REIN)	COLONEL MITCHELL
NINTH MARINES (-)(REIN)	COLONEL BARRETT
TWELFTH MARINES (-)(REIN)	COLONEL READ

1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY FORCES.

(1) GENERAL: SEE CURRENT INTSUMS.

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SECRETMESSAGE FORM **SECRET**
3d MarDiv - (2100)2 ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

<u>ENEMY</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
B.20 BN HQ	30	(AR 8854)
B.21 CO	100	HEMS OP IN SONG THU BON
B.22 CO	120	VALLEY IN THONG DUC TO
B.23 CO	120	(BT 0153)
B.24 CO	120	
HOI AN LF CO	90	(BT 1856)
DUY KUYEN LF CO	120	(BT 0147)
DIEN BAN LF CO	100	(BT 0061)
DAI HOC LF CO	70	(AR 8055)
THONG DUC LF CO	60	(ZU 1454)
V.25 BN*	400	(AR 8753)

*REPORTS INDICATE A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN V.25 AND B.20 BNS.
THE POSS EXISTS THAT THEY MAY BE SAME UNIT, HOWEVER, EVIDENCE IS
SUFFICIENT TO CONFIRM THIS. V.25 BN IS CLASS AS PROB UNIT.

(3) REINFORCEMENTS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
HOA HIEU LF CO	120	(AR 9166)
70TH BN	500	THONG BINH DIST

(4) RECENT ACTIVITY

(A) ON 23 JUNE HIGHWAY #1 BRIDGE AT (BT 0955) OVER SONG CAU
ROAD WAS DAMAGED BY EXPLOSIVES. TWO OTHER MINING AND ROAD CUTTING INCIDENTS
OCCURED DURING WUN IN SAME AREA.

(B) DEFECTOR FROM B.21 CO INDICATES POOR UNIT MORALE DUE TO
RECENT COMBAT LOSSES AND SHORTAGE OF FOOD.

(C) THE DELTA AREA WEST OF THE CONFLUENCE OF THE SONG TU GIA
AND SONG THU BON IS CONSTANTLY BEING USED AS AN AREA OF HIGH ENERGY ACTIVITY

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2100/2

NUMEROUS ENEMY INSTALLATIONS/FACILITIES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED IN THE MOUNTAINOUS AREA IN THE VIC (ZG 1949).

(5) ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE: THE AREA OF OPS CONTAINS THE GREATEST ENEMY ANTI AIR EFFORT IN ICTZ. THE HEAVIEST VOLUME AND MOST ACCURATE FIRE HAS BEEN RECEIVED AND CAN BE EXPECTED. BOTH SMALL ARMS AND AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE IS UTILIZED, MOSTLY FROM VILLAGES, TREE LINES AND OCCASIONALLY FROM BOATS. FIFTY CALIBER FIRE HAS BEEN REPORTED.

(6) ENEMY CAPABILITIES

(A) THE ENEMY HAS THE CAPABILITY TO HARASS FRIENDLY TRAFFIC AT ANY POINT ALONG THE SONG THU BON COMPLEX NOT PHYSICALLY OCCUPIED AND CONTROLLED BY FRIENDLY FORCES.

(B) ALL UNITS LISTED IN PART I.A. (2) AND (3) COULD BE EMPLOYED AGAINST FRIENDLY FORCES AS THEY MOVE UP RIVER.

(C) 57MM RR AND 60 & 81/82MM MORT FIRE CAN BE EXPECTED THROUGH LENGTH OF RIVER COMPLEX.

(D) THIS RIVER COMPLEX ALSO SERVES THE ENEMY FOR MOVEMENT AND INFILTRATION OF PERSONNEL AND SUPPLIES AND TRANSITING ENEMY ELEMENTS MAY BE ENCOUNTERED.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES:

(1) SEE REF (B)

(2) NAVFORV CONDUCTS HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY OF SONG THU BON RIVER COMPLEX FROM SOUTH CHINA SEA (BT 2157) TO VICINITY AN HOA (AT 9648).

(3) FIRST MAW WILL PROVIDE AIR SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

2. MISSION

T-1ED MARDIV CONDUCTS OPERATIONS ON NORTH AND SOUTH BANKS OF SONG THU BON RIVER COMPLEX BETWEEN SOUTH CHINA SEA COAST (BT 2157) TO VICINITY

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SECRETMESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/2

AN HOA INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (AT 8648) TO PROVIDE LOCAL SECURITY FOR AND PROTECT ELEMENTS OF CTF 116 CONDUCTING HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY OF SONG THU BON RIVER.

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. UNITS TASKED WILL PROVIDE SECURITY FOR SURVEY PARTY ON BOTH BANKS OF SONG THU BON RIVER TO DESTROY PREPARED VC POSITIONS, DENY RIVER BANKS TO VC WITHIN OBSERVATION RANGE OF SURVEY PARTY AND CLEAR BANKS OF COMMAND DETONATED ANTI-BOAT MINES. PLT (REIN) ANTHRACS WILL BE ATTACHED TO TASKED UNITS AND WILL PROVIDE NORMAL SUPPORT. LVTH-6'S AND LVTC-1'S WILL BE INCLUDED IN PLT (REIN). ADDITIONAL ENGL-NEER PERSONNEL WILL BE PROVIDED AS REQUIRED. COMMAND VESTED IN SENIOR GROUND COMMANDER. SURVEY BOAT IS IN DIRECT SUPPORT. PRIMARY PLANS TO INCLUDE MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF LVT'S. ALTERNATE PLANS TO BE PREPARED FOR UTILIZATION OF HELICOPTERS TO ACCOMPLISH ASSIGNED MISSION IN EVENT LVT'S UNABLE TO PROCEED. NORMAL FIRE SUPPORT PROCEDURES ARE IN EFFECT. MO, PAC (X) AND NGF SPOT TBS TO BE EMPLOYED ON BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH BANKS OF RIVER. AO AND GUNSHIPS ON STATION. CAS AIRBORNE WHEN OPERATING OUTSIDE ORGANIC ARTY FAN COND III ALERT ALL OTHER TIMES.

B. FOR FIRST MARINES.

(1) RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT AREA ALONG SONG THU BON RIVER FROM SOUTH CHINA SEA (BT 2157) TO VICINITY WESTERN BOUNDARY OF ASSIGNED BAOR (AT 9756).

(2) EFFECT PASSAGE OPCON OPERATION TO NINTH MARINES VICINITY WESTERN BOUNDARY REGIMENTAL TAOR. (AT 9756).

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 - 2100/2) BE PREPARED TO ASSUME OPCON OPERATION FROM NINTH MARINES VICINITY WESTERN BOUNDARY REGIMENTAL TAOR AT SUCH TIME AS SURVEY PARTY RETURNS THIS POSITION ON RETURN TRIP.

(4) ON RETURN TRIP RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT AREA ALONG SONG THU BON RIVER FROM WESTERN BOUNDARY OF ASSIGNED TAOR (AT 9756) TO SOUTH CHINA SEA (BT 2157).

C. FOR NINTH MARINES.

(1) RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT AREA ALONG SONG THU BON RIVER FROM EASTERN BOUNDARY OF ASSIGNED TAOR (AT 9756) TO VICINITY AN HOA (AT 8648).

(2) ASSUME OPCON OPERATION FROM FIRST MARINES AT EASTERN BOUNDARY OF ASSIGNED TAOR (AT 9756) PROCEED ALONG SONG THU BON RIVER TO VICINITY AN HOA (AT 8648), THENCE RETURN TRIP TO EASTERN BOUNDARY OF ASSIGNED TAOR (AT 9756) AT WHICH TIME OPCON WILL PASS TO FIRST MARINES.

D. FOR TWELFTH MARINES.

(1) PROVIDE ARTILLERY SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

(2) COORDINATE EMPLOYMENT OF AERIAL ARTILLERY AS REQUESTED.

E. 1ST AMTRAC BN. ATTACH PLT (HELN) TO INCLUDE FOUR LVTH-6 AND TWO IVTC-1 FOR DURATION OF OP.

F. 3D ENGR BN (-). ATTACH ENGR DET FOR DURATION OF OP.

G. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) D-DAY 14 AUG 66.

(2) H-HOUR - AS MUTUALLY AGREED UPON BY NAVFORV SURVEY PARTY AND FIRST MARINES.

(3) DURATION OF OPERATION EXPECTED TO BE 6 DAYS.

(4) SPEED OF ADVANCE TO BE DETERMINED BY SLOWEST ELEMENT.

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2100/2

(5) DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED BETWEEN THIRD MARDIV UNITS

NAVFORSY UNITS AND ARVN FORCES FOR PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF OPS.

(6) STANDARD PROCEDURES FOR USE OF FO'S, FAC'S AND NGF SP TM APPLY. WEAPONS TO BE EMPLOYED WITH INFANTRY ELEMENTS ON BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH BANKS.

(7) ASSIGNED DD GS FIRST MARINES.

(8) FIRE SUPPORT AREA CLEARANCE.

(A) THE AREA FROM (AT 220570) ALONG SOUTH BANK OF SONG CHIE DAI TO 173540 TO 169528 TO 150525 TO 144512 TO 134504 SOUTH SONG LI LI TO 150468 NE ALONG PROVINCE BOUNDARY TO 229523 TO 220570 IS A FREE FIRE AREA AS APPROVED BY QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR COMMANDER.

(B) ALL OTHER AREA CLEARANCE BY NORMAL METHODS.

(C) DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED BETWEEN FIRST MARINES AND QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR.

(D) FIRE COORDINATION LINE BETWEEN FIRST MARINES AND NINTH MARINES IS CURRENT BOUNDARY.

(9) ONE SQUAD OF INFANTRY WITH T/O WPNS TO BE EMBARKED ON SURVEY BOAT AT ALL TIMES DURING MOVEMENT PHASES.

(10) PRC 25 ON CONTROLLING BW TAG NET WITH OPERATORS TO BE EMBARKED ON SURVEY BOAT TO MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS CONTACT WITH SURVEY PARTY.

(11) DURING NIGHT SNOPOVERS, PROVIDE DEFENSIVE PERIMETER FOR SURVEY BOAT AND CREW.

(12) AREA OF OPERATION. SEE ANNEX (A).

(13) REPORTS:

(A) SPOT REPORTS HOURLY AND AS REQUIRED BY INCIDENT.

(B) SITREPS EVERY SIX HOURS.

(C) AFTER ACTION REPORT.

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SECRETMESSAGE FORM - SECRET
34 MarDiv - 2100/2

- (14) CAUTION PERSONNEL TO BE ALERT FOR MINES IN WATER AND RIVER BANKS.
- (15) UNCLASSIFIED. REPORT USE THIS HQS ASAF.
- (16) UNCLASSIFIED CODE NAME SWANEE.
- (17) COORDINATE OPERATIONS WITH ARVN UNITS LOCATED IN AREA OF OPERATION. DIRECT ITATION WITH ARVN UNITS AND U. S. ADVISORS AUTHORIZED.
- (18) EMPHASIZE MET. SEE PARAGRAPH 3.A.
- (19) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT APPLY.
- (20) COPIES OF OPERATION ORDERS/FRAG ORDERS FORWARDED THIS HQ.
- (21) CONSIDERED READY REACTION FORCE FOR COMMITMENT VIA HELO AS REQUIRED.
- (22) PROVIDE RESERVE FORCE AS REQUIRED.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. SUPPLY

- (1) SUPPLY SOURCE - FLSG (A) FOR NORMAL SUPPLY. LSU AN HOA FOR EMERGENCIES.
- (2) PRESCRIBED LOADS - AS PRESCRIBED BY UNIT COMMANDERS.
- (3) RESUPPLY
 - (A) FLSG (A). EMERGENCY RESUPPLY LSU AN HOA.
 - (B) THE UNIT PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY PARTY WILL RESUPPLY ICH 3 WITH WATER.

B. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

- (1) EVACUATION - BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS TO C CO, 3D MED BN.
 - (2) HOSPITALIZATION - C CO 3D MED BN.
- C. PERSONNEL - IN ACCORDANCE CURRENT DIRECTIVES.

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
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3d MarDiv - 2100/2

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS

A. COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THEED MARDIV IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE
(C) AND OTHER OFFICERS DISSEMINATES.

01-4

RELEASED BY



MARKS:

A AREA OF OPERATIONS (OVERLAY PAPER)

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HEADQUARTERS
34 Machine Division (Rein), MFC
PFO San Francisco 96602

1 August 1966

UNIT	NAME	GRADE	DATE	LOCATION
1ST MARINE REGIMENT	1stBn 1stMar	Blade 6	Aug66	
	2ndBn 1stMar	Round 6	Jun67	
	3rdBn 1stMar	Chalk 6	Jun67	
3RD MARINE REGIMENT	1stBn 3rdMar	Crowd 6	Sep66	
	2ndBn 3rdMar	Barbe 6	Oct66	
	3rdBn 3rdMar	Squire 6	Aug67	
		Squad 6	Jul67	
		Afterglow 6	Aug67	
4TH MARINE REGIMENT	1stBn 4thMar	Impassive 6	Jun67	
	2ndBn 4thMar	Reveille 6	Aug67	
	3rdBn 4thMar	Reveille 6	Aug67	
	2ndBn 1stMar	Cedar Mind 6	Apr67	
		Sawtooth 6	Jul67	
		Inventory 6	Oct66	
		Black Box 6	Jul67	
9TH MARINE REGIMENT	2ndBn 9thMar	Fertilizer 6	Aug66	
	3rdBn 9thMar	Click 6	Jul67	
		Coosa 6	Mar67	
12TH MARINE REGIMENT	2ndBn 12thMar	Wagon Master 6	Jul67	
	3rdBn 12thMar	Thaps 6	Sep66	
	4thBn 12thMar	Brace 6	Aug66	
	1st 8" Howitz	Yan 6	May67	
	1st 155 Gunbtry	Amphib 6	Apr67	
		Evans 6	Aug66	
		Roasting Beans 6	Jun67	
15TH ARCTIC BATTALION		Sustenance 6	Oct66	
		Artemis 6	Oct66	
15TH MILITARY POLICE BN		Whale 6	Jun67	
		Walt 6	Aug66	
3RD TANK BATTALION		BarryDut 6	Apr67	
		Saint Joe 6	Jul67	
3RD ENGINEER BATTALION		Fun Handle 6	Oct66	
		Highway 6	Aug66	
3RD MEDICAL BATTALION		Engage 6	Sep66	
		Dante 6	Oct66	
3RD AVIATION BATTALION		Shupe 6	Jul67	
3RD COMMUNICATIONS BN				
7TH ENGINEER BATTALION				
9TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BN				
HEADQUARTERS BATTALION				

Note: Please report any errors, changes and/or omissions to the Division Adjutant prior to 27 August 1966.

Major, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve
Division Adjutant

FORWARD DIRECTORY

POSITION	NAME	GRADE	DATE	LOCATION
DIVISION COMMANDER	Alde-de-Camp	Alde-de-Camp	Apr67	Shore 6
Alde-de-Camp	Alde-de-Camp	Alde-de-Camp	Sep66	Dunsmg 6155
CHIEF OF STAFF	Col. J. B. SWENEY	Col. J. B. SWENEY	May67	Shore 5
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF	Col. J. R. BROWNE	Col. J. R. BROWNE	Aug67	Shore 105
Staff Secretary	Capt D. G. MASON	Capt D. G. MASON	May67	Dunsmg 6465
COMMAND DEPT OFFICER	3000 - 0700	3000 - 0700	May67	Dunsmg 6115
ASST CHIEF OF STAFF C-1	Col. J. P. LANIGAN	Col. J. P. LANIGAN	Jul67	Shore 1
Asst C-1	Maj L. J. DOMARIE	Maj L. J. DOMARIE	Oct66	Dunsmg 6218
Asst C-1	Maj M. G. SERTYCK	Maj M. G. SERTYCK	Aug67	Shore 101
ASST CHIEF OF STAFF C-2	Col. T. N. ROBE	Col. T. N. ROBE	Jun67	Shore 402
Asst C-2	LtCol R. J. SCRIVER	LtCol R. J. SCRIVER	Sep66	Shore 102
Asst C-2	Maj J. T. SWINNEY	Maj J. T. SWINNEY	Apr67	Shore 2
Asst C-2	Capt D. A. TUFFY	Capt D. A. TUFFY	Dec66	Shore 2
Asst C-2	2ndLt R. D. NEWMAN	2ndLt R. D. NEWMAN	Dec66	Shore 2
Asst C-2	2ndLt J. J. SLACUM	2ndLt J. J. SLACUM	May67	Shore 2
Asst C-2	1stLt R. J. KAPSCHE	1stLt R. J. KAPSCHE	May67	Shore 302
Asst C-2	Capt D. M. KEMLOCK	Capt D. M. KEMLOCK	Apr67	Paradise 17
Asst C-2	Capt V. A. LIENHORN	Capt V. A. LIENHORN	Aug66	Shore Laundry
Asst C-2	2ndLt C. A. WARELS	2ndLt C. A. WARELS	Apr67	Paradise 302
Asst C-2	2ndLt E. V. HARTZLER	2ndLt E. V. HARTZLER	Mar67	Shore 2
Asst C-2	Shore Laundry	Shore Laundry		Shore 302
Asst C-2	Shore 302-2	Shore 302-2		Shore 302-2
ASST CHIEF OF STAFF C-3	Col. V. F. JOSELER	Col. V. F. JOSELER	Jun66	Shore 3
Asst C-3	LtCol L. G. ALEXANDER	LtCol L. G. ALEXANDER	Aug67	Shore 3, 103
Asst C-3	LtCol R. E. SULLIVAN	LtCol R. E. SULLIVAN	Nov66	Shore COC
Asst C-3	Capt D. V. KIRARD	Capt D. V. KIRARD	Sep66	Shore 3
Asst C-3	Capt J. V. SAROUSE	Capt J. V. SAROUSE	Jun66	Shore 3
Asst C-3	Maj T. C. WALKER	Maj T. C. WALKER	Nov66	Shore 203
Asst C-3	Capt M. E. STAVELLI	Capt M. E. STAVELLI	Jun67	Shore 203
Asst C-3	Capt C. W. SIMPSON	Capt C. W. SIMPSON	May67	Shore 402
Asst C-3	1stLt E. SCHMIDT	1stLt E. SCHMIDT	Sep66	Shore 3
Asst C-3	COC Marbo	COC Marbo	Apr67	Shore COC

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Tab 10


ASST CHIEF OF STAFF C-4	ASST CHIEF OF STAFF C-5	ASST CHIEF OF STAFF (COMPTROLLER)	ADJUTANT	AIR OFFICER	BAND OFFICER	CHAPLAIN	COMB SELECT OFFICER	CIDRES OFFICER	DENTAL OFFICER	DISBURSING OFFICER	ENGINEER OFFICER	EXCHANGE OFFICER	FOOD SERVICES OFFICER	FIRES SUPPORT COORDINATOR	INFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFF	INSPECTOR	INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OFF	LEGAL OFFICER	MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICER	ORDNANCE OFFICER	PHOTO OFFICER	POSTAL OFFICER	PROVOST MARSHAL	REPRODUCTION OFFICER	SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICER	SUPPLY OFFICER	SUBSERG	ADMINO	FIELD DIRECTOR MED CROSS	ASSTFLDIR	ASSTFLDIR		
Asst C-4 Plans & Programs Ops	(CIVIL AFFAIRS) Asst C-5 Civ/act/ctemo	(COMPTROLLER) Asst/Compt/Budget/Off	AsstAdj Pers AsstPerO SAG/Off RPS/Off Cash/PO Award/DO	AsstAIJ AsstAIRO AsstAIRO	AsstAIJ AsstAIRO	AdminAsst/Chap Asst Chaplain Jewish Chaplain	AsstCBO AsstCBO Asst CBO	AsstCBO AsstCBO Asst CBO	AsstCBO AsstCBO Asst CBO	AsstCBO AsstCBO Asst CBO	AsstCBO AsstCBO Asst CBO	AsstCBO AsstCBO Asst CBO	AsstCBO AsstCBO Asst CBO	Mess Administrator Asst FSC Asst MFO TIO AsstAIRO Chief AO	Asst FSC Asst MFO TIO AsstAIRO Chief AO	AsstFSC AsstMFO TIO AsstAIRO Chief AO	AsstFSC AsstMFO TIO AsstAIRO Chief AO	AsstFSC AsstMFO TIO AsstAIRO Chief AO	AsstFSC AsstMFO TIO AsstAIRO Chief AO	AsstFSC AsstMFO TIO AsstAIRO Chief AO	AsstFSC AsstMFO TIO AsstAIRO Chief AO	AsstFSC AsstMFO TIO AsstAIRO Chief AO	AsstFSC AsstMFO TIO AsstAIRO Chief AO	AsstFSC AsstMFO TIO AsstAIRO Chief AO	AsstFSC AsstMFO TIO AsstAIRO Chief AO	AsstFSC AsstMFO TIO AsstAIRO Chief AO	AsstFSC AsstMFO TIO AsstAIRO Chief AO	AsstFSC AsstMFO TIO AsstAIRO Chief AO	AsstFSC AsstMFO TIO AsstAIRO Chief AO	AsstFSC AsstMFO TIO AsstAIRO Chief AO	AsstFSC AsstMFO TIO AsstAIRO Chief AO	AsstFSC AsstMFO TIO AsstAIRO Chief AO	
1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	Maj J. L. MC BRIDE Capt C. D. BAILEY Lt Col R. C. MASON, USN 1stLt E. BROWN Capt H. J. FENNELL Maj C. P. HANSEL	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	1stLt C. M. SIMMONS 2ndLt W. E. BARHOUSE	
Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Sep66 Shore 22 Aug66 Shore Bailey 22A Dec66 Shore Bailey 26 Jan67 Shore Bailey 26A Mar67 Shore Bailey 24 May67 Shore Bailey 24	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58	Aug66 Moment 58 Aug66 Moment 58

3rd Marine Division
Command Chronology
Aug 1966
Supporting Documents

Encl 1 Msg 021553 Z Subj: Operation Bucks
2 Msg 030006 Z Subj: Operation Bucks, Support Requirements
3 Msg 030750 Z Subj: Operation Bucks
4 Msg 070744 Z Subj: Termination, Operation Bucks
5 Msg 080534 Z Subj: Railroad Protection
6 VIP 10 Aug Subj: Visit of General Wallace M. Greene Jr.,
Commandant of the Marine Corps to 3rd Marine
Division, Vietnam, w/4 Tabs A - D.
7 Msg 111315 Z Subj: Special SITREP Operation Wilcox #1
8 Msg 130700 Z Subj: Song Thu Bon River Survey
9 Msg 211405 Z Subj: Termination of Swannee
10 Msg 220120 Z Subj: Operation Ottawa & Operation Pawnee
11 Msg 311925 Z Subj: Extension of Pawnee Area to Lang Co Bridge
12 Msg Aug 66 Subj: Operation Bucks SITREPS

CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE FORM - CONFIDENTIAL
3d MarDiv - 2100/1



Back folder

MAF DE DIV NR 75
ZNY CCCCC
P 021553Z
FM COC THIRD MARDIV
TO EOC III MAF
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJ: OPERATION BUCKS

1 D-DAY. 2 AUG 66

H-HOUR 2300H

T-HOUR TO BE ANNOUNCED

2. 3D MEEE BN 1ST MARINES CONDUCTS SEARCH AND CLEAR
OPNS IN ASSIGNED OBJ AREA (SECTOR 1)

E3. 1/3/1 COMMENCING T-HOUR CONDUCT SEARCH AND CLEAR
IN ASSIGNED SECTOR.

B. K/3/1 BY H-HOUR EST BLOCKING POSITIN FROM BT 071699 TO BT
084658.

D. LXEE L/3/9 GY H-HOUR EST BLICKING POSITOON FROM BT 073699 TO
BT 086500 TO BT 114651

D. B/1/1 BY H-HOUR EST BLOCKING POSITION ALONG PHASE LINE ORANGE.

E. C/1/1VBY H-HOUR EST BLOKcing POSITION FROM BT 084658 TO BT 115650

F. 1 CO, 51ST ARVN REGT OPERATE WITH SEARCH FORCE,

4. 1ST BN 11TH MARINES DS 1ST MARINE WITH PRIORITY OF FIRES TO 3/1.

5. MAG-16 PROVIDES 2 ARMED UH-1E AND 2 H-34D'S.

6 OVERLAY OF OP AREA WILL BE PROVIDED WITH 3D MAR DIV

SITREP ABOUT 030630H.

BT


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DE MAF AN MATE I EEEEE JSL 02/1557 KKK

021553

CONFIDENTIAL

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3d MarDiv - 2100/2



M

Return to COC

FD 237
OO RUMFKB RUHPCR
DE RUMNMF 159 2150006
ZNY SSSSS
O 030006Z
FM CG III MAF
TO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUMFKB/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
ZEN/FIRST MP BN
RUHPCR/244TH PSY OPNS CO
INFO RUMFKB/CTF ONE ONE FIVE
ZEN/FIRST MARINES

BT
S E C R E T
OPN BUCKS-SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS
A. CG THIRD MARDIV 010641Z (S) (PASEP)
1. REF (A) REQUESTED FOLLOWING FORCES FOR SUPPORT OPN BUCKS:
A. DET, SCOUT DOG PLT (FOUR SCOUT DOG TEAMS)
B. DET, PSY WAR COMPANY
C. ONE SWIFT BOAT TO BE ON STATION CONTINUOUSLY DURING
OPERATION.
2. SUPPORT REQUESTED PARA (IA) AND (IB) APPROVED.
3. FOR CTG 115.1 REQUEST ASSIGN SWIFT BOATS SUPPORT THIRD BN,
FIRST MARINES TO PROVIDE COASTAL SURVEILLANCE AND BLOCKING FORCE

PAGE TWO RUMNMF 159 S E C R E T
IN AREA OF OPERATIONS. NO SCHEDULED SHORE BOMBARDMENT ANTICIPATED
BUT REQUEST SWIFT BOATS BE AUTHORIZED TO TAKE SHORE TARGETS UNDER
FIRE AS REQUESTED BY C.O. THIRD BN FIRST MARINES. REQUEST SUPPORT
BE PROVIDED WITHIN APPLICABLE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.
4. DIRLAUTH ALCON.

GP-4
BT

03/080477 Aug 66/1000

030006Z

2-3/1000
NNNN

Enc

03

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SECRET

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3d MarDiv - 2100/2

12

ZCZC MFD 426MFB210ESAC765

LEQTAVV BBA374

OO RUMMF
DE RUMFKB 098 2150750
ZNY SSSSS
O P 030750Z AUG 66
FM CTF ONE ONE FIVE
TO ZEN/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
INFO RUMMF/CG III MAF
RUMSMF/CG THIRD MARDIV FIRST MARINES

BT

S E C R E T

OPN BUCKS

N. CG III MAF 030006Z

1. PROVIDE SUPPORT REQUESTED UTILIZING PCF IN AREA WHERE POSSIBLE. KRLAUTH.

GP-4

BT

C-3/coc stand + Fsec

nk 030750z

TOR: 03/11512/AUG 66 (Fwd INT)

03 07750

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SECRET

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3d MarDiv - 2100/2

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DRAFTER 30P: RES/rjh
SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE 3
CWO [Signature]

OCN 410

IMMEDIATE 070744Z AUG 66

AIR 0 / USD
G-4 / MA

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: FIRST MARINES
INFO: [Redacted]
CG III MAR
THIRD MARDIV

// S E C R E T //

TERMINATION OPN BUCKS

A. YOUR 061435Z (NOTAL)

1. REF A PROVIDED PHASE OUT SCHEDULE OF UNITS AND REQUESTED TERMINATION OPN BUCKS AT 081200H, PHASE OUT SCHEDULE AND REQUESTED TERMINATION APPROVED.

2. MOVE 1/3/69 ON 7 AUGUST TO LOCATION SPECIFIED BY CO NINTH MARINES.

CHOP OPCON TO NINTH MARINES ON DEPARTURE YOUR TAOR. ADVISE THIS HQS ASAP RE TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS FOR MOVEMENT TO INCLUDE TOTAL PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT, AND STAGING AREA(S).

3. DIRLAUTH FOR IMPLEMENTING UNIT PHASE OUT.

GP-4

RELEASED BY [Signature]

070744

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Encl 4

SECRET

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3d MarDiv - 2100/2

ACTION

G-3 / WSD
G-3A / [Signature]

17

ZCZC MFD 741
DE RUMNMF 506 2200534
ZNY SSSSS
O 080534Z AUG 66
FM CG III MAF
TO CG THIRD MARDIV

BT
SECRET

RAILROAD PROTECTION

- A. JOC THIRD MARDIV 190046Z JUL
- 1. REF A IS THIRD MARDIV PLANNED OPNS SCHEDULE FOR AUG66. PARA 1B OF REF A SCHEDULES OPN PAWNEE TO BE CONDUCTED DURING MIDDLE AUG IN THE PHU LOC AREA.
- 2. RECENT INCREASES IN ENEMY ATTACKS ON THE RAILROAD NORTH OF HAI VAN PASS INDICATE THAT ARVN UNITS CHARGED WITH RAILROAD SECURITY ARE UNABLE TO ACCOMPLISH THE TASK.
- 3. PREPARE OPN PLAN TO INCREASE SECURITY OF THE RAILROAD NORTH FROM HAI VAN PASS TO THE PHU BAI TAOR AND FORWARD CONCEPT THIS HQS PRIOR TO 11AUG66. PLAN SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH ARVN FORCES.
- 4. EARLY EXECUTION OPN PAWNEE WILL SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.

GP-4
BT

7-19/28/46 & 37/AUG 66/ATK/ [Signature]

2-3 COC, copies, [Signature]
08 05 34

08 AUG 1966

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3A SECRET
Encl 5

Ser: 0026066

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FME
FPO, San Francisco 96602

VISIT OF

GENERAL WALLACE M. GREENE, JR.
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

TO

3D MARINE DIVISION

10 August 1966

INDEX

BRIEFING BY REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS	TAB A
BRIEFING SUBJECTS	TAB B
POSITION PAPERS ON SELECTED TOPICS	TAB C
ITINERARY OF VISIT	TAB D

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

BRIEFING BY REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS

FOR

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

10 August 1966 - In The Field - Vietnam

A-1	1ST MARINES - CURRENT OPERATIONS	COL MITCHELL
A-2	3D MARINES - CURRENT OPERATIONS	COL HAYES
A-3	4TH MARINES - CURRENT OPERATIONS	COL CEREGHINO
A-4	9TH MARINES - CURRENT OPERATIONS	COL BARRETT
A-5	12TH MARINES - CURRENT OPERATIONS	COL REID

TAB A

BRIEFING BY CO, 1ST MARINES

I. HISTORY

- A. One year ago today sailed
- B. 1/1
- C. 2/1
- D. Regimental Headquarters
- E. 3/1
- F. Chu Lai
- G. Danang
- H. Today 2/1 commences move to Danang

II. TAOR

- A. Physical
 - 1. Beach - 17000 meters
 - 2. Sand
 - 3. Rice Paddies
 - 4. Rivers
 - 5. Marble outcropping
 - 6. Size
- B. Political
 - 1. Population
 - 2. Three Districts
 - a. Hoa Vong
 - b. Dien Bahn
 - c. Hieu Nhon
 - 3. Villages - 23

4. Officials

III. TROOP DISPOSITIONS AND OPERATIONS

- A. Political Boundaries
- B. 3/1
- C. 1/1
- D. Operations against local force and hamlet guerrilla to include countermine.
- E. Cooperation and coordination with GVN.
 - 1. County Fairs
 - 2. Day to Day
 - 3. Special

IV. CIVIC ACTION/PACIFICATION

- A. GVN/1st Marines
- B. GVN Area
 - 1. Phase I Priority
 - a. Cadres
 - b. Medcaps
 - 2. Phase II
- C. 1st Marines
 - 1. Organization
 - a. Army Team
 - 2. Area
 - 3. Restoration of local government to include work with PF.

BRIEFING OUTLINE

CMC visit

Briefing Officer: Commanding Officer, 3d Marines

Time and Place: 0745-0800, 10 August 1966, DAI LOC Fort

Subj: 3d Marines' Operations

I. INTRODUCTION

A. WELCOME TO 3D MARINES

B. BRIEFING PLAN

II. BRIEFING PRESENTATION

A. REGIMENT

(1) ORGANIZATION (3 BNS W/4 COMPANIES; SUPPORT UNITS) (BASIC MAP)

(2) AREA COVERAGE (TAOR SIZE AND CONTENT)

(3) TYPE OPERATIONS (S&C; S&D; COMBAT/RECON PATROL; AMBUSH; ROUGH RIDER; CORMORANT; COUNTY FAIR; BLUE SPRINGS)

B. EACH BATTALION

(1) COMPANY/PLATOON OPERATING BASES (OVERLAY)

(2) AUGUST PLANS

C. CAC PROGRAM (OVERLAY)

D. CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM (OVERLAY)

E. PERSONNEL & LOGISTICS STATUS

III. CONCLUSION

A. QUESTIONS

B. INTRODUCE 2/3 CP VISIT

BRIEFING BY CO, 4TH MARINES

OUTLINE OF OPERATION HASTINGS

I. TERRAIN

- A. EXISTING SITUATION (C-O-G-O-A)
- B. EFFECTS ON ENEMY OPERATIONS
- C. EFFECTS ON OUR OPERATIONS

II. WEATHER

- A. EXISTING SITUATION
- B. EFFECTS ON ENEMY OPERATIONS
- C. EFFECTS ON OUR OPERATIONS

III. BRIEF STATEMENT OF ENEMY DISPOSITIONS ON 14 JULY 1966.

Note: Detailed Briefing to be given by G-2, 3d Marine Division.

A-3

BRIEFING BY CO, 9TH MARINES

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Map and Terrain Orientation.

II. 9TH MARINES MISSION AND TAOR.

III. CIVIL RESETTLEMENT AND PACIFICATION.

A. Resettlement keyed to military and civilian lines of communications.

IV. LIBERTY ROAD AND ROUTE 1A.

A. Secure military road leads to civilian traffic which leads to restricted VC interdiction and mining.

B. Civilian and commercial traffic sets stage for resettlement of refugees, reduces VC influence and leads to resettlement sequence.

C. Resettlement to occur progressively along lines of communication with USMC/Vietnames village security.

V. CONCLUSION.

A. We believe we are making progress. It appears slow, but it is significant. We now use roads relatively freely which were inaccessible two months ago. People are beginning to return to abandoned homes and areas, even without security.

B. We believe there is a point somewhere; perhaps not too far distant, when the VC structure will begin rapidly to fall apart. Our programs, we are convinced, are hastening that day.

And

CMC BRIEFING - AN HOA and HILL 55 - 10Aug66 0825-0950

Sequence of events:

- 0825 - Arrive An Hoa Airfield. Mighty Mite to Mr. CAN's briefing.
- 0830 - Briefing by Mr. CAN and tour facility.
- 0855 - Enroute An Hoa Airfield.
- 0900 - Depart for Hill 55.
- 0910 - Arrive Helo Pad - Mighty Mite to OP.
- 0915 - Briefing - CO, 9th Marines.
- 0925 - Briefing - CO, 1st Marines.
- 0935 - Briefing - CO, 12th Marines.
- 0945 - Depart by Mighty Mite for Helo Pad.
- 0950 - Depart Hill 55.

ARTILLERY BRIEFING
FOR
CMC

5 Aug 1966

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose. The purpose of this briefing is to describe the current artillery situation in the 3d MarDiv; to briefly review the employment of artillery in past operations; to present an analysis of the current effectiveness of artillery support of the 3d MarDiv; and to indicate ways in which Ammunition Conservation will be effected.

II. FORCES ASSIGNED

- A. Tubes by caliber (Chart #1)
- B. Organization for Combat (Charts #2 & #3)

III. REVIEW OF ARTILLERY OPERATIONS (Chart #4)

- A. PHASE I: MARCH, 1965 - 1 DECEMBER 1965
- B. PHASE II: 1 DECEMBER 1965 - PRESENT
- C. TYPICAL OPERATIONS
 - (1) HARVEST MOON - 8-20 December 1965
 - (2) DOUBLE EAGLE (I & II) - 28 Jan - 28 Feb 1966
 - (3) UTAH - 4-7 Mar 1966
 - (4) TEXAS - 20-24 Mar 1966
 - (5) GEORGIA - 20 Apr - 10 May 1966
 - (6) JAY - 25 Jun - 11 July 1966
 - (7) MACON - 4 July - (Continuing)
 - (8) HASTINGS - 7 July - 3 Aug 1966
- D. ADDITIONAL SUPPORT MISSIONS (Chart #5)
- E. OPERATIONAL STATISTICS (Chart #6)

IV: ANALYSIS OF EFFECTIVENESS

A. RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS

V. MEASURES TO CONSERVE AMMUNITION (Chart #7)

VI. CONCLUSIONS

- A. Existing forces not adequate for present. Anticipate need for one additional 155mm Gun Battery.
- B. 3d MarDiv Artillery in excellent shape. It can shoot accurately - rapidly - and effectively.

(CHART #1)

ARTILLERY ASSETS

<u>CALIBER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>FHU BAI</u>	<u>CAM LO</u>	<u>DONG HA</u>
107MM HOWTAR	18	12	6		
*4.2 MORTAR	12	12			
105MM HOW	72	48	18	6	
155MM HOW (SP)	18	12	6		
*155MM HOW (TOWED)	18	8	6	2	2
155MM GUN (SP)	6	4	2		
8 INCH HOW (SP)	6	4	2		

*AUGMENTATION WEAPONS

(CHART #2)

ARTILLERY SUPPORT FOR DANANG TAOR

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>
<u>1ST MARINES</u>	
1ST BN, 11TH MAR	3 - 105MM HOW BTRYS 1 - 107MM MORTAR BTRY
<u>3D MARINES</u>	
1ST BN, 12TH MAR	3 - 105MM HOW BTRYS 1 - 107MM MORTAR BTRY
<u>9TH MARINES</u>	
2D BN, 12TH MAR	3 - 105MM HOW BTRYS
<u>3D MARDIV (REIN)</u>	
4TH BN, 12TH MAR (-)	2 - 155MM HOW BTRYS (SP) 4 - 8" HOW (SP) 4 - 155MM GUNS (SP)

(CHART #3)

ARTILLERY SUPPORT FOR PHU BAI TACR

UNIT

WEAPONS

4TH MARINES

3D BN, 12TH MAR

3 - 105MM HOW BTRY
1 - 107MM MORTAR BTRY

BTRY M, 4/12

1 - 155MM GUNS (SP)

1ST 155MM GUN BTRY (-)(REIN)(SP)

2 - 155MM GUNS (SP)
2 - 8" HOW (SP)

CAM LO

DONG HA

2D BN, 4TH MARINES

BTRY G, 3/12 (REIN)

1 - 155 HOW PLT (WITH FDC)

1 - 105MM HOW BTRY
1 - 155MM HOW PLT

(CHART #4)

REVIEW OF ARTILLERY OPNS

PHASE I: MARCH 1965 - 1 DEC 1965

PHASE II: 1 DECEMBER - PRESENT

TYPICAL OPERATIONS

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u># BTRYS</u>	<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>ROUNDS</u>	<u>EST VC KIA</u> <u>CONF</u>	<u>PROB</u>
HARVEST MOON	8-20DEC	6	957	6,386	319	327
DOUBLE EAGLE (I & II)	28 JAN- 28 FEB	8	1,065	12,630	365	12
UTAH	4-7 MAR	4	165	4,413	364	332
TEXAS	20-25 MAR	4	269	7,199	283	
GEORGIA	20 APR- 10 MAY	5	454	8,316	196	160
JAY	25 JUN- 11 JUL	2	222	2,479	82	264
MACON	4 JUL* -----	5	878	8,758	152	273
HASTINGS	7 JUL- 3 AUG	7	3,684	36,922	788	908

(CHART #5)

ADDITIONAL SUPPORT MISSIONS

PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR ALL:

RECON OPNS

ARVN OPNS

ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS (U. S. & ARVN)

SPECIAL FORCES CIDG UNITS

(CHART #6)

OPERATIONAL STATISTICS

SINCE APRIL 1966

TOTAL MISSIONS FIRED	<u>50,009</u>
TOTAL ROUNDS EXPENDED	<u>191,571</u>

(CHART #7)

AMMO CONSERVATION MEASURES

- REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF H&I FIRE WITH 105MM
- INCREASED USE OF GENERAL SUPPORT WEAPONS FOR PREARRANGED FIRES AND ATTACKING TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY
- INCREASED USE OF ORGANIC INFANTRY WEAPONS FOR MARGINALLY SUITABLE ARTILLERY TARGETS
- INCREASED USE OF 4.2 MORTARS
- ADDITIONAL TRAINING OF PIT LDES AND SMALL UNIT LEADERS IN ALL ASPECTS OF OBSERVED FIRE PROCEDURE

BRIEFING FOR CMC

10 August 1966 - 2000 - Conference Room

Opening Remarks	CG	
<u>OPERATION HASTINGS</u>		
1. Enemy Situation	G-2	
2. Scheme of Maneuver, Tactics, Command and Control, and Coordination with ARVN Units	S-3, 4th Marines	
3. FSCC and Tactical Air	ALO, 4th Marines	
-----		23 min
4. <u>Future Operations</u> (planned) in Danang and Phu Bai TAORS	G-3	5 min
5. <u>Reconnaissance</u> ; discussion of types and techniques used	CO, 3d Recon Bn	5 min
6. <u>Counter-Mine and Booby Trap Program</u>	G-3	5 min
7. <u>Combined Action Companies</u> ; discussion of current status of program	G-3	5 min
8. <u>Logistics in Support of Operations</u> ; special and unusual considerations	G-4	5 min
9. <u>Personnel</u>	G-1	5 min
	TOTAL	53 min

TAB B

CONFIDENTIAL

INTELLIGENCE BUILD-UP FOR OPERATION HASTINGS

1. Introductory remarks:
2. Initial Information received:
 - a. NVA Lt. rallied to ARVN on Route 9 West of CAM LO on 19 May.
 - (1) Member of STUDYING CADRE GROUP from 324th Division with mission to "Study the BA LONG BASE and QUANG TRI AREA."
 - (2) Crossed BEN HAI about 18 May.
 - (3) Rallier deserted 19 May vicinity (XD 988548).
 - b. Agent reports directly or indirectly indicating presence of 324B Division.
 - (1) 7 in May
 - (2) 10 in June
 - (3) 17 from 1 to 14 July
3. Recon Effort:
 - a. Began planning 22 June with aerial recon to determine most likely infiltration routes and assembly areas and development of RECON ZONES.
 - b. Recon effort delayed until 1 July by Operations JAY and HOLT.
 - c. Recon Insertion attempts 1 thru 15 July.
 - (1) 14 of 18 either retracted early or could not be inserted because of enemy activity in area.
 - (2) Number of sightings and description of troops indicated extensive infiltration had taken place.
 - (3) Mortar Co Cmdr and Bn Staff Officer 5th Bn, 812th Regt killed by recon patrol at (YD 080486).
4. ARVN LAM SON 287 (5-8 July)
 - a. Contacted NVA units in D-5 base area.
 - b. 2 ralliers on 5 July.

CONFIDENTIAL

B-1

CONFIDENTIAL

- (1) Lt from 812th Regt.
- (2) Pvt from 90th Regt.
- 5. Air Force AO sightings 6 July:
 - a. Prepared AA positions.
 - b. Troop movement along North-South Valley.
- 6. Indicated disposition of NVA forces on D Day (Overlay).

CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATION HASTINGS

I. SCHEME OF MANEUVER

- A. Concept of operation as proposed by ARVN, modified by us.
- B. Trail network and suspected Division CP.
- C. Landing of battalions 3/4 and 2/4.
- D. Possible employment of SLF.
- E. Location of artillery.

II. TACTICS

- A. Landing of 3/4 and 2/4 difficulty with helo's.
 - 1. Contact by 3/4
 - 2. Location of supplies
 - 3. Loss of CH-46 and evening contact
- B. Decision to reinforce 3/4 with 2/4.
- C. Commitment of 2/1
 - 1. Relocation of 2/1
- D. Activities of D+3
 - i. Contact of 2/1
 - 2. Landing of 3/5
 - 3. Reasons for moving
 - 4. Co K, 3/5
 - a. Use of supporting arms
- E. I/3/4 contact
- F. Commitment of 1/1, D+5
- G. Shifting of activity to area of main east-west corridor
 - 1. Contact by 2/1 and 3/5 forces

2. Contact by M/3/5 on D+7

3. Contact by C/1/1 on D+8

4. Contact by I/3/5 on D+9

d. Loss of contact

e. Withdrawal of forces

1. Use of supporting arms

2. Sweep of 1/3 and 2/9

III. COMMAND AND CONTROL

A. Task Force Delta Staff

1. A working staff mandatory

2. Required augmentation

B. Desirability of another regimental headquarters?

1. Close proximity of action

2. Economy of supporting units

a. Artillery

b. Helicopters

c. LSA

C. Communications

1. 2 tactical nets

2. Overload of other nets

IV. COORDINATION WITH ARVN

A. Previous experience

B. Planning phase

C. During operation

1. Joint CP's

2. Liaison officers

3. Supporting arms

B-2

FSCC AND TACTICAL AIR BRIEFING FOR CMC BY ALO 4TH MARINES

I. FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

- A. Artillery
- B. Air
- C. Reasons for success
 - 1. Aggressive
 - 2. Foresight not hindsight
 - 3. Special procedures

II. ARTILLERY - SIZE OF SUPPORTING UNIT

- A. Missions Fired
- B. Total Rounds Fired
- C. Location of Units
- D. Coordination with ARVN

III. AIR

- A. Planning Phase
 - 1. Use of 4th Marines OpO 301-66
 - a. Task Force Delta Operations
 - b. Other Operations of 4th Marines
 - 2. Advance Base
 - a. Co-location Command Elements
 - b. Helos Forward
 - 3. Preplanned Air
- B. Cooperation and Coordination
 - 1. 1st MAW
 - a. Ease of entering operation
 - b. Resources made available

2. ARVN

- a. USMC support to ARVN
- b. Sharing resources

C. Execution

1. Overall

a. Sorties Flown

- (1) Helos
- (2) CAS
- (3) Interdiction
- (4) Radar Controlled

b. Ordnance

c. Supplies/Troops

- | | |
|--------------------|------------------|
| (1) Danang-Dong Ha | 110 tons/daily |
| (2) Helo | 140 tons/daily |
| (3) Helo | 600 troops/daily |

d. Methods of Control

- (1) FAC
- (2) TACA/FAC(A)
- (3) TPQ-10

e. Significant Points

- (1) Large number of CAS missions
 - (a) Use of FAC
 - (b) Use of TACA/FAC(A)
- (2) Use of other agencies for controlling
 - (a) USAF

(b) USA

(c) Radar Controlled

IV. MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED

- A. Battle Damage Assessment
- B. DASC
- C. CO-LOCATION OF CPs
 - 1. Ground Units
 - 2. Air
 - 3. ARVN
- D. Advanced Base
- E. Formation Bombing

PLANNED OPERATIONS

1. Backdrop of those operations held during June and July to paint picture of recent operational situations.
2. Some major factors affecting operational planning:
 - a. BLT rotation occurring 25-27 Aug.
 - b. Operations conducted by 1st MarDiv (Colorado).
 - (1) Bn (rein) on 8 hr alert
 - (2) Helo availability
 - c. ARVN operations
 - d. ARVN problems:
 - (1) RR and other LOC security
 - (2) Isolated outposts - relief plans
 - e. Lucrative targets/suitable objectives
3. Operations continuing through the present and into the future:
 - a. MACON
 - b. PRAIRIE
 - c. COMANCHE
 - d. PAWNEE
 - e. GORDON

RECONNAISSANCE TECHNIQUES

- A. TWO TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED BY RECON BN TO ACCOMPLISH MISSION IN RVN.
- (1) OP'S WHICH AFFORD OBSERVATION OF AVENUES OF APPROACH INTO THE TAOR'S.
 - (2) RECONNAISSANCE PATROLLING.
 - (a) DETERMINE ENEMY LOCATION
 - (b) DISCOVER PRODUCTION AREAS
 - (c) LOCATE HARBOR SITES
 - (d) DETERMINE RESULTS OF MOVEMENT
 - (3) BOTH TECHNIQUES USED BY MOST PATROLS AT SOME TIME DURING PATROL.
- B. SIZE OF PATROL
- (1) SQUAD
 - (a) 6-10 MEN
 - (b) MOSTLY UTILIZED AS OP
 - (c) SHORT RANGE PATROLLING
 - (2) PLATOON
 - (a) 10-18 MEN
 - (b) LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS
- C. INSERTIONS
- (1) GENERALLY BY HELICOPTER
 - (a) EARLY MORNING
 1. ALLOWS MOVE OF MAXIMUM DISTANCE FROM AREA OF INSERTION TO PATROL AREA.
 - (b) LATE AFTERNOON
 1. MOVE IMMEDIATELY TO NIGHT HARBOR SITE
 2. COMMENCE ACTIVE PATROLLING BEFORE FIRST LIGHT

(2) WALK IN PATROLS

(3) "STAY-BEHIND" PATROLS

D. DURATION OF PATROL

(1) 4-5 DAYS AVERAGE

(2) EIGHT DAYS POSSIBLE

(a) COMPLETELY SELF-SUFFICIENT - REQUIRE NO RESUPPLY

(b) CARRY OWN RATIONS, AMMO, BATTERIES

(c) UTILIZE LOCAL WATER SOURCES

E. COMMUNICATIONS

(1) AN/PRC-25 PRIMARY MEANS - AN/PRC-10 ALTERNATE

(2) CONTACT WITH RECON BN OR INFANTRY UNIT THROUGH RELAY SITES

F. ARTILLERY SUPPORT

(1) MAJORITY OF PATROLS INSERTED WITHIN RANGE OF SUPPORTING ARTILLERY

(a) ABLE TO FIRE ON TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY

(b) DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY IN CASE OF CONTACT WITH ENEMY

(2) FO PROCEDURES

(a) ALL MARINES AND CORPSMAN TRAINED TO CALL AND ADJUST ARTILLERY FIRE

(b) EACH PATROL MEMBER CAN ACT AS FO

(3) MAY BE INSERTED OUTSIDE OF ARTILLERY RANGE IN SPECIAL INSTANCES

(4) ARTILLERY MONITORS PATROL'S FREQUENCY

(a) SIGHTING INFORMATION LAID ON GUNS IMMEDIATELY

(b) NO DELAY AFTER MISSION IS APPROVED

(c) EXCELLENT RESULTS OBTAINED

G. AMBUSHES AND CONTACT WITH ENEMY

(1) PATROLS NOT EQUIPPED FOR SUSTAINED GROUND COMBAT

(a) PRIMARY MISSION TO GATHER INTELLIGENCE

(2) PATROL LEADER HAS OPTION TO AMBUSH

(a) ENCOURAGED TO TAKE UNDER FIRE IF RESULTS WILL FURTHER MISSION

(b) EXCELLENT RESULTS FROM AMBUSHES

1. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

2. CAPTURED WEAPONS

3. CAPTURED VC

H. INFANTRY SUPPORT

(1) SPARROW HAWK

(a) 23 MEN

(b) HELI-LIFTED

(c) REINFORCE OR EXPLOIT RECON SIGHTINGS

(2) GROUND PATROLS

(a) CUT OFF RETREAT

(b) SUPPORT RECON IN FIRE FIGHT

STATISTICAL INFORMATION

Number of Patrols	1832
Significant Sightings	2723
Significant Contacts	591
VC KIA (CONFIRMED)	520
VC WIA (CONFIRMED)	277
VC CAPTURED	46
Captured: Weapons	179
Equipment	529
Documents	1271
USMC KIA	20
USMC WIA	244
TOTAL	264

COUNTER MINE AND BOOBY TRAP PRESENTATION

I. INTRODUCTION

A. During period 1 April - 3 August, 813 VC mines or booby traps have been discovered.

1. Most of these have been found in the southern portion of the Danang TAOR.

2. 195 of the 813 VC mines found have been the M16A1 "Bouncing Betty".

B. Division Counter Mine Program.

1. Employment of current active measures.

2. Rigid application of passive measures to minimize effect of VC mines.

3. Development of new active measures.

II. ACTIVE MEASURES.

A. Supporting Arms Fires

B. Engineer Sweeps.

C. Tanks LVTs.

D. Searchlights and Sniper Teams.

E. Flame Tanks.

F. Grappling Hooks.

G. LVTE Line Charges.

H. Mine Warfare School.

I. Active, Constant, Aggressive Patrols and Ambushes.

III. PASSIVE MEASURES.

A. Distance between individuals.

B. Distance between vehicles.

C. Distance between vehicles.

IV. COMMAND DIRECTION. CG, 3d MarDiv 110925Z directed that the senior Marine at any location, regardless of organization, was responsible for enforcing counter mine regulations. Reward program.

V. NEW ITEMS

A. P-153 Metallic Dector.

B. MLEL

C. Drags

D. Vehicle mounted mine detector.

VI. SUMMARY

A. This Division has an active, vigorous, effective counter mine program.

B. LtCol DONAHUE's statement.

COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM

- I. Organization of CAC units to date.
 - A. Extracting qualified Marines from tactical units to limited extent so as not to affect combat readiness of unit.
 - B. Generally along line of what would be spared.
 - C. This would be satisfactory for a CAC program on a limited basis.

- II. Plans and directives in being which expand this program very ambitiously, on the order of approximately fifty additional platoons.
 - A. To implement such a program on orderly basis requires:
 - 1. Careful and thorough overall planning to insure
 - a. Most effective use of all assets, those already existing and those needed but not now available.
 - b. Control, coordinated direction insofar as policies in organization and operation of CAC's are concerned.
 - c. Intelligent allocation and tactical assignment of such units within various organizational TAOR's.

- III. In order to accomplish a task of this magnitude, Commanding General, 3d Marine Division established a special combined action planning group.
 - A. Planning group has representation from all of the "G" Sections, certain of the special staff sections and unit representation from infantry regiments.
 - B. Membership at present includes at least two officers involved in organizing certain of the original CAC units.

C. Initial tasks assigned to this group:

1. Mission statement
2. Concept of employment
3. T/O and T/E for a CAC unit

D. This work has been completed and forwarded to higher authority for appropriate action. Is also being included in a 3dMarDiv SOP for the CAC program, one of the subsequent tasks assigned to the committee but not yet completed. Here is an example of a completed project:

C H A R T

E. Other additional tasks include:

1. The development of a recruiting program within the Division designed to induce combat experienced Marines to extend their tours an additional six months for CAC duty assignment. Of interest is fact that one infantry battalion pushing this type of program initially, had a very good extension rate among its younger Marines.
2. A programmed organization of the many additional CAC units presently planned to coincide with availability of personnel and equipment for these units.

IV. Presently programmed organization follows generally along these lines:

C H A R T

V. Some statistics concerning activities of existing CAC units during one week in July are indicated on this chart:

C H A R T

B-7

VI. In short, we feel that we have a good foundation for the organization of a larger CAC program. With availability of Marines and equipment needed to staff larger numbers of platoons, we can make tremendous strides forward in expanding this most important program.

B-7

10 Aug 1966

LOGISTICS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS:

Special and unusual considerations

I. OPERATION HASTINGS

- A. Determination of logistic support requirements.
- B. Establishment and operation of Logistic Support Area, DONG HA.
- C. Logistic operations peculiar to HASTINGS (charts with statistics).
 - 1. Fixed wing airlift resupply
 - 2. Sealift resupply. Special Landing Force (SLF) and SON
THACH HAN RIVER (LCU).
 - 3. Medical Evacuation
- D. Future Logistic Support of Operation PRAIRIE (Rein Inf Bn)

II. LOGISTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS PECULIAR TO DANANG, PHU BAI AND AN HOA TAORS.

A. DANANG TAOR

- 1. Supply Point distribution
- 2. Emergency resupply by helicopter, LVT and Otter.

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B. PHU BAI (with chart)

1. Rough Rider
2. Sea Lift
3. Fixed Wing

C. AN HOA

1. Fixed Wing
2. Helicopter (Resupply and Evacuation)
3. Rough Rider (on completion of highway to AN HOA)

III. ENGINEER EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF LOGISTIC OPERATIONS (Charts and Maps)

1. Roads and bridging within DANANG TAOR (including data on mine sweeps)
2. Engineer efforts in connection with opening of highway to AN HOA (include coordination with Mr. CAN)

(Statistics Attached)

OPERATION HASTINGS

LSA at DONG HA opened 6 July

Code name "HASTINGS" assigned 7 July

5 day level of supplies established by 3d MarDiv message 111610Z Jul

LSA personnel - DONG HA

	Officer	Enlisted
Shore Party Bn	6	78
SLF Shore Party Team	1	14
FLSG Augmentation	2	61
One Inf Co	3	150
Det 3d Med Bn	4	32
Det Comm Co	2	4
Co B (-) 3d MT Bn		48
MP Detachment		<u>7</u>
Total	18	394

Fixed wing C-130 sorties to DONG HA.

From DANANG 440

From BINH BAI 74

Airlifted tonnage of supplies by class

CL I 489

CL II 131

CL III 212

CL IV 182

CL V 3263

Resupply of DONG HA via sea lift

2 LCU's 244 s/t CL V

3 LCU's 1 Tank Plt 5 M48A3

Logistical support estimated through 7 August - daily

CL I	2250 lbs
CL II	250 lbs
CL III	2500 lbs
CL IV	2500 lbs
CL V	<u>42,500 lbs</u>
Total	50,000 lbs

Rough Rider convoys to PHU BAI and DONG HA during July.

DANANG to PHU BAI	2	
		83.6 tons CL I, II, III, IV
DANANG to DONG HA	1	
		70 tons CL V

Operation HASTINGS Med Evacs

DANANG	161
PHU BAI	96
USS REPOSE	293
USS PRINCETON	90
	<hr/>
Total	640

ENGINEER FACT SHEET

Engineer units have accomplished the following:

- a. Constructed and maintain 97,000 meters of roads
- b. Constructed and repaired 67 bridges
- c. Installed 212 culverts
- d. Daily sweep over 50,000 meters of roads for mines
- e. Produce over 210,000 gallons of water daily
- f. Graduated over 7,000 students from the Division Mine Warfare School

ROADS

A useable surface route to AN HOA will be opened by 27 August 1966.

Road progress during July includes:

- a. Construction of final 1,300 meters of route 1-D
- b. Repair of 8,400 meters of Route 14
- c. Construction of 4,200 meters of Route 5 (south) from Route 14 to SONG THU BON
- d. Improvement of 4,200 meters of road from AN HOA (north) (Mr. CAN)

In order to open up the area in the Southern part of the DANANG TAOR it has been recommended to III MAF that:

- a. A Class 60 fixed Bridge be constructed on Route 5 at the SONG TUY LOAN (VIC AT 947700)
- b. Bridges on Route 14 (VIC of 0156 and 9858) be repaired or replaced to provide class 60 capacity.
- c. A fixed bridge of class 60 capacity be constructed over the SONG THU BON (VIC of 9253)
- d. A road be constructed from the vicinity of 0766 to Route 1 (VIC 0346) to include a class 60 bridge over the SONG VINH DIEN (VIC 0464)

CHART 1OFFICER PERSONNEL STATUS

<u>RANK</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>31JUL</u>	<u>30SEP</u>
GEN	2	2	2
COL	17	19	17
LTCOL	54	39	33
MAJOR	119	86	92
CAPT	274	200	200
LT	581	666	636
WO	66	37	37
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	1113	1049	1017

3d MarDiv/G-1

PERSONNEL

1. Enlisted Personnel Status:

<u>AUTH</u>	<u>31JUL</u>	<u>31AUG</u>	<u>SHORTAGE</u> <u>31 AUG</u>
20290	18484	18658	1632

2. Significant enlisted shortages by OF - Stress downward trend in certain fields:

<u>OF</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>31JUL</u>	<u>31AUG</u>	<u>SHORTAGE</u> <u>31 AUG</u>
01	710	593	582	122
03	9354	8502	8991	363
13	1573	1304	1167	406
25	2426	2085	2035	391
28	339	293	274	65

3. Officer Personnel Status: See Chart 1 (Attached).

4. Significant Officer Shortages by MOS: See Chart 2 (Attached).

5. Personnel Status

a. Shortage of O3 personnel has resulted in average strength of rifle companies being 3 officers and 138 enlisted. This situation has improved during July. As of 4 August average strength of rifle companies was 4.4 officers and 157 enlisted.

b. M/L will be increased in First Quarter by approximately 1150 in OF 05. This will provide for 60mm mortar sections, scout-sniper platoons and CACs.

c. Based on information from FMFPac our O3 strength will increase, however, considering the new M/L increase it is anticipated we will still be about 1000 O3s short at the end of September.

6. Personnel Retention.

7. Extension of Tours.

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CHART 2SIGNIFICANT OFFICER SHORTAGES

<u>OF</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>31JUL</u>	<u>30SEP</u>	<u>SHORTAGE</u> <u>30SEP</u>
01/02/03/04	478	377	347	131
13	86	70	51	35
25	69	53	51	18

POSITION PAPERS FOR SELECTED TOPICS

1. TRANSITION FROM THE M-14 RIFLE TO THE M-16 RIFLE WITHIN THE 3D MARINE DIVISION.
2. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS.
3. REQUIREMENT FOR NCF SHIPS WITH LONGER RANGE GUNS.
4. DEADLINING OF TD-15 TRACTORS.
5. DEADLINING OF GENERATORS.
6. REQUIREMENT FOR IMPROVED POWER UNITS FOR TACTICAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM.
7. NEW FAMILY OF FM RADIO SETS: AN/PRC-25; AN/GRC-125; AN/MRC-109; AN/MRC-110.
8. KY-8 SPEECH SECURITY EQUIPMENT.
9. DEFECTIVE MORTAR AMMUNITION (SUSPENDED EXCEPT FOR COMBAT EMERGENCY USE ONLY).
10. NON-T/O REQUIREMENTS.
11. OFFICER RETENTION.
12. ENLISTED RETENTION.
13. EXTENSION OF TOURS.
14. M48A3 TANK MAINTENANCE FLOAT.
15. MARINE CORPS SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM.

TAB C

3d MarDiv/G-3 Section

AGENDA SUBJ: TRANSITION FROM THE M-14 RIFLE TO THE M-16 RIFLE WITHIN THE 3D MARDIV1. FACTS:

a. The 3d MarDiv will receive a limited number of M-16 rifles for training purposes. This initial shipment of rifles is expected during August 1966.

b. Training facilities for marksmanship training in the TAOR of the 3d MarDiv are limited.

c. Instructor personnel in the 3d MarDiv have completed a course of instruction on the M-16 rifle. Course of instruction was held at Okinawa.

2. DISCUSSION:

a. Upon arrival of the initial shipment of the M-16 rifles, the Division Instructor Team will conduct M-16 training for an appropriate number of personnel in each Infantry Regiment and the Reconnaissance Battalion who will, in turn, train personnel within their respective units.

b. Training facilities at the present are limited to ranges at two Regional Force Camps, one at Danang and one at Phu Bai. These ranges extend to 300 meters with a capacity of 25 targets on each range. They are available to Marine Forces on week-ends only, permitting extremely limited rifle marksmanship training. Plans are at the present, being processed for a complex of ranges in the Danang TAOR, to be controlled by 3d MarDiv. When completed these ranges will have the following facilities:

- (1) One 50 target rifle range with a range of 1000 meters.
- (2) One 25 target pistol range.
- (3) One 1000 inch range.
- (4) One live grenade range.
- (5) One M-79, 3.5 range.
- (6) A calibration range for tanks, artillery, etc.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. All unit marksmanship training will start after sufficient back-up of rifles, ammunition and spare parts are on hand as prescribed in current directives.

b. Continue reserve of M-14 rifles in country until the M-16 rifle has proven itself in the field, as a precautionary measure.

c. Priority be given to a training program for the M-16 rifle in CONUS for personnel being ordered to Marine Forces, WestPac.

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d. Marksmanship Training Unit, Quantico, Virginia conduct a test of the M-16 rifle to determine concrete facts to be published as training hints to assist commanders in the field during the transition period. Recommendations to include but not limited to, the following:

(1) Recommended maximum effective range (to get hits, not penetration factor).

(2) Recommended modification of firing positions if required.

(3) Sights and sight changes.

(4) Effects of wind.

(5) Dispersion radius at known distance targets. (Semi-automatic and Automatic fire).

(6) Recommended hold-off at different ranges.

(7) Recommended adjustment for battle sights.

(8) Recommended FAM course based on field conditions where time and facilities are limited.

4. ACTION BEING TAKEN:

a. A training program is being formulated to insure maximum effectiveness is maintained during the transition phase to the M-16 rifle.

5. ACTION REQUIRED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY:

a. Adoption of recommendations contained in subparagraphs 4.a., b., c., and d. above.

3d MarDiv/G-3 Section

AGENDA SUBJ: PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS1. FACTS:

a. At the present time, 3d Marine Division does not have a T/O and T/E designed to adequately support psychological operations.

b. The Marine Corps has no formal schools designed to qualify personnel to conduct effective psychological operations.

c. Marine Corps units in RVN are primarily utilizing the psychological operations capabilities of the other services.

2. DISCUSSION:

a. Operations in Vietnam have demonstrated an urgent requirement for employment of psychological operations which are an integral part of the present conflict. Each work and deed has psychological ramifications that may either create a psychological advantage or provide the enemy with a propaganda weapon. The objectives of psychological operations in the 3d Marine Division are:

(1) To gain the loyalty and support of the Vietnamese people.

(2) To explain to villagers the presence of U. S. Forces in Vietnam.

(3) To reduce the fighting effectiveness of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Forces by conducting psychological operations in conjunction with tactical operations.

(4) To appeal to the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Forces to defect under the CHIEN HOI (Open Arms) Program. The CHIEN HOI Program is the policy whereby the Government of Vietnam welcomes any Viet Cong or North Vietnamese soldier who rallies to the Government of South Vietnam.

b. Establishment of a T/O and T/E for psychological operations and assignment of selected personnel to a formal course of instruction, would greatly enhance Marine Corps Psychological Operations. The course should be of sufficient length to qualify personnel in all aspects of psychological operations. Upon completion of the school, personnel would be assigned an appropriate MOS.

c. At present, plans are being implemented to train certain 3d Marine Division personnel on OJT basis through agreement with the 244th USA Psy Ops Co, in Danang.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. It is recommended that:

(1) T/O and T/S be established for psychological operations.

(2) Regular quotas at existing service schools be obtained to train selected personnel in all aspects of psychological operations.

(3) All personnel who successfully complete the school be assigned an appropriate MOS prior to assignment to WestPac Forces.

4. ACTION BEING TAKEN:

a. A manning level has been established in the 3d Marine Division Headquarters to include a Psychological Operations Branch within the G-3 Section. This section consists of one officer and one SSgt. At present, an officer is assigned; the NOO billet is as yet unfilled.

b. A loudspeaker system was designed for broadcasting psychological operations tapes from either aircraft or vehicle. This system was designed, fabricated, and tested locally and has been employed extensively by three regiments of this Division with outstanding results by operating from Marine Corps helicopters at 2000 feet or from the ground with an effective range of 4000 meters. The command will continue to employ this capability.

c. Psychological leaflets were compiled in booklet form as a reference to rapid selection of standard leaflets for appropriate employment by 3d Marine Division units.

d. Close liaison is maintained with psychological operations units of other services. Their psychological operations capabilities are heavily relied upon to supply Marine units with equipment and guidance for programs within the Division.

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3D MARDIV/G-3 SECTION

TOPIC SUBJ: REQUIREMENT FOR NGF SHIPS WITH LONGER RANGE GUNS:

FACTS:

(a) The maximum effective ranges of the naval guns presently in commission are as follows:

5"/38	15,000 yds.	13,700 meters
5"/54	20,000 yds.	18,300 meters
6"/47	21,000 yds.	19,200 meters
8"/55	26,000 yds.	23,800 meters

(b) The weight of the HE projectile and the amount of explosive contained plus the penetrating power of the COMM/AP projectile when fired at a range of 6000 yards (5500 meters) are as follows:

Penetration at 6000 yds.

<u>Caliber</u>	<u>Proj</u>	<u>Expl</u>	<u>Concrete</u>	<u>Earth & Logs</u>	<u>Armor</u>
5"/38	54 lbs.	8 lbs.	2.5 ft.	5 ft.	2.5 in.
5"/54	70 lbs.	8 lbs.	Unk	Unk	Unk
6"/47	105 lbs.	14 lbs.	5 ft.	7.5 ft.	6 in.
8"/55	260 lbs.	21 lbs.	10 ft.	12 ft.	8 in.

There are presently four 6"/47 light cruisers and two 8"/55 heavy cruisers assigned to the Pacific Fleet. The Seventh Fleet is usually supported by two light cruisers and one heavy cruiser. During any given day, one of these ships is usually assigned NGF support duties in RVN.

DISCUSSION:

(a) As USMC operations in RVN have been expanding farther inland from the coast, the need for support of longer range naval gunfire has increased. At present, the naval gun which is in greatest supply is the 5"/38 with a range of 15,000 yards. This provides excellent support for coastal operations, but is insufficient in range to contribute

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to the increasing inland operations. The 5"/54 gun with its 20,000 yard range provides deeper support; however, the majority of these guns are on DDG/DLG type ships. Since the primary function of these missile ships is Anti-Air Warfare and support of the Seventh Fleet Strike Force, they are seldom assigned NGF support duties. Therefore, at any one time, there is usually only one 5"/54 ship assigned NGF support duties in RVN.

(b) In Operation HASTINGS (7 Jul - 3 Aug), the USMC TAOR was outside the range of any naval gunfire, although the ARVN TAOR was supportable. This ARVN area was 10% supportable by 5"/38, 60% supportable by 5"/54 and 6"/47, and nearly 90% supportable by 8"/55.

(c) In Operation MACON (4 Jul - continuing) only 5% of the TAOR was supportable by 5"/54 and 6"/47 whereas nearly 25% of the area was supportable by 8"/55.

(d) In Operation JAY (25 Jun - 2 Jul), the operating area was within the range of 5"/54 guns. However, on one occasion it was found that the fire power of this smaller caliber gun was insufficient to penetrate and destroy some of the enemy bunker fortifications. These bunkers would have been well within the destructive capabilities of a heavier caliber gun.

(e) Another benefit available from the CA is the greater endurance to remain on station. This, with the inherent mobility of naval gunfire, increases the present ability to deliver longer range fire power on short notice.

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3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) In view of the increasing USMC inland operations, the range and destructive capability of the 8"/55 naval gun, the ability of naval gunfire to attack targets quickly without prior warning, to remain on station for extended periods and to be available over a wide area, it is recommended that all possible efforts be made to procure an additional 8"/55 SALEM class CA for use as a NCF support ship in RVN.

4. ACTION BEING TAKEN:

(a) Working level discussions have been held between III MAF and 3d MarDiv Naval Gunfire Officers to assist III MAF in presenting the above recommendation to higher authority.

30 July 1966, Submitted:

Division Engineer

Agenda Subject: Deadlining of TD-15 Tractors

Ref: (a) CO, 3d Engr Bn ltr 4/JED/lck 11260 of 22 Oct 1965
 (b) CMC ltr AQ4K-nd-10 of 28 Dec 1965

1. Facts: The TD-15 tractor was placed in service in this Division on 18 June 1965. Several months delay had been necessary to complete modifications and attain repair parts stockage objectives.

The deadline rate for this tractor has been extremely high since it was placed in service. The current rate is 30 percent. During the period January - July 1966 the deadline rate has averaged 48 percent.

2. Discussion:

The TD-15 tractor was placed in service in the 3d Marine Division after months of delay in completing modifications and attaining parts stockage objectives. It has achieved a consistently high deadline rate since that time.

There are several factors which contribute to this condition. They are:

a. The tractor is not designed for heavy earthmoving. It is however the heaviest tractor in the Division engineer battalion T/E. While it is true that TD-18 tractors have been made available to the 3d Engineer Battalion on special allowance, the number available during most of the period in question has been so small that the TD-15 has had to be used for continuous heavy duty work. Since the TD-18 is obsolete its availability is limited.

b. The TD-15 is a versatile piece of equipment which performs well in light soil or sand. In RVN it has of necessity been used in heavy abrasive soil, deep mud and thick dust under adverse climatic conditions.

c. Operators and maintenance personnel were not well trained on this item of equipment before it was placed in service.

d. It was necessary to replace the suction fan with a blower fan to reduce radiator wear and the amount of dust in the engine compartment.

e. Parts availability has been totally inadequate to support the equipment in this operational environment.

Construction and earthmoving requirements in RVN are of such magnitude that most of the Division and Force engineer battalions' earth moving capability in this TAOR must of necessity be employed in heavy earth work. There are very few requirements which involve light work. The TD-15 is not designed or powered to perform heavy duty work.

As long as the TD-15 is used as it presently must be used and parts support is inadequate a high deadline rate will persist.

3. Recommendations:

That increased effort be made to improve the availability of parts for the TD-15.

That when stocks of the TD-18 are exhausted an adequate heavy duty tractor be provided Division engineer battalions operating in the environment and conditions found in RVN.

4. Action Being Taken:

The services of manufactures' technical representatives were requested. Representatives of International Harvester and Drott Incorporated arrived in December 1965. They conducted operator, maintenance and supervisory personnel training.

Continued training of operators and maintenance personnel is conducted.

An engineer equipment inspection and assistance program has been implemented in this Division to ensure more adequate levels of operator proficiency and equipment maintenance.

A special allowance of EIMCO tractors for the 3d Engineer Battalion was requested by reference (a). While this request was denied by reference (b) it also indicated that if the requirement still existed after distribution of the EIMCO tractor to FMFPac units had been completed it would be reconsidered at that time. If the requirement for a heavier tractor for the Division engineer battalion exists when distribution of the EIMCO tractor to FMFPac units is completed a request for reconsideration will be submitted.

Continuing effort is being made at this level to improve repair parts availability. Included is the use of high priority requisitions and "Red Ball".

5. Action Required by Higher Authority:

N/A

Division Engineer

Agenda Subj: Deadlining of Generators

1. Facts: Units of the 3d Marine Division are operating tactical generators, of 8 KW and above, on an around the clock basis to provide necessary power for communications equipment, command centers, refrigeration equipment, shop and maintenance equipment and for lighting. This is necessary because commercial power is not available.

Tactical generators are not designed for continuous running. The T/E provides no generator equipment that is.

Repair parts support for generators has been totally inadequate to support the useage in RVN.

Many of the generators which arrived in RVN with the Division were old on arrival. This, coupled with continuous useage and the lack of spare parts has produced a high deadline rate.

2. Discussion:

Non-availability of commercial power, lack of suitable continuous run type generators and extended deployment in a semi-garrison type environment have made it necessary to operate tactical generators on a continuous basis.

The age of the generators when introduced into RVN, the conditions of operation and lack of repair parts has resulted in an average deadline rate for 8-60 KW, 60 cps generators of 17 percent during the period January - July 1966. This figure is low because it does not reflect those deadlined generators which have been evacuated to 3d FSR for various reasons and 13 generators which are being processed in Yokosuka for rebuild.

Tactical generators are powered by high speed engines and are not suitable for continuous operation. Slow speed generators are not available to provide power for the facilities in which most units are housed. Therefore tactical generators must be used to provide required electrical power. Use under these circumstances results in an extremely high consumption rate for repair parts. Lack of these parts has resulted in a high deadline rate.

Supply action including the use of high priority requisitions and "Red Ball" has been taken to overcome the repair parts problem but it seemingly defies solution.

CMC has precured forty (40) 100 KW MUSE generators for delivery to III MAF. These will partially relieve the requirement for continuous operation of tactical generators. There are many requirements which are too small for economical use of 100 KW generators. Many units are too widely separated to be serviced by a single power source unless transformers and a high voltage distribution system are installed. These are not readily available.

3. Recommendations:

That action be taken to provide slow speed, continuous run generators in the 30 - 100 KW range for units deployed in semi-garrison conditions.

That additional efforts be made to improve the repair parts availability for tactical generators.

4. Action Being Taken:

Continuing supply efforts are being made at this level to improve repair parts availability. These include the use of high priority requisitions and "Red Ball".

Recommendations concerning requirements for non-tactical generators for semi-garrison conditions were made at a CMC sponsored conference on expeditionary power at HQMC in December 1965.

5. Action Required by Higher Authority:

N/A

COM SELECT SECTION

AGENDA SUBJ: Requirement for improved power units for Tactical Communication System

1. FACTS

a. High failure rates exist with tactical communication equipment generators.

b. When conditions permit camp power is used to power tactical communication equipment. This type of power is limited by suitability, availability and reliability of the camp power system.

2. DISCUSSION

a. More than 50% of the organic power sources become un-serviceable when tactical communications are fully employed over extended periods. Repair of these power units required submission to FLSG often with subsequent evacuation of the equipment from Vietnam.

b. To maintain communications under these conditions camp power sources are used but this is only a partial solution to the problem. The remoteness of tactical equipment and the special power requirements (400 cycle and 3 phase) often preclude the use of camp power.

c. A critical need exists to obtain reliable power for tactical equipment over extended periods of time.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS. Additional sources of dependable 60 cycle and 400 cycle power should be made available for tactical communication equipments.

4. ACTION BEING TAKEN

a. CG, 3d MarDiv spdltr 10A/RAF/ptm over 2302 of 30 July 1966 requested the addition of 15 PU-392/GRC to organic assets for operation with AN/TRC-27 radios.

b. CMC message 271930Z/APR 66 authorized requisitioning of PU-549/G to replace unsatisfactory PU-454/G generators.

c. A maintenance float allowance of 60 cycle generators PU-239 and PU-482 is being established at FLSG to provide replacement for items evacuated for repair.

5. ACTION REQUIRED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY

a. A favorable reply to our speedletter request for 15 PU-392/GRC is requested.

b. Expedite delivery of PU-549/G generators on requisition.

Agenda Subj: New family of FM Radio Sets: AN/PRC-25; AN/GRC-125;
AN/MRC-109; AN/MRC-110

1. Facts: These radios are presently being distributed in accordance with instructions received from FMFPac. Distribution of Radio Sets AN/PRC-25 and AN/GRC-125 to subordinate units commenced on 4 August 1966 and is expected to be completed during August. The AN/PRC-25s and AN/GRC-125s, will be placed in service immediately upon receipt. The Radio Sets AN/MRC-109 and AN/MRC-110 have been distributed to the users but are presently on administrative deadline pending receipt of initial spares and repair parts (CG III MAF 181108Z July 1966). Liaison with 3d FSR disclosed that approximately 80% of the required spare/repair parts for the $\frac{1}{2}$ ton, 4x4, M151A1 associated with AN/GRC-125 and AN/MRC-12 family of radio equipment are available and approximately 90% of the spare/repair parts for the radio sets are available.
2. Discussion: This Division has had available for approximately six months 173 AN/PRC-25s and 106 AN/GRC-125s from an allowance established by III MAF from limited assets made available to them. The performance of the Radio Sets AN/PRC-25 and AN/GRC-125 have proven to be superior to that experienced with the AN/PRC series of radios. The availability of the initial assets of the AN/PRC-25 and AN/GRC-125 down to and including the company level has permitted operator training to be conducted. No operator training problems beyond the capability of this command to correct are anticipated at this time. Operator training for the Radio Sets AN/MRC-109/110 will be conducted by the use of Contact Instruction Teams from FMFPac and this Division. This program is presently underway.
3. Recommendations: Expedite the procurement and delivery to RVN of the repair/spare parts necessary to remove the Radio Sets AN/MRC-109/110 (including the M151A1) from administrative deadline.
4. Action being taken: Close liaison being maintained with FLC and 3d FSR to insure orderly phase-in and to ascertain date of anticipated delivery of spare/repair parts.
5. Action required by higher authority: 3d FSR continue to monitor status of repair/spare parts and ship to RVN as soon as required levels are achieved.

3d MarDiv/CEO

Agenda Subj: KY-8 Speech Security Equipment

1. Facts: The TSEC/KY-8 is a half-duplex wide-band speech security device. It will be used with the Radio Sets AN/MRC-109 and AN/MRC-110. Radio Set AN/VRC-12, the basic component involved, is the only radio equipment designed and built to operate directly with the KY-8; all others require modifications of varying degree.

2. Discussion: This Division presently has sufficient assets of KY-8 to permit its employment. Three factors prevent its employment at the present time. These are:

a. Radio Sets AN/MRC-109/110 are on administrative deadline (CG, III MAF 181108Z July 1966 applies).

b. Key lists have not been distributed and an in-service date has not been announced (CG, III MAF 211024Z July 1966).

c. Shortage of KY-8 technicians MOS 2847. As of 4 August the Division had on board 13 of 39 technicians rated with 8 due in during August.

3. Recommendations:

a. That Radio Sets AN/MRC-109 and AN/MRC-110 be removed from administrative deadline as soon as possible.

b. That key lists be provided and an in-service date established.

c. That additional KY-8 technicians (MOS 2847) be made available.

4. Action being taken: G-1 requested input of 18 MOS 2847 this date.

5. Action required by higher authority: Program input of MOS 2847 into the 3d Marine Division to meet manning level figures

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THIRD MARINE DIVISION/ACoS G-4

AGENDA SUBJ: Defective Mortar Ammunition (Suspended Except For Combat Emergency Use Only)

1. **FACTS:** All 60mm mortar HE ammunition and M43 series 81mm mortar HE ammunition in-country is currently suspended except for combat emergency use only due to premature detonations and frequent misfires and duds. Approximately 75% of this Division's 81mm mortar HE assets are of the M43 series round.

All 60mm mortar HE ammunition and the M43 series 81mm mortar HE ammunition is fuzed with the M52 series point detonating fuze.

New production ammunition is fuzed with the M525 and M526 series fuzes, a version of the M52 series fuze modified by the addition of a delay arming head, or by an entirely new fuze.

The Marine Corps has procured sufficient quantities of the delay arming head to modify all M52 series fuzes on ammunition in stock.

2. **DISCUSSION:** The M52 series fuzes are a very old design not incorporating modern safety features. This fuze becomes armed as soon as it clears the mouth of the mortar tube and the bore-riding safety pin is ejected. Premature detonations have been experienced at any place along the trajectory. Most rounds equipped with the fuze are of Korean War vintage. Internal corrosion often causes failure of the fuze to arm resulting in a dud. In addition, time and the tropical climate have caused the deterioration of ignition cartridges and propellant increments resulting in misfires and short rounds. It has been necessary, from time to time, to withdraw entire lots from all use because of an unacceptable rate of malfunctions.

Defective and/or dangerous ammunition is a morale problem as well as a factor decreasing combat effectiveness. A high dud rate is undesirable because duds can be made into mines and booby traps by the Viet Cong.

Ammunition subject to frequent malfunctions and resultant suspensions generates burdensome turn-in, storage and reporting problems for the tactical commander.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS: That this command be furnished with new or reworked 60 and 81mm mortar ammunition as soon as possible.

That no further shipments of unreworked ammunition be sent in-country.

4. ACTION BEING TAKEN: Ammunition malfunctions are being closely monitored. Subordinate units have been directed to carefully inspect all rounds before firing and set aside those which show evidence of damage, corrosion or submersion. Special safety precautions have been published to assist mortar crews in protecting themselves against the effects of premature detonations.

CG III MAF msg 030038Z Aug queried FMFPac whether any program was planned for rework of the 60 and 81mm HE ammunition. CG III MAF also requested information regarding any plan to place serviceable ammunition in the pipeline if no program for rework was planned.

5. ACTION REQUIRED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY: Expedite rework of M52 series fuzes to ensure that adequate stocks are available to support the operating forces.

Agenda Subj: Non T/O Requirements

1. Facts:

a. During the past year the 3d Marine Division has been providing personnel for 60mm mortar sections, scout sniper platoons and combined action platoons/companies without an increase in authorized strength or without an increase in personnel. This draw down on OF O3 has resulted in Rifle Companies being at reduced strength. This has degraded the combat effectiveness of rifle companies in sustained combat.

2. Discussion:

a. T/O increases for the 60mm mortar have been approved by Headquarters Marine Corps. Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, reports that the FY 67 Manning Level will be increased during the first quarter by an estimated 1150 in OF O3 which will provide 60mm mortar sections, scout sniper platoons and combined action companies.

b. Current enlisted personnel status OF O3 is as follows:

	<u>Auth</u>	<u>On Board 31 July</u>	<u>Projected 31 Aug</u>	<u>Shortages 31 Aug</u>
FY66	9354	8502	8991	363
FY67	10504	8502	8991	1513

The personnel forecast by Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, (CG FMFPac 260342Z CONF to III MAF) predicts a substantial increase in OF O3 by 30 September that would put the 3d Marine Division within about 500 personnel of authorized strength in OF O3. These figures, however, are based on rotational losses and do not include casualties. Based on the best information available it appears the 3d Marine Division will be approximately 1000 personnel short in OF O3 by the end of September. This shortage coupled with the added draw-down generated by the activation of additional combined action units will continue to hold our rifle companies at a seriously low strength.

c. The method of operation in Vietnam which requires task organizing from three or four regiments for major operations while still maintaining the integrity of the TAQRS generates an additional requirement for personnel. The net result is the employment of two or three company battalions with the companies at effective strengths of 130 Marines or less.

3. Recommendations:

a. Recommend that OF O3 assets in the Marine Corps be re-evaluated with a view to bringing the 3d Marine Division to authorized strength at the earliest date possible.

Agenda Subj: Officer Retention**1. Facts:**

a. During FY 66 twelve reserve officers applied for augmentation and seventeen officers applied for extensions of active duty. Ninety three reserve officers did not desire to apply for a regular commission for a variety of reasons none of which established a definite pattern. This was reported to CMC during June by CG FMFPac.

2. Discussion:

a. The importance of retaining trained experienced officers in the Marine Corps is clearly recognized. Success of a retention program calls for the highest caliber of leadership and guidance at each command level. This program will be stressed as a continuous command responsibility.

b. MCO 1120.20C of 10 December 1965 provided for submission of applications for augmentation from 10 December 1965 to 1 April 1966. Selection for augmentation is limited to one time each fiscal year. It is considered that a program that is limited to only a portion of the fiscal year does not permit a command to capitalize on those opportune periods when an officer is highly motivated toward the Marine Corps as a career. The majority of young officers coming to Vietnam are highly motivated and this motivation can best be guided toward a career as a Marine Officer by having a continuing augmentation program. Such a program would permit application at any time and selections could be made quarterly. This would provide a continuing program that would best meet the situation in Vietnam.

3. Recommendation:

a. That an augmentation program be established for FY 1967 that will authorize submission of applications throughout the year with prompt board action at or near the end of each fiscal quarter.

Agenda Subj: Enlisted Retention

1. Facts:

a. The reenlistment rate for the 3d Marine Division from 1 January 1966 to 31 July 1966 is as follows:

	<u>1st Term</u>	<u>Career</u>	<u>Total</u>
Eligible & Recommended	152 163	189	341 352
Reenlisted	43 49	174	217 223
Not Recommended	13 15	0	13 15
Percentage	20% 35.5%	92% 94%	63.6% 66.7%
Career Length Extensions	12 9	29 3	41 12
Short Term Extensions	97 107	26 12	123 119

b. Career Advisory Assistants are appointed on either a primary or additional duty basis on company/battery level.

c. The critical need for retention of skilled and experienced Marines has been presented at the Commanding General's Conference and the Sergeants Major Conference.

d. There are 364 first term enlisted who are due for discharge or release from active duty in October 1966. (the month in which involuntary extensions terminate). Attention is being concentrated on these personnel.

e. Command information programs provide dissemination of information on career benefits and incentives.

f. Division Order P1133.1C of 9 July 1966 establishes the Division Career Advisory Program. Highlights of this program include:

(1) Three formal interviews in the last month of active service. The initial interview 12 months prior to EAS.

(2) Insertion of interview reports in the SRB when the individual is transferred to CONUS.

(3) Stresses early reenlistments and extensions.

(4) Bi-monthly Training Conferences for all Career Advisory Personnel.

g. A mobile Career Advisory Team of one officer and two enlisted has been established. This team will visit and assist all commands in the Division.

2. Discussion:

a. The Divisions reenlistment program has had moderate success but an increased reenlistment rate is expected to result from increased command attention. To further improve the effectiveness of the retention program bi-monthly conferences were initiated at the Division Level. The first of these training conferences was held in July. This conference covers latest policies, incentives, interview techniques, problem areas and goals.

b. Reenlistment incentives and career benefits are more lucrative than at any previous time. The environment here in the Division for reenlistment is particularly good.

c. A Career Advisory Information Booth is being established in the large Post Exchange located in the Red Cross, USO, and Post Exchange complex in the Danang TAOR. An estimated 5500 Marines visit this installation daily. Information and handouts will be available on all matters of career guidance including bonuses, options, and benefits.

d. Reenlistment and Extension percentage could be increased by:

(1) Receiving a monthly "shopping list of quotas" for formal schools and specific posts and stations. This information to be available to the Division six months in advance of execution of orders. Such quotas would be based on the number of personnel eligible for reenlistment at the time of rotation. This would give the program and the individual a degree of stability and would increase the stability of posts and stations. This would work as follows:

(a) 3d Marine Division in August reports 25 personnel eligible for reenlistment due for rotation during March. In September Headquarters Marine Corps established a quota for five for formal schools and ten for specific posts and stations. 3d Marine Division has three months to fill quotas through reenlistment.

(2) Relaxation of restriction of assignment of personnel with critical MOSs to the more desirable posts and stations on reenlistment or long term extensions. It is recognized that this is not desirable from the critical skill viewpoint, however, if Marines will extend for two years and complete six years in the Marine Corps he is very susceptible to becoming a career Marine.

3. Recommendations:

a. Establish limited quotas for formal schools and specific posts and stations as reenlistment options.

b. Relax the restriction of assignment of critical MOS's to posts and stations on reenlistment or extension.

Agenda Subj: Extension of Tours

1. Facts:

a. Extensions of tour from August 1965 to January 1966 averaged 55 per month. From February to July 1966 the average has increased to 88 per month.

b. Continuous efforts are being made to encourage extensions of tours to alleviate shortages of personnel and to retain experienced and trained personnel.

2. Discussion:

a. The increase in extensions of tours is primarily attributable to the authority to grant leave in WestPao.

b. A major deterrent is the objection of dependents or parents. This could be overcome by guaranteeing an option for geographic choice of duty in CONUS upon completion of a minimum of a six month extension.

3. Recommendation: Guarantee personnel who extend their overseas tours six months or longer transfer to a geographic location in CONUS upon completion of extended tour.

3d MarDiv G-4
4 August 1966AGENDA SUBJ: M48A3 Tank Maintenance Float1. FACTS:

a. Prior to the publication of FMFPac Order 4000.19, no maintenance float was established for the subject end item.

b. FMFPac Order 4000.19 established a maintenance float of 10 M48A3 tanks to be established at the 3d FSR.

c. CG, 3d MarDiv msg 190032Z Jun 66 requested that the 10 M48A3 tanks be positioned at FLC.

d. This item was discussed at the WestPac Logistics conference at I MAC Forward during 19-20 Jul 66. At that time the 1st MarDiv stated that it had no requirement for an in-country maintenance float of M48A3 tanks. The 3d MarDiv reiterated its position that an in-country maintenance float of M48A3 tanks was essential to the provision of continuous tank support for this division. It was recommended that a maintenance float of M48A3 tanks less those required to support 9th MAB, be established at FLC to support the 3d MarDiv.

e. Follow up action contained in FMFPac msg 031105Z Aug directed a split of maintenance float assets currently held at 3d FSR in accordance with FMFPac Order 4000.19. It further contained instructions to 3d FSR to ship 5 M48A3 tanks to FLC for use in maintenance float.

2. DISCUSSION:

Tank operations by the 3d MarDiv have produced very satisfactory results but have also resulted in 40 major mine incidents since Sept 1965. These incidents have caused the tanks to be deadlined for periods of 1 day to several months. The initiative and hard work demonstrated by the 3d Tank Battalion precluded what is conservatively estimated to be a continuous deadline of 10 vehicles.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS: None4. ACTION BEING TAKEN:

Monitor M48A3 shipments until arrival in-country.

5. ACTION REQUIRED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY: None

C-14

Agenda Subj: Marine Corps School Construction Program

1. **Facts:** As one part of its Civic Action Program the 3d Marine Division is engaged, with the Vietnamese people, in the construction of a number of school classrooms. Currently there are plans for constructing a total of 34 classrooms and of these 26 are already underway.
2. **Discussion:** The building of a school, or an addition to an existing school, makes an excellent civic action project and most major units within the TAOR are engaged in this activity. These projects are not forced on local authorities. In most cases the request for assistance has come from the village or hamlet and in every case coordination has been effected with District or Province officials to insure that teachers will be available, and that continued support will be received from the government.

These are essentially self-help projects, with supervision provided by Marines and materials supplied by Marines and by other U. S. agencies. Marines, in general, supply lumber, hardware (nails, belts, screening) and gravel; USAID supplies cement and textbooks; school kits and teachers' kits will be supplied by CARE.

The 7th Engineers has organized an earth block factory, employing refugees, to make the blocks used in building construction. Refugees are paid in rice. So far, over 17,000 blocks have been produced.

Following are some of the units which have school or classroom projects:

1st AmTrac Bn - has two classrooms under construction at Cam Le Bac (014718). The foundation is laid and the walls half completed. This project is unique in that the 59th ARVN Bn is assisting with four carpenters. This same battalion has expressed interest in constructing two classrooms at Hoa Cuong and we are assisting by furnishing the building material.

7th Engineer Bn - has completed building the forms for the foundation and plans to pour the deck for 6 classrooms at Hoa Khanh (955786) village. Blocks have been delivered to the site.

3d Tank Bn - has leveled the ground and plans to pour the foundation this week for a single classroom at Phong Bac (998708). This will be added to an existing two room structure that the 3d Tank Battalion had previously constructed.

3d Engineer Bn - plans to start construction 10 August on a six room school at Phu Ha Hamlet (910736).

4th Marines - are working on 9 classrooms in the Phu Bai area. Cement, lumber and the required hardware has been shipped to them.

3d AT Bn - has all the required materials for a one room school at Yen Bac (985708). Estimated completion date is 25 August.

HoBn - has completed a 5 classroom school at Hoa Phat (988765). This, unlike the others, is a private school. The Buddhist monk who operates the school and an orphanage came to the Division directly for assistance and the school was "adopted" by Headquarters Battalion.

3. Recommendations: None. As soon as current projects are completed others will be started. One of the limitations is the production of earth blocks. Another has been the effect of tactical operations on the time and effort which can be devoted by some units. It is expected, however, that these visible examples of U. S. - Vietnamese cooperation will continue to multiply.

DECLASSIFIED

ITINERARY

TAB D

DECLASSIFIED

ITINERARY FOR CMC VISIT TO 3D MARDIV ON WEDNESDAY, 10 AUGUST 1966

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>RESPONSIBLE STAFF OFFICER/COMMANDER</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
<u>10AUG66</u>			
0710-0730	Enroute to 2/3 CP	CG 3d MarDiv	By Helo
0730-0815	Visit/Tour 2/3 CP (Dai Loc, AT 916582) and Old Fort	CO 3d Marines	
0815-0825	Enroute An Hoa	CG 3d MarDiv	By Helo
0825-0900	Briefing/Tour An Hoa	CO 9th Marines	
0900-0910	Enroute 9th Mar CP (Hill 55)	CG 3d MarDiv	By Helo
0910-0950	Briefing/Tour/Visit Hill 55 Complex and unit positions	CO 9th Marines	
0950-1000	Enroute County Fair	CG 3d MarDiv	By Helo
1000-1030	Visit County Fair (072625)	CO 1st Marines	
1030-1040	Enroute Hoa Phu (CAC-32)	CG 3d MarDiv	By Helo
1040-1105	Visit CAC-32 Hoa Phu (924723)	CO 3d Marines	
1105-1145	Enroute Phu Bai via Marine Air Freight	CG 3d MarDiv	By Fixed Wing
1145-1200	Enroute 4th Mar CP. Drive by "A" Med, HMM-161 and FLSU	CG 3d MarDiv	By Vehicle
1200-1300	Lunch - Include CO, 1st ARVN Div (Col Truong) and Mayor Hue (LtCol Khea)	CO 4th Marines	
1300-1400	Preliminary Briefing on Operation HASTINGS, Tour of 4th Marines CP and Camp	CO 4th Marines	
1400-1430	Enroute Dong Ha	CG 3d MarDiv	By Fixed Wing
1430-1530	Visit/Tour Bn CP, Dong Ha and Cam Le	CO 4th Marines	By Helo
1530-1630	Enroute Air Freight	CG 3d MarDiv	By Fixed Wing
1745	Depart for 3d Marine Division		By Helo

1800-2000 Dinner/Social CG's Mess

CG 3d MarDiv

2000-2100 Briefing CP Conference Room

2100 Depart Division CP for III MAF

By Hole

CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE FORM - CONFIDENTIAL
3d MarDiv - 2100/1

MAF DE DIV 3 NR 444

ZNY CCCC

P 111315 Z

FM COC THIRD MARDIV

TO COC III MAF

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECIAL SIT REP OPN WILCOX NO 1

DTG 111800H

FOR PERIOD 110630H-111800H

A.

A/1/9 966585

D/1/9 962607

1/9 971619

B. CONDUCTED CLEARING OPERATIONS, PSY WAR EFFORT, SCREENED CIVILIAN POPULACE WITHIN WILCOX AREA OF OPERATION.

EEEE

C.

1. AO 110745H A CO BLOCK 993606 SAW SIX VC W/WEAPONS.

MARINOB FIRED 15 RDS SA, 20 HE 81MM AND 20 WP. 1 VC KBGF (CONF)

2. AT 110830H A CO BLOCK LOCATED VIC AT 993606 OBS 14-15

0BFWR3 WEAPONS. MARIN

EEEEEEEEEE 14-15 VC W/3 WEAPONS. MARINES FIRED 2 RDS SA AND 15 HE AND

16 WP 81MM ROUNDS. UNDETERMIND RESULTS.

3. AT 110950H A CO BLOCKING FORCE VIC AT 996EE 992606 OBS 1 VC W/PACK AND WEAPONS RUNNING OUT OF HUTS WEARING GREEN JUNGLE UNIFORM. MARINES FIRED 10 RDS 7.62MM UNDETERMIND RESULTS.

4. AT 111059H CO A BLOCKING FORCE VIC AT 9936EE AT 993608EE

AT 993806 REC 8 RDS AUTO CARBINE FIRE FM VIC AT 996EE 994604. MARINES RETURNED 150 7.62MM RDS. 100 MAYPN TAM-79, CALLEDIMYTY MISSIONM QEEE

1 VC KBGF (PROB)

5. AT 111230H A CO BLOCKING FORCE VIC AT 992606 REC 1 RD SA FROM SNIPER AT 992603. MARINES FIRED 1 SA RD CALLED 81M M MISSION.

FIRED 45 HE, 1 WP. UNDETERMINED RESULTS.

6. AT 111400H A CO PPB VIC 989607 REC 15 RDS AUTO CARBINE FROM 3 DIRECTIONS VIC AT 994605. MARINES FIRED 50 RDS 7.62MM, 10 M-79

CALLED 81MM MORTAR FIRE MISSION, FIRED 25 HE, 5 WP. UNDETERMINED RES.

D. RALLIERS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED 4 MALES AS VC. ALL RETAINED AND SENT TO ITT. 3 VC WIA AND 12 VCS APPREHENGED AT 11100EE 111100H.

CHOPPED OPCON E/2/9 TO 2/9.

E. PREPARE FOR AND CONDUCT NIGHT DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

F.

USMC


VC

NONE

1 KBGF (CONFKV)

1 KBGF (PROB)

BT



Return to COC

11

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MESSAGE FORM - SECRET


3rd MarDiv - 2100/2

DRAFTER 5P/JBH/das
SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE 3
CNC

CCH 817

IMMEDIATE 130700Z AUG 66

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG THIRD MAF
INFO: CG FIRST MAF
COMUSMACV
COMNAVFORV
COMNAVSUPACT DEG
CTF 115
CTF 116
CTF 115.1
CG I CORPS ADV GRP



Swanee File

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SCHM THU BON RIVER SURVEY

A. CG III MAF MSG 060852Z

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE (A) SUBJECT OPERATION SCHEDULED TO COMMENCE 14 AUG 66.

2. FOLLOWING SUPPORT REQUIRED:

A. NAVAL GUNFIRE REQUIREMENTS: (STANDARD REQUEST FORMAT GUN 10)

- (1) SUPPORT THU BON RIVER SURVEY OPERATIONS
- (2) 1 5"/54 DE
- (3) DE 235575
- (4) 140700H
- (5) UNTIL 191800H
- (6) OPPORTUNITY
- (7) THIRD MARDIV
- (8) MGF SPOT PRI 3224 KCS USB. 5120 KCS USB. TODAY 26 OSCAR.

TODAY 26 CHARLIE BORNH. TODAY 26 CHARLIE SOUTH.

PAGE OF PAGES

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SECRETMESSAGE FORM - ~~SECRET~~ AIR SPOT 262.2 MCS. SACRED (LETTER SUFFIX)
3d-MFGDiv - 2100/2

A. AIR REQUIREMENTS:

(1) AIR REQUIREMENTS ARE SUBSTANTIAL AND ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION. REQUEST SUFFICIENT PRIORITY BE ASSIGNED TO ENSURE THE FOLLOWING: #

(A) AC AND GUNSHIPS ON STATION THROUGHOUT DAYLIGHT HOURS; MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY COND III DURING DARKNESS.

(B) BALD EAGLE MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY COND IV THROUGHOUT OPERATION.

(C) TWO RESUPPLY ACFT AVAILABLE AS REQUIRED DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS, MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY COND IV FOR EMER RESUPPLY DURING DARKNESS.

(D) MINIMUM 80 MAN WAVE LIFT CAPABILITY AS REQUIRED TO DISPLACE COVER ELEMENTS ON PACE OF MIKE 8. REQUIREMENT MINIMIZED IF TERRAIN TRAFFICABLE BY LVT - MAJOR EFFORT IF LVT'S UNABLE TRAVERSE TERRAIN.

~~(E) VMA ON STATION DURING TRAVERSE RIVER SECTOR DISTRICT PAN ORGANIC ARMY; NORMAL STRIP ALERT BALANCE OF OPN.~~ *used*

(F) FLARE PLANE - PRIORITY ACCESS TO NORMAL I CORPS SUPPORT.

(2) IN ADDITION TO THE FOREGOING CONTINUING REQUIREMENTS RELATED PLANE INCLUDE HELILIFT OF THREE COMPANIES FROM VIC NINTH MARINES CP TO FOLLOWING HELZ. ONE CO 995523 - ONE CO 970518 - ONE CO 989384 AND 983528. DESIRE MINIMUM 150 MAN WAVE LIFT CAPABILITY THIS PURPOSE. DATE OF EXECUTION TO BE DETERMINED BY PROGRESS OF SURVEY PARTY.

C. NECESSARY CLEARANCE FOR FIRE SUPPORT AREAS WILL BE OBTAINED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS FROM THE SECTOR HQTRS QUANG NAM SECTOR.

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
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31 Mes Div - 210972

3. CLAIMS/COMPENSATION. REQUEST III MAP TAKE REQUIRED ACTION RE FOREIGN CLAIMS RESULTING FROM THIS OPERATION.

4. FRAG ORDER TO FOLLOW TO INCLUDE OVERLAY OF AREA OF OPERATIONS.

GP-4

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
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3d MarDiv - 2100/2

MAF DI DIVE
NR 915

ZNY SSSSS
P 211405Z AUG 66
FM COC THIRD MARDIV
TO COC III MAF
BT
SECRET
TERMINATION OP SWANNEE
1. TERMINATE OP SWANNEE EFFECTIVE 212000H AUG 66.
GP-4
BT



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
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3d MarDiv - 2100/2

DRAFTER 30PNS/URG/jiw
SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE-3
CWO *[Signature]*

CGN 1346

IMMEDIATE 22 0120 AUG66

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: FOURTH MARINES (RSAR)
INFO: CG III MAF
CG FMAW
THIRD MARDIV



//SECRET//

OP OTTAWA AND OP PAWNEE

Ref

A. FOURTH MARINES MSG 211122Z AUG 66

1. REF A APPROVED.

2. TERMINATE OP OTTAWA 221600H AUG. COMMENCE OP PAWNEE 241200H AUG 1966.

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3d MarDiv - 2100/2

14

DRAFTER 3OP: CRC/rvk
SEC G-3, PHONE SHOVE-3
CWO

H

CCN 2091

IMMEDIATE 311925Z AUG 66

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG III MAF
INFO: 3D MARINES

// SECRET //

EXTENSION OF PAWNEE AREA TO LANG CO BRIDGE

1. IT IS REQUESTED THAT OPERATION PAWNEE AREA BE EXTENDED TO THE FOLLO
FROM AT 860940 EAST ALONG AT 94 GL TO AT 920940, NORTH TO AT 920946, N
ALONG COASTLINE TO AU 860016. THEN SOUTH ALONG 86 GL TO AT 860940. DI
OF EXTENSION TO COINCIDE WITH PAWNEE.

2. IT IS INTENDED TO CONDUCT S&D OPERATIONS IN ASSIGNED AREA TO INCLU
SEARCH OF LIKELY AMBUSH POSITIONS ALONG HIGHWAY AND BRIDGES IN ZONE PR
TO ELECTION STAND DOWN. PLAN TO COMMENCE OPNS IN THIS AREA 2 SEP.

GP-4

311925

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3d MarDiv - 2100/1

MAF DE DIV 3 NR 081

P 030025Z

FM COC THIRD MARDIV

TO COC III MAF

BT

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SITREP OPN BUCKS NR 1 -022400H

A. LOCATIONS

1) C/1/1 CP BT 090653, ESTABLISHED BLOCKING FORCE ALONG SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF OBJ AREA FROM BT 084658 TO BT 115650.

2) I/3/1 CP BT 068713

3) K/3/1 CP BT 072669 ESTABLISHED BLOCKING PSN ALONG WESTERN BOUNDARY OF OBJ AREA FROM BT 071699 TO BT 084658.

4) L/3/9 CP BT 078708 ESTABLISHED BLOCKING PSN ALONG NORTHERN & EASTERN BOUNDARIES OF OBJ AREA FROM BT 073698 TO BT 086700 TO BT 114651.

5) 2 FLT M/3/1 CP 073699

B. NEG CONTACT

C. NONE

D. NONE

E. MAINTAIN PRESENT BLOCKING PSNS IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARMORED CONNECTION PATROLS ALONG SHORE IN OPNS AREA. AT FIRST LIGHT CONDUCT DETAILED & SYSTEMATIC SEARCH OF SECTOR 1. SEE FRAGORDER 30-66.

BT

23

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DE MAF QSL UR NR 081 ZUB 03/0045Z

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03 AUG 1966

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MESSAGE FORM - CONFIDENTIAL
3d MarDiv - 2100/1

22

MAF DE DIV 3 NR 082

P 030030Z

FM COC THIRD MARDIV

TO COC III MAF

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

SITREP OPN BUCKS NR 2 022400-030600H

A. NO CHANGE

B. AT 030035H SEAWARD ESCAPE ROUTES SECURED. OTHR UNITS NO CHANGE.

C

PTL CRAFT (LEDGER) 1/3/1 -20 AT 030110H, FR GS (BT 1165,) VC (BT 114649). SPOTTED MAN IN BASKET BOAT APPROX 200 YDS FM SHORE TRYING TO EVADE PATROL CAEE CRAFT, CRAFT FIRED 1 WARNING SHOT, MAN CONTINUED TO EVADE, PTL OPENED UP WITH 50 RDS SA, AT THIS TIME PTL CRAFT REC UNK NR OF SA FIRE FM VIL AT ABOVE VC COORD. BROKE CONTACT WITH BASKET BOAT UNITL FIRE FM VIL CEASED. UPON RESUMPTION OF SEARCH FOR BASKET BOAT NOTHING COULD BE FOUND.

D. NONE

E. AT 030630H TO COMMENCE S&C OPNS IN PHASE SECTOR ONE FOLLOWING GS (BT 0713) (0767) (0768) & (0769) UTILIZING 1/3/1 FOR SEARCH ELEMENT.

BT

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03 0030
100 03/005324

03 AUG 1967

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COMMUNICATION CENTER
3D MARINE DIVISION

MAF DE 3DIV NR 167
ZNY CCCCC
R 042310Z
FM COC THIRD MARDIV
TO: MAF
BT

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3

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OPN BUCKS SITREP 050600H

- A. NO CHANGE
 - B. CONT ACTIVITIES, MAINTAIN PRES PSN & K CO ASSUMES MSN PRES MSN
 - A' MOBILE SWEEP FORCE WHILE CO 1 REVERTS TO BLOCKING FORCE.
 - C. NONE
 - D. NONE
 - E. MAINTAIN PRES PSNS TO INSURE ISOLATION OF GENERAL AREA.
CO K & 4/5 ARVN REGT WILL CONT S&C OPNS WITH IN SECTOR 2GS BT 0965 AND 1065
 - F. NO CHANGE
- BT

NNN
DIV DE MAF QSL UR NR 167 AT 04/2313Z
KKK

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05 AUG 1988

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end

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COMMUNICATION CENTER
3D MARINE DIVISION

50

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NAF DE DIV 3 279--279
P 070930Z
FM COC THIRD MAR DIV
TO COC III MAF
BT

SITREP FOR PERIOD 070600H TO 071200H (OPN BUCK)

- A. LOCATIONS: CO COMMAND POST AND BLOCKING POSITIONS REMAIN THE SAME EXCEPT FOR CO K 3/1 CO POSITIONS A VBT 088678 FRONT LINE POSITIONS FROM BT 083683 TO BT 091690
- B. ACTIVITY: AT 071100H CO L3/9 WAX RELIEVED IN POSITION BY CO K 3/1 AND DETACHED TO PARENT UNIT
- C. ENEMY CONTACT
 - 1. AT 070925H THE 3 RD PLAT CO K IN VEV BT 083683 FOUND VC PROPAGANDA BOOK IN BOMB SHELTER. APPREHENDED 1 VCS IN AREA. VCS IS BELIEVED TO BE VC CADRE AND WILL BE FORWARDED TO IIT.
 - 2. AT 071050H A PLAT PATROL FROM CO I IN VEC BT 083689 APPREHENDED 1 VCX ENTERING HAMLIT. WILL BE FORWARDED TO IIT.
- D. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: NONE
- E. INTENTIONS: MAINTAIN PRESENT ACTIVITY WITHIN SECTOR J 4.
- F. ACCUMULATIVE RESULTS
 - 17 VC APPREHENDED
 - 4 USMC WIA, 2 USMC KIA

CP-4
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07 AUG 1968

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End 12