

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MJH

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EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (
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Withdrawal No. 5-33

K. CLARK BOURNE 11/3/00

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Transmitting Draft of Proposed Reply to Prime
Minister Macmillan

There is enclosed the draft of a proposed reply from the
President to Prime Minister Macmillan's communication of November 27,
1961. The letter was in the form of a personal message rather than
a letter. The Department's draft is in the form of a letter but it
could be used as a message simply by dropping the heading and closing,
if you prefer that we employ the same form as the British.

L. D. Battle
Executive Secretariat

Enclosure:

Draft Proposed Reply

Clearance: EUR - Mr. Kohler

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S/O:EUR:GER:MJHillenbrand:all
11/30/61

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DRAFT

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I appreciated very much receiving such a prompt and full report of your weekend conversations with President de Gaulle, together with your personal message. The results, I agree, were not very promising, and it does seem that the main burden of trying to bring him around to a more reasonable position must be Chancellor Adenauer's. It is regrettable that their meeting of November 30 had to be cancelled; it would be unfortunate if continued illness made it impossible for the Chancellor to visit Paris on December 9 as now planned, before the four Foreign Ministers meet on December 11.

I have sent the Chancellor a letter expressing disappointment over de Gaulle's continuing negative attitude on the subject of negotiations, as reported by you. I stated that I thought it highly important that de Gaulle be brought to accept that negotiations with the Soviets, prior to signature of a separate peace treaty and based on a realistic and agreed Western negotiating position, are a necessary part of our effort to achieve a satisfactory and peaceful solution of the Berlin crisis before we move on to the confrontation which a failure of
diplomacy

The Right Honorable

Harold Macmillan, M. P.,

Prime Minister,

London.

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diploamcy would bring. I suggested that the Chancellor was in the best position to influence de Gaulle in view of the strong role in the latter's thinking played by his estimate of German interests and reactions. I indicated that he might wish to consider, even in advance of his meeting of December 9, supplementing the letter which he sent de Gaulle from Washington with a further letter making the point that his Government does favor early negotiations with the Soviets and the Western initiatives which will be necessary to lead to them.

Ambassador Dowling has been instructed to deliver my letter to the Chancellor in person, if the latter's physical condition permitted. He was to stress the seriousness with which we would regard continuation of the impasse created by the negative French attitude and to make the point that the effectiveness of an approach to de Gaulle would partly depend on the degree to which the latter was convinced that the Germans were acting out of their own conviction and not primarily because of pressures from us.

I share your concern about the difficulties of developing a substantive negotiating position on which we can all agree. As I indicated in my letter of November 22, we did make some progress during the Adenauer visit in eliminating or at least clarifying certain points at issue. Meanwhile, discussions continue in the Ambassadorial Group and I would hope that the four Foreign Ministers can move nearer agreement during their

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during their Paris meetings. Some areas of disagreement will undoubtedly remain, and we shall have to do some hard thinking about these. But the most urgent task at this point is to find some way out of our procedural impasse with de Gaulle.

Sincerely yours,

John F. Kennedy

S/O:EUR:GER:MJHillenbrand:mda:all

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