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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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4/24/61

Approved in the
White House 5/11/61

S/P FILE COPY

DATE: April 13, 1961
TIME: 10:30 a.m.
PLACE: The White House

SUBJECT: European Integration and the Six and Seven Problem

PARTICIPANTS: (See attached list)

Adenauer

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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The President said that the United States appreciated German efforts to unite Western Europe. We had informed Prime Minister Macmillan that we hoped the United Kingdom would play a leading role in the economic and political integration of Europe and that the British would join the European Economic Community. However, that was a decision which the Six and England would have to make for themselves. The United States did not want to see other countries taken into EEC at the expense of the Rome Treaties. It is best for the Atlantic Community if the United Kingdom joined the EEC on an unconditional basis.

The President added that the more closely integrated Western Europe becomes, the more likelihood that economic problems will be created for the United States. In the interest of a stronger Atlantic Community, however, we are prepared to meet these problems. We would nevertheless be reluctant to face these economic problems and adjustments both as regards the US and Latin America, unless definite political benefit results therefrom. Therefore the US is hopeful that before the year's end, the UK and possibly other EFTA countries will have joined the EEC with full acceptance of the Rome Treaties.

The Chancellor stated that he had recently discussed this matter with Hallstein, who saw no insurmountable problem to the entry of the UK into the Common Market. Hallstein felt that the question is whether the UK is ready to negotiate seriously on joining up to the present time, however, he saw no

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indication that they were. The Chancellor said he will consult once again with Hallstein. The Common Market countries are ready for the UK today, and not tomorrow.

The President responded that it was his impression from his talks with the British that they seriously desired to join the EEC, but the British have the impression that not all of the Six welcome their entry. This would be in our common interest, and we should use our influence -- the Federal Republic within the EEC and the United States on the outside -- to induce the UK to associate with the EEC.

Foreign Minister von Brentano said that it was most interesting to have the President's views on this matter. The Federal Republic will do its utmost to strengthen the EEC and not to let it be weakened. Germany would welcome the UK as a member of the EEC and the Foreign Minister was happy that the US had now modified its position. Up to now this had been a difficult situation. He went on to state that the former Administration had opposed expansion of the Six on grounds that it would hurt the United States. This position of the US had been used to good advantage by countries opposed to expansion of the EEC and to European integration. Foreign Minister von Brentano stated that he was glad that the present Administration supports the German view. The Federal Republic could see that problems did exist for the US economy in this European movement. When the Chancellor and Prime Minister MacMillan had last met, the Chancellor had suggested bilateral talks in which the EEC countries could make known the conditions which the British would have to meet in order to join. This proved to be a useful suggestion, and subsequent discussions were held between Paris and London and between Rome and London, which indicated that, as the President had so frankly stated, not everyone is ready to let the UK join the EEC. The French in particular are doubtful. The Federal Republic will do everything possible to assist in a solution to this problem, if the UK really wishes to come in, and would appreciate any US assistance with London and Paris.

Foreign Minister von Brentano pointed out that the existence of EFTA had not made matters easier for the EEC to find a solution, since the purposes are so different. The EEC has political character and motivation. EFTA has neutral member-countries who may have difficulty in associating themselves with the Common Market. The United Kingdom would like to join the EEC on a basis which excluded the agricultural sector and enabled them to maintain their Commonwealth association. The Six cannot accept this arrangement, but the Foreign Minister said that Germany will do its utmost to find a way for the United Kingdom to join.

Minister von Brentano added the view that once the UK comes in, the Common Market could be broadened by the inclusion of Norway, Portugal, Denmark and other NATO countries, -- possibly not on a full membership basis -- although he felt that something could be worked out.

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A rapprochement could be brought about in conformity with GATT. He was happy at news of the UK interest.

Under Secretary Ball emphasized that there had been no change in the United States position between the former Administration and the present Administration concerning the expansion of the EEC. Actually, the problem had not previously been formulated as the British have now done, but rather in the thought that a loose association between the EEC and EFTA might weaken the political institutions of the Six and result in economic discrimination against the United States. However, if MacMillan had asked point blank whether we favored their joining the Six within the Rome Treaties, the former Administration would have said yes. If this new question did present itself as an actuality, Mr. Ball believed that the US would find a formula for cooperation.

Mr. Ball had the following impressions on this subject, as a result of his discussions recently with UK officials, including the Prime Minister:

a) Many elements in the British Government wanted major steps taken in this direction, although this will present difficulties within the UK;

b) EFTA is not a serious bar to a solution, and it should be possible for NATO members to join; special arrangements for Portugal and the neutral countries would be needed;

c) The institutional consequences of the Rome Treaties do not constitute a problem and the UK could live with them. Nor are the non-commercial obligations an obstacle;

d) The UK saw two problems -- Commonwealth preferences (which could be worked out) and Agriculture, which is the most serious hindrance to association with the Six. The French do not agree to special arrangements accommodating the British agricultural sector.

Mr. Ball concluded by stressing that the Six will be weakened if a common agricultural policy is not developed. This is a most serious problem for the Federal Republic which should enlist the highest possible support to induce the UK to find a solution. It may be necessary for the German Government to take the longest step within the Six in overcoming present domestic difficulties impeding a common agricultural policy.

Foreign Minister von Brentano noted that Italy and Holland have the same difficulties on agriculture.

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PARTICIPANTS:

United States

The President
The Secretary
Mr. Ball
Mr. Bundy
Mr. McCloy
Mr. Bohlen
Ambassador Dowling
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Freshman
Mr. Cash
Mrs. Lejins (interpreter)

Federal Republic

The Chancellor
Dr. von Brentano
Mr. von Eckardt
Dr. Carstens
Mr. von Etzdorf
Mr. Harkort
Mr. Barth
Mr. Limbourg
Mr. von Hase
Mr. Osterfeld
Mr. Hoffman
Mr. Weber
Ambassador Grewe
Mr. Krapf
Mr. Schnippenkoetter
Mr. Strätling

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Germany
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Memorandum of Conversation

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White House
5/11/61

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ADENAUER VISIT
Washington April 12-13, 1961

DATE: April 13, 1961
TIME: 10:30 a.m.
PLACE: The White House

SUBJECT: Aid to Underdeveloped Countries

PARTICIPANTS:
(See attached list)

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	S/AL	B/FAC	Treasury - Sec. Dillon	Amembassy Brussels for
	EUR	INR/C	Amembassy London	USEC

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

In opening the discussion on aid to underdeveloped countries, the President stated that useful discussions had taken place with Foreign Minister von Brentano in February, and that more recently Mr. Ball had held equally useful talks in Bonn on this subject.

The President added that it is in the common interest of all of us to provide for a stable economy for the underdeveloped countries, so that they will see some hope in solving their problem through a non-communist system. He cited one example of German aid efforts for which the US is particularly grateful, -- what they are doing in Bolivia. The President stated that this is most helpful. The US has been carrying a very heavy aid burden for the past few years, and the needs are growing rather than diminishing. Therefore the US will appreciate anything the Federal Republic can do to help.

The President added that the US feels that the Atlantic Community is the key and the anchor to free world security. If the world to the south becomes unstable and insecure, then the Atlantic Community will be insecure. Therefore all these aid efforts should be coordinated. The US aid program is now to be more efficiently coordinated. There should be continuing consultation between countries so that each country knows what is being done by other countries in the aid field. Foreign aid should be a multi-national and not a national effort.

The President

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The President noted that there are presently four areas offering possibilities for cooperative efforts:

Bolivia -- Bolivia is a most critical problem, both politically and economically. This would be the worst time for the Castro regime to get a foothold in another Latin American country; this would add momentum to the Communist movement at a time when the momentum is going down.

Turkey -- Here is a NATO ally which has vigorously opposed the Soviet Union and which is maintaining a large military program, assisted by substantial US grant aid. Turkey has a critical economic problem, resulting in considerable measure from its military effort.

India and Pakistan -- Both countries have broad long-range economic development plans which call for continuing and large-scale external assistance.

The President then called on Under Secretary Ball to comment on aid to underdeveloped countries. Mr. Ball noted that steps are being taken within the forum of the DAG and OECD to expand and improve the areas of cooperation for providing assistance to underdeveloped countries. As to India, Mr. Ball noted that meeting with the consortium of nations responsible for financing the third 5-year plan would be taking place in the next two to three days to discuss the next economic plan for India. He hoped that the Federal Republic could commit substantial amounts toward the fulfillment of that plan, extending over the next two to three years. Both Pakistan and India require financing for longer than a one-year period. Pakistan also is being examined by a consortium of nations meeting soon. The US is entering into a sizable burden of commitments, and it is hoped that Germany can do likewise. Both countries need long-term loans at low interest rates. Turkey too has a balance of payments problem. It has taken on tremendous military burdens under its NATO commitments. The US has given \$90 million in grant aid over the past three years. We hope that the Federal Republic can help now by providing long-term loans as well as grant assistance, so as to not add further to Turkey's short-term capital debt problem. On COMIBOL, Mr. Ball noted that we have a representative in Bonn for discussions on Bolivia, and that the Federal Republic has been very helpful in cooperating with us. We hope that in view of the political situation, the Federal Republic will continue to provide assistance to Bolivia, jointly with the United States program.

Foreign Minister von Brentano said that there was a question whether in the case of Bolivia, the problem was simply one of reviving COMIBOL. Preliminary reports on the German side indicated that a much broader program of economic reconstruction would be required, costing a minimum of \$150 million.

Turning to Turkey, the Foreign Minister reported that bilateral talks will begin tomorrow in Bonn on the 1961 financial needs of that country. The Federal Republic plans to make DM 100 million available for Turkey in 1961/62 and will also consider extending long-term 3% loans for economic infrastructure

purposes

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purposes.

Minister Etzel recently visited India and tentatively pledged DM 400 million in assistance for first year of India's third 5-year plan. The Federal Republic will participate in the consortium for the India and Pakistan programs along with the World Bank.

As to Pakistan, the Federal Republic is prepared to make available DM 75 million annually for 1961/62 and also through the coordinated efforts of the consortium discuss possibilities for further financial assistance.

The Foreign Minister then reverted to Turkey and stressed the Chancellor's special interest in that country, which he regarded as a particular responsibility of the Federal Republic to assist. A total of DM 1.5 billion has been made available up to the present time, and the Federal Republic is prepared to undertake whatever may be necessary in further measures.

The Foreign Minister summed up by stating that the Germans are prepared to do their share with the US on foreign aid through the DAG and OECD, and within this framework to determine what program should be undertaken bilaterally and multilaterally.

Mr. Ball stated that he was grateful for von Brentano's statement. It shows there is general agreement on the problem of foreign aid. He then commented briefly that the US is prepared to extend substantial assistance to India and Pakistan and hopes that in the consortium talks the Federal Republic will contribute in proportionately substantial measure. Mr. Ball stressed the need for long-term assistance to Turkey rather than short-term or even medium-term loans, in view of their balance of payments situation. In conclusion, the US would be pleased to discuss Bolivia with the German Government representatives when they come to Washington in May for that purpose.

The President expressed his gratification that progress is being made in aid planning. The problem will continue for years to come. The US is now trying to provide aid on a longer term basis. This is a difficult political problem domestically, just as it must be for the Chancellor.

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PARTICIPANTS:

United States

The President
The Secretary
Mr. Ball
Mr. Bundy
Mr. McCloy
Mr. Bohlen
Ambassador Dowling
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Freshman
Mr. Cash
Mrs. Lejins (interpreter)

Federal Republic

The Chancellor
Dr. von Brentano
Mr. von Eckardt
Dr. Carstens
Mr. von Etzdorf
Mr. Harkort
Mr. Barth
Mr. Limbourg
Mr. von Hase
Mr. Osterheld
Mr. Hoffmann
Mr. Weber
Ambassador Grewe
Mr. Krapf
Mr. Schnippenkoetter
Mr. Stratling

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4/22/61

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

ADENAUER VISIT

Washington, April 12-13, 1961

DATE: April 13, 1961

White House

4:30 p.m.

Approved in the
White House

5/11/61

SUBJECT:

Strengthening of NATO

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XR 375-45

XR 375.42

United States

Federal Republic

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Ambassador Dowling
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Salinger
Mrs. Lejins (interpreter)

The Chancellor
Foreign Minister von Brentano
Ambassador Grewe
Dr. Carstens
Mr. von Eckardt
Mr. von Hase
Mr. Kusterer (interpreter)

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GER The White House

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The President indicated that one topic which had not been discussed quite as fully as he had wanted to do was the problem of strengthening the North Atlantic Council. In previous conversations he had referred to certain problems such as colonial issues which involved a number of important states and therefore had repercussions in and out of NATO. In this situation it had been customary to rely primarily on bi-lateral talks in the past and this had led to all sorts of difficulties. The President felt that if the North Atlantic Council were strengthened and contained representatives who really represented their Governments and could speak for them, the situation would be much improved.

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5/11/61

Memorandum of Conversation

ADENAUER VISIT

1961 Washington, April 12-13, 1961

DATE: April 13, 1961
TIME: 12:00 noon
PLACE: The White House

(38)

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
S/P

SUBJECT: Atomic Armament for NATO

PARTICIPANTS: United States

German

The President
Secretary Rusk
Ambassador Dowling
Assistant Secretary Kohler
Mrs. Lejins (Interpreter)

Chancellor Adenauer
Foreign Minister von Brentano
Ambassador Grewe
Dr. Karl Carstens
Mr. Weber (Interpreter)

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The White House

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The Chancellor then indicated that he wanted to raise one more question. General Norstad had proposed to the previous Administration that NATO be equipped with atomic weapons. President Eisenhower had left the matter unsettled since he had not been able to reach a decision. The Chancellor hoped that President Kennedy would leave the matter pending for the moment. The Chancellor could well understand that the United States did not want at this moment to act favorably on General Norstad's proposal for fear of disrupting the chances for re-establishing normal channels of communications and for successful talks with the Soviets. On the other hand, if General Norstad's proposal were turned down outright at the present time, the effects might be even worse. The Chancellor had asked General Heusinger to look into this matter, and General Heusinger had convinced him that for military reasons a solution similar to the one proposed by General Norstad was necessary.

The President indicated that Mr. Acheson had devoted some attention to this matter. Mr. Acheson felt that the offer to equip NATO with Polaris submarines had some merit. He was not so happy, however, with having ballistic missiles driven all over Europe. Too many hazards were involved in this enterprise and this aspect therefore required careful examination. The United States was primarily concerned with carefully examining the proper control structure for the use of such atomic equipment. The President was hopeful that by the time the Secretary of State would leave for the NATO meetings in Oslo, the United States stand might have been clarified.

The Chancellor

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The Chancellor stated that these matters would probably play a certain role in the President's talks with General de Gaulle. The Chancellor had hoped, when General Norstad first made his proposal last fall, that Washington would reach a very quick decision in the matter and he could tell General de Gaulle that now that nuclear support for NATO was assured, de Gaulle could well give up his striving to develop atomic weapons for France. This had not been possible, however, because the Eisenhower Administration had not been able to come to any decision. The Chancellor believed that at present this matter did not require an immediate decision. The United States could afford to study the matter a little longer, and nothing would be lost if the American stand should not have been completely clarified by the time the Secretary left for Oslo. In closing, the Secretary indicated that this was certainly a matter requiring much future consultation.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

ADENAUER VISIT

Washington, April 12-13, 1961

The White House

DATE: April 13, 1961
12:00 noon

Approved in the
White House
5/11/61

SUBJECT: Balance of Payments Problem

000003

PARTICIPANTS: United States

Federal Republic

The President
Secretary Rusk
Ambassador Dowling
Assistant Secretary Kohler
Mrs. Lejins (Interpreter)

Chancellor Adenauer
Foreign Minister von Brentano
Ambassador Greve
Dr. Karl Carstens
Mr. Weber (Interpreter)

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The White House

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1961 MAY 17 AM 8 44

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The President brought up the problem of the balance of payments. He stated his great concern about the outflow of gold from the country, which had resulted in the Anderson-Dillon mission of last year. Moreover, the matter had been discussed with the Foreign Minister during his February trip to Washington, and Ambassador Dowling had been carrying on talks concerning it in Bonn. The President wanted to make three points perfectly clear: (1) Last year the impression had been created abroad that the United States might withdraw one or two divisions from Western Europe. This was the last thing the United States would do. The President hoped that sufficient adjustments would be made to cope with the situation in other ways, and he was definitely not going to withdraw any divisions from Europe. (2) Last year the impression had been created in Western Germany that the United States felt the burden of maintaining its troops was too heavy from the standpoint of its domestic taxation program and was therefore asking help from Germany. Again the President wanted it to be very clearly understood that the United States was prepared to bear its own international burdens. His only concern was the outflow of gold, as previously indicated. (3) Regarding the outflow of gold, during the past three months the United States has lost 1,200,000,000 DM. The largest amount was lost in January. February and March had shown some improvement. If the rate of the last three months were projected for the entire year, the United States would lose 4 billion DM in 1961. As previously indicated, the President hoped that the loss would not be as great as that, since some improvement was in the making. The President indicated that we were losing gold in three ways: (1) Last year part of the loss had been occasioned by the interest differentials. That, he understood, had been brought to an end. (2) The United States was losing gold because of its troop payments

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and maintenance abroad. (3) A large outflow of gold was occasioned by United States aid to under-developed countries. Understandably enough the United States was reluctant to diminish its aid efforts in any way or to diminish its troop maintenance abroad. That would be very bad for both the security of the United States and the joint security of the Free World. Therefore the President was very anxious to diminish the outflow of gold so as not to decrease either foreign aid or troop maintenance. He was thus very much interested in seeing that everything possible was done to lessen the outflow of gold resulting from our maintenance of troops in the Federal Republic. The joint utilization of facilities should be a very helpful step. Moreover, he hoped that the purchase of supplies in the United States could be encouraged, since this would be a second very significant step forward. Somehow, the President felt, this matter would have to be brought into balance before the end of the year in order to permit the United States to carry out its commitments on a world-wide basis.

The President continued by stating that the United States net deficit each year because of the maintenance of troops, etc., in Germany amounts to 350 million dollars in gold. This constitutes approximately one third of the total gold loss; last year it was one quarter; this year, if the improved trends continue, this sum might possibly constitute one half of the overall gold loss. The President hoped that the Federal Republic would work closely together with the United States to find means of diminishing this deficit.

The Chancellor stated that he well understood the United States position and problem in this respect. He understood that the United States had undertaken steps to improving the situation. It had, for example, introduced compulsory savings among the troops in Germany and had banned the sale of German products in the PXs. The Chancellor welcomed these measures.

The President indicated that he hoped these matters could be explored further through Ambassador Dowling and Under Secretary Ball. It was necessary to strike a better balance since that would improve the overall situation of the United States.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Germany 6187
762-0221/4-1361

Memorandum of Conversation
ADENAUER VISIT

Washington, April 12-13, 1961

The White House
DATE: April 13, 1961
12:00 noon

000003

SUBJECT: Berlin Contingency Planning and Related Matters

PARTICIPANTS: United States

Federal Republic

The President
Secretary Rusk
Ambassador Dowling
Assistant Secretary Kohler
Mrs. Lejins (Interpreter)

Chancellor Adenauer
Foreign Minister von Brentano
Ambassador Grewer
Dr. Karl Carstens
Mr. Weber (Interpreter)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE
DIRECTOR
FOR
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
APR 13 1961
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In the discussion in his private office the President raised the question of contingency planning for Berlin. He stated that Mr. Acheson agreed to take this task upon himself, and he understood that Mr. Acheson had discussed the problem to some extent with the Chancellor. The President indicated that he had discussed contingency planning with Mr. Macmillan during the latter's recent sojourn in Washington and intended to discuss it also during his pending talks with General de Gaulle. The important thing which the President wished to point out was that he had noticed that there was a considerable gap between the planning done in such instances and the commitments which the various nations understood they had taken upon themselves. This was true of such organizations as SEATO as well as of other international bodies. The President wanted to have an absolutely clear understanding on the part of the United Kingdom, France and Germany as to what each country, including the United States, understands its duty to be in concerted action, so that it will be possible to know exactly how each country is going to respond to the pressures which may arise. Again, the President reiterated that there was a tremendous gap between the plans that had been worked out and what the various nations were willing to do in the case of need. The President had discussed this problem with the British and he felt that the end of these talks had by no means been reached so far. He was serious concerned with finding out what the response of the various nations would be under certain conditions. The United States, for instance, wanted to strengthen the military probes in the event that a formal blockade of Berlin might be undertaken by either the Soviets or the East Zone. He indicated that he could hardly say that any final conclusions in this matter had been reached with the British and he felt that discussions would probably have to continue for some time. Moreover, he had no idea at all of what General de Gaulle might be prepared to do. For this

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reason he was very anxious to get the Chancellor's ideas on how best to strengthen the Allied position with reference to Berlin and how best to demonstrate that the United States was firm in its stand on Berlin. He wanted to hear what the Chancellor envisaged the role of Germany to be in the case of an emergency, especially as regards the commitment of German troops.

The Chancellor replied that the last time he had had a chance to discuss this matter was with Mr. Dulles. It had been at a time when Mr. Dulles was in Bonn. At that time he gained the impression that there was no firm agreement on this matter between the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Mr. Dulles had told him that the planning had reference only to a case in which United States forces might be cut off from access to Berlin, regardless of who it was who cut them off. Mr. Dulles had indicated that in such a case the United States would be prepared to resort to the use of troops, if necessary tanks, and would not hesitate to use atomic weapons if this appeared warranted. At that time there had been no talk whatsoever of German forces being used beyond the Iron Curtain, since, according to Mr. Dulles, this entire situation was regarded by the United States as the direct outgrowth of the 4-power agreement on Berlin.

The Chancellor made reference to his discussions of yesterday with the Secretary. He had not gone into any detail because it had not been the right time to do so. He agreed, however, that this entire matter was a very complicated one, which needed to be discussed quietly and calmly. This morning, then, the Foreign Minister had told him of his talk with the Secretary, and he fully agreed with the conclusion reached on that occasion that, first of all, the problems of international law which were involved in the Berlin situation should be carefully studied and only after that should the matter be taken up again for consideration. The Chancellor indicated that he had wanted to inquire what agreement there existed among the United States, France and United Kingdom and that he had hoped this matter could be discussed to some degree. He realized, of course, that agreements among the three countries were affected, and the situation changed, by the NATO guarantee with reference to Berlin. In any event, the Chancellor wished to assure the President that Germany was prepared to do everything that appeared necessary in the interest of this joint cause.

The President returned to the matter of the gap between the military planning and the commitments and policy decisions by governments in this respect. He stated that the Secretary could testify that such a gap had been found to exist with reference to SEATO in regard to the Laos situation. He presumed that there might well be no clear idea on the part of the various countries as to exactly what the commitment of each nation was with reference to Berlin under the guarantee made by NATO. It was most necessary, however, to find out exactly where everyone stood and how far each government was prepared to go, and the President was going to make every effort to try to clarify this situation.

The Chancellor agreed that a gap of this kind definitely existed, that it had to be closed, and that it was necessary to find out how far each government felt committed.

The President then asked the Chancellor what he thought might happen in Berlin this summer, for example. The Chancellor smilingly replied that he was

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no prophet. Anything or nothing could happen. When Khrushchev made his threats in November 1958, no one would have expected that he would wait as long as he did.

At this point Foreign Minister von Brentano made reference to his statement during the conference at the State Department the afternoon of the previous day (April 12, 4:00 p.m.). At that time he had said that there existed two possibilities with reference to Berlin: (1) Some kind of direct action by the Soviets similar, perhaps, to the blockade of some years ago. The Foreign Minister hardly thought that any such action would be forthcoming. (2) The Foreign Minister felt that the Soviet Union might enter into a separate peace treaty with the Soviet Zone, as it had previously announced, and transfer the obligations for the control of access to Berlin to the GDR, accompanied, of course, by carefully prepared instructions as to how to proceed. The GDR would then assume control of access to Berlin and quite possibly start various harassing actions against the traffic seeking access. This might initially be directed against German traffic alone and might or might not be expanded to include the Western Allies. Consequently, the Foreign Minister felt that it was necessary to decide what action should be taken in case the Soviet Union chooses the second alternative. The Foreign Minister felt that it had been pointed out correctly that the responsibilities of the various nations concerned were no longer clearly defined, especially since the issuance of the NATO guarantee on Berlin of December 1958, which had been re-confirmed several times, the last time in the very recent past. These guarantees did affect to some extent the responsibility of the three occupying powers. Germany, too, entered into the picture, of course. In order to be able to carry out the various guarantees, it was necessary for the three powers to get together, with Germany also included, and carefully to work out a program which would indicate exactly what action should be taken in a number of specifically designated eventualities, as well as at what point such action should be taken. Once such a program had been worked out, the Foreign Minister felt, it would be time to inform NATO and discuss the whole matter there, since the NATO guarantee was, of course, involved in this entire picture. This was the reason that the Foreign Minister had suggested yesterday that the matter of contingency planning for Berlin be discussed on a high level in order to clarify and confirm the obligations and commitments of the various parties concerned. The Foreign Minister wished to re-confirm what the Chancellor had said, namely, that the German Government had no intention of not living up to its obligations. After all, the question involved the capital of Germany and beyond that even the very future of Germany itself. If Berlin fell, the Foreign Minister said, it would mean the death sentence for Europe and the Western World.

The Chancellor indicated that the questions of international law pertaining to the Berlin question were very involved and complicated. This matter did not concern only the rights of the three or the four occupying powers. The three Western Allies, as occupying powers, had the right to demand unobstructed access to Berlin. As regards Germany, the legal situation was much more difficult. Germany has no title to Berlin at present from the standpoint of international law. However, it had the hope of becoming re-united and, when this was accomplished, of having Berlin re-instated as the capital of the nation. Germany's approach, therefore, had to be based on the fact that Berlin was not part of Western Germany and that the East Zone was not part of Western Germany at the present time. Therefore, the legal situation was a most confused one and the

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Chancellor felt that it was highly desirable, in fact absolutely necessary, to study this situation very carefully before engaging in any further talks on the subject.

At this point the President directly inquired what rights, if any, Germany claimed to have on West Berlin under international law, and what rights Germany felt she should have in Berlin. The Chancellor and the rest of the German party vigorously agreed that Germany had no rights in Berlin under international law. Ambassador Grewe spent a few minutes outlining the various agreements and statutes from which the rights of the various parties derived. Some, including the rights of the four powers, went back to 1945. The Soviet rights, of course, went back to that time. Then there were the rights of the Berliners themselves, as the inhabitants of the locality. The German constitution claimed Berlin as the capital of Germany, but this was a de jure situation only and was actually suspended by the occupation statute of 1949. The right of access of the Federal Republic to Berlin was based on various de facto arrangements growing out of its trade relations with Berlin. In all, the legal situation was a most confused one.

The President then asked whether our occupational rights in Berlin gave us the right to provide adequate supplies for the local population. Both Ambassador Grewe and Foreign Minister von Brentano answered in the affirmative, stating that this was naturally implied in the rights and obligations of an occupying power.

The Secretary of State said that all of us understood that there were various gradations of rights, duties and responsibilities. The three Western Allies were, of course, the three powers principally and most critically involved in the Berlin situation. Over and above this, however, NATO had assumed a guarantee for Berlin. However, the Secretary felt that as the representative of the German people and the German state, especially in terms of future reunification, the German Federal Republic had claims on Berlin. The United States understood these gradations, but as the need for action arose a practical situation would confront all parties concerned which would obliterate by necessity the gradations of responsibility and rights. For this reason the Secretary felt that very close and careful scrutiny of the problem was required in order that all might know what everybody's role was to be and how each of the parties concerned would meet its responsibilities. The Secretary thought that this would require much consultation. The Chancellor stated that he was in full agreement.

The President then asked the Chancellor what, in his judgment, the United States response should be if the Soviet Union entered into a separate peace treaty with East Germany, thereby giving control of access to the GDR, but the latter, while assuming such control, did not interfere with traffic to Berlin.

The Chancellor stated that he was not sure whether the President realized that at present there still had been no peace treaty by the four powers with Germany. He was making reference to this matter for the purpose of indicating once again how complicated the overall legal situation was. A peace treaty was supposed to be signed with all four powers. Again, the Chancellor did not know whether the President was aware of a little-known fact that the Soviet Union still maintained military missions in the area of Western Germany. The three Western Allies had asked Germany not to cause difficulties with reference to these Soviet missions,

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
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because the three Western Allies had military missions stationed in East Germany which enabled them to get all sorts of intelligence and information which they otherwise might not be able to obtain. Thus, the Chancellor again indicated that the legal situation was an extremely complicated one; at the same time the national aspects could not be kept out entirely. The Chancellor then continued to say that if an attack were made on American soldiers who were trying to get unhindered access to Berlin, to which they were entitled, then, under its NATO commitments, Western Germany would have to bring its troops into play. Again, however, the Chancellor reiterated that this whole thing was so complicated that he greatly welcomed the Secretary's suggestion that the legal situation be studied carefully before any further steps were taken.

The Chancellor then turned to answer the President's question regarding the action recommended in case of a separate peace treaty with the GDR, without the GDR harassing traffic. If he remembered correctly, he said, a similar question had arisen once before, when the Soviet Union had asked the GDR to take over control of the access routes in the name of the USSR, thereby having the GDR act in the capacity of Soviet agent. At that time the three Western Allies and Germany had rejected the idea of agency very firmly. Thus, in any consideration of the Berlin situation, it was really necessary to have at hand the tremendous bulk of material covering all the various legal involvements and past history.

The Secretary indicated that he hoped the question would be examined both on a tripartite and quadripartite basis and agreed that the legal situation was indeed a most confused one. He said that the situation reminded him of one of the Soviet Ambassadors to Washington, who was quoted as stating that the law is like the tongue of a wagon; it goes in the direction in which it is pointed.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation

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DATE: April 12, 1961

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SUBJECT: Meeting between the Secretary and the German Chancellor
and Foreign Minister at the Department 4:00 p. m. - 5:30 p. m.
April 12, 1961 — NATO AND DEVELOPMENT AID

7261A

PARTICIPANTS: United States German Delegation German Embassy

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|-----------------|------------------|----------------------|
| The Secretary | The Chancellor | Ambassador Grewe |
| Mr. Bowles | Dr. Von Brentano | Mr. Krapf |
| Mr. Ball | Mr. Von Eckardt | Mr. Schnippenkoetter |
| Mr. McCloy | Dr. Carstens | Mr. Straetling |
| Mr. Harriman | Dr. Von Etzdorf | |
| Mr. Bohlen | Dr. Harkort | |
| Mr. Dowling | Mr. Barth | |
| Mr. McGhee | Mr. Limbourg | |
| Mr. Kohler | Mr. Von Hase | |
| Mr. Nitze | Dr. Osterheld | |
| Mr. Hillenbrand | Mr. Sahn | |
| Mr. Fessenden | Mr. Hoffmann | |
| Mr. Freshman | Mr. Reinkemeyer | |
| Mr. Cash | Mr. Balken | |
| Mrs. Lejins | Mr. Weber | |

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The Secretary opened the meeting with the Foreign Minister in the absence of the Chancellor by welcoming the fruitful discussions that had taken place in the morning and then said he wished to begin by obtaining German ideas concerning which topics should be discussed first in the afternoon meeting, and which should be reserved until the Chancellor arrived. He thought the subject of Berlin might well be saved for the Chancellor. The Foreign Minister agreed.

The Secretary continued by saying that the subject of solidarity in NATO had been alluded to, and that, in this connection, the United States and some of its allies did not always find full agreement on all issues in the world outside the Atlantic community. He added that this, of course, did not destroy our common interest, but it did create friction. We looked upon the Atlantic community as of fundamental importance to the free world.

A problem very much on our minds, he continued, was the Sino-Soviet bloc attack on the non-Western part of the world. During the '50's they had turned

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to extending their influence to the non-Western world with great energy. We were particularly troubled by the Soviets' assertion of leadership of the Revolution of Nationalism and of the Revolution of Rising Expectations, i.e., economic and social improvement. We felt these penetrations of Africa, South America, Southeast Asia, etc. could defeat us. We could understand why some of our friends in NATO sometimes did not understand our positions, as well as why some of the nations of the non-Western world also had similar difficulties in understanding our positions. We hoped that more intensive consultation in NATO would promote better understanding among our allies.

The Foreign Minister replied that the Germans agreed that NATO was of fundamental importance, and that they welcomed the recognition of the need for strengthening the Alliance. At first, he continued, we had faced only a military threat, but now the political situation had worsened, and we faced a political, as well as a military, threat. We must strengthen the Alliance politically. Even with effective military defense, it was possible to be defeated on political grounds alone, and that was the danger today. In the continuing rough battle with the Communists, we must fight on political, and not only military, grounds.

Part of the world today was developing, and some welcomed this, while others complained about it. But all must recognize it and accept reality. In addition, the necessary conclusions must be drawn. It was quite understandable that the serious responsibilities of a great nation like the United States required that in the relations between NATO and the developing nations it must take strong and clear positions. Consultations should improve the situation. Sometimes complete agreement could not be reached, but this was not really necessary. The real necessity was to produce understanding rather than complete agreement. Issues should be discussed with complete freedom. Failure to understand could be dangerous. Political consultation was vitally necessary. This was the first point the Foreign Minister wished to make.

The second matter was aid to the new nations. We certainly had to help them.

(At this point the Chancellor entered and was briefed on the preceding discussion by the Foreign Minister.)

The Foreign Minister said that he had already explained what we should prevent from happening, and now he was turning to what we should do positively to prevent the spread of Communism. He said we must establish priorities as to what should be done, and when, and where, which countries should be helped, and what should be done individually, and what should be done together. NATO was the proper forum to determine where the threat was greatest, i.e. which country was particularly exposed. This was so purely a political matter that it should be discussed in NATO.

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A further point, the Foreign Minister continued, concerned implementation. Development aid should be dealt with in OECD, from which it would be better received inasmuch as OECD comprises more countries than just those belonging to NATO. This was discussed at the DAG meeting and was largely agreed. Everything need not be coordinated in OECD, but the decision should be made there as to what should be done bilaterally, and what should be done multilaterally, after the political decision had been made in NATO.

The Secretary responded by saying the United States appreciated the exchange of views which had taken place during Mr. Ball's visit to Bonn and the DAG meeting in London. We recognized, he continued, that the very important question of priorities did arise, but we also recognized that the establishment of such priorities was difficult. The nature of the Sino-Soviet bloc approach was flexible, and they could jump over our strong points. It was, therefore, difficult to establish a detailed system of priorities. We could, however, perhaps agree on the most important countries, e.g., India, Pakistan, Turkey, etc. On the economic side we could undoubtedly operate more effectively after consultation in NATO.

At this point the Secretary asked for comments from Mr. Ball, who said that we found ourselves fully in accord with what the Foreign Minister had stated. Much consultation could be accomplished in NATO. The free world must approach the development aid problem as something quite apart from the cold war. No one country alone could do everything that was necessary. We appreciated the support we had received at the DAG meeting. This cooperation was essential.

The Secretary said he believed the discussions so far had indicated a wide range of agreement, and that these points could be further discussed at another level.

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Memorandum of Conversation
ADENAUER VISIT
Washington, April 12-13, 1961

DATE: April 12, 1961
TIME: 10:00 a.m.
PLACE: White House

000003

SUBJECT: NATO and East West Relations

PARTICIPANTS: United States

German

- The President
- Secretary Rusk
- Ambassador Dowling
- Assistant Secretary Kohler
- Mrs. Lejins (Interpreter)

- Chancellor Adenauer
- Foreign Minister von Brentano
- Ambassador Grew
- Mr. Kusterer (Interpreter)
- Dr. Karl Carstens

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The President greeted the Chancellor, indicating how happy he was to have this occasion to discuss mutual problems. He indicated the great respect in which he himself, as well as previous occupants of the White House and all the citizens of the United States, held the Chancellor and his country. President Kennedy stated that, as the new President of the United States, he was anxious to hear the Chancellor's suggestions for the strengthening of United States relations with Germany, Western Europe and the security of the countries involved, including his suggestions on matters pertaining to Berlin and over-all German problems.

The Chancellor expressed his gratification at the President's kind words. He stated that Germany owes its spectacular recovery after the war in large measure to United States assistance and therefore feels very closely tied to this country. He expressed his thanks for this assistance by the United States and stated that he was happy to be able to make the President's acquaintance. He felt confident that in the ensuing talks many matters of great importance could be profitably discussed. The Chancellor stated that he had been watching world developments very closely these past 12 years. He had looked at them largely from the standpoint of Europe, but had also familiarized himself with the viewpoint of the United States concerning these matters. He hoped that the President would have the time to discuss some of these things with him during the next few days.

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As a beginning the President stated that he understood the Chancellor had talked with former Secretary of State Dean Acheson last Saturday in Bonn. He expressed hope that Mr. Acheson had given the Chancellor a clear idea of American thinking during the past two months with regard to the problems of NATO. The President hoped that Mr. Acheson had given the Chancellor assurances of American determination to strengthen NATO, to maintain American forces in Western Germany and to strengthen these forces rather than to diminish them. These were the considerations which had been discussed in Washington during the past months, since American concern was directed toward strengthening NATO and, by the guaranties connected therewith, to increase the protection of Germany and Western Europe. If Mr. Acheson had failed to make this completely clear and any questions were left in the Chancellor's mind, the President wished to reassure the Chancellor that the United States was prepared and determined to stand by its commitments.

The Chancellor replied that he and Mr. Acheson had talked for several hours. He stated that Mr. Acheson had been the first Secretary of State to visit Bonn after the war and that he and Mr. Acheson had remained friends ever since. The Chancellor and Mr. Acheson had talked very freely. The Chancellor described Mr. Acheson as a person who thinks very clearly and is able to put his thoughts into clear language. He stated that the discussions with Mr. Acheson had made him very happy.

The President indicated that in Mr. Acheson's discussions here in Washington the emphasis had been placed on increasing the capability of the conventional forces and on raising the threshold for the use of atomic weapons. The President realized that these considerations had created a certain concern in Germany, where it was feared that these plans might lessen the prospects for the use of atomic weapons in the defense of Western Germany, and that the relegation of the use of atomic weapons further to the background might encourage the Soviet Union to launch an attack with conventional weapons. The President stated that he hoped he made it clear that the United States was as much committed as before to the use of atomic weapons, if necessary, for the defense of Western Germany and of NATO interests. He stated that United States efforts were directed toward achieving better command and better control and to make sure that the use of nuclear weapons could not come about accidentally but would be the result of a definite decision.

The Chancellor stated that Mr. Acheson had been emphatic in insisting that MC 70 would have to be fulfilled, and the Chancellor agreed that Mr. Acheson was right. The Chancellor stated that he often felt that Europe must present a very sad and discouraging picture to the United States with reference to the fulfillment of its commitments. Actually the disintegration of NATO was the result of this. However, the Chancellor felt he ought to state one more thing. The United States had been standing by, tolerating this condition, for too long without making use of the moral

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leadership right to which it is entitled for the benefit of the free nations. The Chancellor was happy to learn from his talks with Mr. Acheson that all this seemed to be changing now. The Chancellor said that one sentence of Mr. Acheson's made him especially happy. Mr. Acheson had said that the fate of the United States is the fate of Western Europe, and the fate of Western Europe is the same as the fate of the United States. The Chancellor had told Mr. Acheson that he had never heard this truth stated as clearly by anyone from the United States before. That sentence had indicated to the Chancellor the firmness of the conviction of the new Administration and had lifted a heavy burden which the Chancellor had been carrying, not only since the entry into office of the new Administration, but for the past several years.

The President then inquired into the nature of the burden mentioned by the Chancellor. He asked what exactly was the cause of the latter's dissatisfaction and in what way NATO had failed. The Chancellor replied that he might as well speak frankly. There was no doubt about the fact that NATO had been on the decline and had actually been dying for a number of years, with member nations failing to fulfill their commitments. Moreover, there had been almost no consultation to speak of, and leadership on the part of the United States, which the Chancellor valued very highly and which he considered the only possibility, had been reticent and on the decline. This had been true even during the time of Secretary Dulles, and the Chancellor had called this fact to Mr. Dulles' attention time and again. Mr. Dulles had told him to take a look at Europe itself - at France, where no de Gaulle was in evidence at that time, at Italy and the United Kingdom. Mr. Dulles had said that the United States would remain in Europe only as long as Germany fulfilled her commitments. Thus this disease from which NATO was suffering was one of long standing. Consequently, Mr. Acheson's explanations had been most welcome, especially since, as the Chancellor understood, they expressed the will and determination of the President. The Chancellor had not heard such talk in years. He added that his concern was not confined to any very specific details but dealt rather with the general trend of things. The fact remained that there was no strength in NATO and that he was most happy to hear that the United States was undertaking to change all this.

The President asked the Chancellor whether he was talking about military commitments on the part of member nations of NATO or about other phases of the NATO program. Chancellor Adenauer replied that it was no longer possible to differentiate between military and political matters. He stated that he could not go into any great detail on any of these matters because specific instances would constitute a very long list. In essence, however, he wished to say that NATO was devoid of life. There was no longer any real activity in it. He hoped the President could succeed in reactivating NATO. This would constitute a historic achievement and a tremendous task. The Chancellor indicated that if the President were successful in achieving the reactivation of NATO it would really be the first time that the United States would emerge from an atmosphere of isolation and enter the political arena in the West.

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That is why Chancellor Adenauer had been greatly heartened by his talks with Mr. Acheson. He wished the President great strength and stamina, since he was faced with tremendous tasks.

In continuing the same topic, the President suggested that now that he and the Chancellor had discussed the continued intention of the United States to maintain and even increase its forces, ^{and} the United States intention to ask other nations to do the same, he would like to hear the Chancellor's suggestions on how the United States could be more effective in increasing the security and safety of Western Europe.

The Chancellor replied that the question of consultation was a decisive and determining one for NATO. The Chancellor understood that the President was very much interested in this question. Once the member nations learned that the United States was ready to consult them not only in questions that directly affected their interests and security, but also in questions which had only an indirect effect on their security, the entire atmosphere with regard to NATO would change. Thus the first step was to institute active consultation.

Next, of course, there was the economic situation, which was tied up with everything. Mr. Acheson had told the Chancellor that the President was very much interested in European integration and felt that it was very important. The Chancellor fully shared this view and had been of this conviction for many years. Chancellor Adenauer felt that the United Kingdom was on the verge of entering the European Economic Community even though Mr. Macmillan had not yet quite been able to bring himself to take this step. The younger British cabinet members, however, were in favor of giving serious consideration to joining this body. The Chancellor felt that this was a very important and an essential step, and he was happy to hear that the President felt similarly and also wanted the United Kingdom to give serious consideration to joining the European Economic Community. The Chancellor continued by stating that the economic conditions played a very important role, of course, in the relations between Western Europe and the United States and that they exerted a very direct influence on all political matters. Many difficult tasks lay ahead. Once the discussion of these economic matters is brought before NATO, the question will arise whether the national representatives to NATO are actually qualified and high-level enough to handle such matters. This in itself will lead to a re-examination of the caliber of NATO representatives and will help to raise the over-all level of NATO. Certain procedures might also have to be changed in the process. The Chancellor indicated that it was slightly ironical that the original purpose of NATO had actually been anti-German. The nations involved had gotten together at Brussels because they felt that Germany, which was on the verge of recovery, might want revenge, and therefore they wanted to protect themselves against Germany. Finally, however, largely with the intervention of the United States, Germany had been approached to join NATO and was glad to accept.

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The Chancellor continued by saying that the attacks by the Soviet Union on the freedom of the world take place everywhere, of course. Europe, however, is of particular importance in this struggle. In this connection the Chancellor recalled his visit to Moscow in 1955, and six days of talks with Mr. Khrushchev, in which Foreign Minister von Brentano participated. The Germans had been treated extremely well, although, of course, they had their disagreements, which had to be expected. On one of the last days Mr. Khrushchev had come out of his inner sanctum and told Chancellor Adenauer--and there were only four persons present at that time (Bulgerin and von Brentano in addition to the two principals)--that the Soviet Union had two chief enemies, the United States and Red China. Of the two, Red China was by far the greater enemy. Mr. Khrushchev had said to the Chancellor: Imagine what the future will bring, with 600 million Red Chinese increasing by about 12 million each year and living on a hand-full of rice, and Mr. Khrushchev had made a significant gesture with his hand as though he were holding just one hand of rice. The prospects, Mr. Khrushchev said, were appalling, and he had turned to Mr. Adenauer to say: "help us." In other words he wanted help against the United States and Red China, but again Chancellor Adenauer wished to be emphatic in stating that Mr. Khrushchev's real concern was primarily with regard to Red China. That was a situation which the Soviet Union really feared, not perhaps in the immediate future, but 10 or perhaps 20 years from now. Mr. Khrushchev is a person who thinks far ahead and he thinks very clearly. He may be brutal at times, but he is smart. He thinks things out, and this was one time when he abandoned some of his darker thoughts and, as it were, let his hair down and expressed his fears of Red China. The Chancellor stated that he had recounted this incident in some detail because he felt that it was important for United States policy vis-a-vis Red China. He was pleased to hear that the United States was not intending to follow the United Kingdom's example with regard to Red China. This was most fortunate.

The President inquired whether the Chancellor had reference to the admission of Red China to the United Nations. The Chancellor nodded. The President then continued by saying that, as the Chancellor knew, there would be great difficulty this year in trying to keep Red China out of the United Nations, since the United Kingdom, Brazil and several other countries had expressed the opinion that Red China should be admitted. Therefore it would be difficult to keep Red China out.

The Chancellor stated that he knew what these difficulties would be, but he said that this is a problem of partnership. In the Chancellor's opinion it should not be possible for two nations who are partners in such a matter of life and death as NATO to have and follow different policies in the UN. Such action would be completely unthinkable among the Communist powers. Therefore the Communist bloc has been so successful in the past years, while the Free World permits itself all sorts of divergent opinions on vital matters. This type of procedure raises hope in the Soviet Union that the free nations of the world might just naturally fall apart. All these things go together. How could the United Kingdom take a different action with reference to such vital problems?

The President

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will certainly receive some surprises from General DeGaulle, too, and will learn that DeGaulle will go off on his own in many instances. That is the weakness and the disease affecting the West, and will break open in many places. Reactivation of the solidarity of the free nations as exemplified by NATO is a historic task but it is the only salvation for the Free World.

Secretary Rusk at this point noted that the Chancellor had spoken of the need for United States leadership in NATO. He said that the President had taken this very seriously and had asked the various branches of this Government to examine very carefully what the United States could do to put new life and strength into NATO. Some other nations of Europe had also indicated that they wanted the United States to take more decisive steps in this respect. The Secretary wanted to ask the Chancellor: "Did he think that the member nations of NATO were ready to accept United States leadership? It was one thing to be ready to lead and to lead alone. It was another thing to lead and be followed. Did the Chancellor think that Europe was actually ready to be led by the United States?"

Chancellor Adenauer said that he would like to say one thing. It was very important that the country exerting leadership treat the small nations well. If the small countries feel that they are not being treated in a friendly manner, there is the danger that they will offer resistance even when things that are beneficial for them are proposed. It was wise to treat the small nations well; it would not cost much, but it bore good fruit. Leadership is not a matter of commanding, it is a matter of convincing and persuading, but above all the nation exercising leadership must show that it has a will and determination. That is essential. As for the Secretary's question whether Europe would go along with the United States, the Chancellor definitely felt it would. As regards the United Kingdom, the change of the United Kingdom from a non-European power to a European power was well underway. Chancellor Adenauer had seen these developments shape up very clearly and indicated that the young people in the United Kingdom recognized that they belonged to Europe and that the old political maxim that the continental European powers should be kept divided so that the UK could rule is passe. Italy was a slightly difficult case. Economically the country had recovered very much. Chancellor Adenauer does not expect that the Nenni socialists will be accepted into the Government and thus strengthen the communist coalition. Moreover, the Chancellor feels that Italy is extremely responsive to good treatment. He knows that the President will see Mr. Fanfani shortly. Mr. Fanfani is very human and a few kind words addressed to him may do a great deal of good. As for the United Kingdom, the Chancellor has previously expressed his views. As regards Germany, the Chancellor stated that Germany is convinced that she can keep her freedom and peace only if the United States leads the Free World. Otherwise there is no hope of saving either freedom or peace. The small countries, the Chancellor feels, will follow the leadership of the United States if they are treated with consideration.

The Chancellor continued, stating that France is a somewhat difficult case. He stated that he himself is on good terms with de Gaulle. He did not know him prior to September 1958, but they have gotten along very well and

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de Gaulle is very frank with him. De Gaulle feels, however, that the United States' attitude in the UN helped bring about the setback for France in its relations with Algeria, and he cannot forget this. However, he is an intelligent man. He is the kind of General --and the Chancellor did not wish to cast aspersions on any other Generals-- who thinks far ahead. The Chancellor realizes that the President will soon meet with General de Gaulle and thinks it would be a fine thing if the President were able to establish rather close contact with him. However, he is rather difficult. His chief interest is the fate of France. The Chancellor does not feel that he is motivated by personal ambitions but that he is really extremely interested in the fate of France. The task therefore will be to convince him that France will fare best in an alliance like NATO. At the present time he is not convinced of this and he can hardly be blamed, since NATO really has been rather ineffective so far. The Chancellor again expressed hope that the President may be able to convince General de Gaulle of the importance of NATO. In addition to this, it is necessary that other countries too revive their confidence in NATO, and even within the United States it would be necessary to find persons who would understand the importance of NATO for the United States. If the President succeeds in reestablishing this confidence and of convincing General de Gaulle, he will have achieved very much. The Chancellor is convinced that this can and must be done.

President Kennedy asked the Chancellor whether, in his statement concerning the United States stand in the UN, he had reference to recent events. The Chancellor indicated that he had reference to events several years ago. He elaborated that General de Gaulle felt that the rebels in Algeria would have been ready to sign a peace pact with France about two years ago if they had not been supported by the United States stand in the UN. On the occasion of President Eisenhower's visit to Bonn the Chancellor had raised the French-Algerian problem. President Eisenhower had not wanted to discuss this matter, stating that the United States had been a colonial people once too and therefore could not leave Algeria in the lurch. The Chancellor had told him that he could not understand this reasoning and could not go along with it. Finally President Eisenhower had said that when the Algerian question came to a vote in the UN, the United States would not vote against France. The Chancellor had thereupon asked him whether he would permit him to call General de Gaulle in his presence and tell him this. President Eisenhower had indicated that he could. Consequently Chancellor Adenauer had called General de Gaulle and told him the outcome of his discussions. The upshot of the matter was that later, when the matter was brought to a vote in the United Nations, the United States did vote against France anyway and General de Gaulle had never forgotten this.

The President replied that there were many factors which had a bearing on United States relations with member nations of NATO. There was, for instance, the matter of Angola and Portugal; the Congo and Belgium; Algeria and France; the differences with the United Kingdom concerning Red China, and others. All these had a direct effect on relations within NATO. The countries with whom

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it was relatively simple to maintain good relations were such countries as Germany, Italy, Greece and Turkey who had no such far-flung commitments, interests and involvements overseas which then had their repercussions on relationships within NATO. For instance, the President had recently talked with the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands. The Netherlands wanted the United States to take very direct action with reference to certain matters in New Guinea, in other words in the involvement of the Netherlands with Indonesia, and the Netherlands regarded the United States attitude in this matter as a test of NATO. Other nations see other problems as a test of the solidarity of NATO.

The Chancellor stated that this was correct. He pointed out, however, that President Kennedy had inherited a great bulk of difficulties which had grown up during the past years because the United States had allowed them to grow up. Now it was the President's historic task to tackle these problems and to create again a true partnership atmosphere. The Chancellor knew that this was difficult, but he felt it was possible. However it required a great deal of patience. The Chancellor was aware of the fact that the American Administration is interested in talks with the USSR, and he feels that this is correct. He feels that the United States must try to see whether any success can be achieved with the Soviet Union as regards disarmament. However, as long as NATO is weak, the Chancellor predicts that there will be no success vis-a-vis the USSR. Success can be achieved only when the USSR sees that NATO, the Alliance of the free countries of the Western world, is strong and stands as one. He strongly feels that if President Kennedy accomplishes the task of rebuilding confidence in NATO, he will at the same time have achieved a step ahead in the direction of controlled disarmament.

The President indicated that he had hoped that the present Geneva talks might give some indication whether there were any favorable prospects for talks with the USSR on the topic of controlled disarmament. The last three weeks, however, had shown that there did not seem to be much hope on reaching any agreement on nuclear tests or talks this summer. If it was impossible to achieve any agreement on nuclear tests, which after all were rather easy to control and inspect, there was not too much point in hoping for any results in the field of general controlled disarmament.

At this point the Chancellor stated that as a new President Mr. Kennedy was testing the Russians to see whether there might be any give in them. Likewise the Russians were at present testing the President to see how hard he was or how firm he would stand. This was a matter that would take some time and require great patience.

The President stated that he was prepared to be patient but that it was impossible for the United States to agree on the Soviet Union's present conditions. Unless the Soviet Union gave some indication of changing its attitude by May, perhaps by the end of May, the United States would have to see how else to proceed and it might be necessary to discontinue the talks.

Chancellor

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Chancellor Adenauer agreed that he also saw no need for keeping on trying indefinitely, but he felt that the present Russian attitude in Geneva was no proof at all that Russia did not want controlled disarmament. Chancellor Adenauer is convinced that the Russians are first of all Russian nationalists and only secondly Communists. He emphasized the nationalistic quality of the present Russian regime repeatedly. He pointed out that the Russians had fought more wars than any other single country over the years. The Chancellor indicated that he had brought along for the President a German book called The Russian Perpetuum Mobile. He hoped that someone would be able to translate for the President some of the more important passages of this very excellent book. It is a very interesting book which shows the real nature of the Russians, and again the Chancellor reiterated that the Russians are Russian nationalists first of all and this explains why Mr. Khrushchev does not want to come under Red Chinese domination. Only in second place is Mr. Khrushchev a Communist, and he is convinced that the capitalist nations are doomed anyway. But Khrushchev wants Communism to rule under Russian leadership. However, he also knows that an all-out war will do no one any good, neither the victor nor the vanquished, and therefore he hopes that the Free World will just fall apart. As far as he is concerned the present conditions in NATO are proof that this will come about. If President Kennedy succeeds in changing the atmosphere around NATO he will have won an important step ahead vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

The President came back to the previously discussed question of the strengthening of NATO and how external interests of the various member states affect the relations within NATO. Perhaps something could be done to achieve a more solid stand on all the previously mentioned problems such as Angola-Portugal, Congo-Belgium, United Kingdom-Red China, etc. The President was not so sure that even if such a more consolidated stand were achieved as regards the NATO member states Mr. Khrushchev would not find something to be pleased about anyhow.

Mr. Rusk at this point interjected the remark that the President had reference to Soviet efforts in the Far East to outflank the effectiveness of NATO by intensified programs of aid to underdeveloped countries.

The Chancellor replied that this was, of course, another matter which could be discussed, but as far as he was concerned, he knew that a great many of the Soviet statistics concerning their aid to underdeveloped countries were sheer lies.

As regards NATO, perhaps it was best to let by-gones be by-gones, he said, but it was important to talk of the future and the leadership which the United States would assume to instill a new spirit into NATO. He felt that, as Mr. Acheson had informed him, the President's desire to see full consultation established was a very important step in the right direction. It was the first time that this intention had been so clearly stated. Never before had this been the case. The Chancellor felt that all NATO partners would welcome this

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step and that it would serve to increase and reestablish confidence in NATO.

The President stated that he felt very definitely that the North Atlantic Council should be strengthened. The appointment of Mr. Finletter to the Council was evidence of the American determination to strengthen this body. Mr. Finletter was a man of great experience who had held an important post in the Truman Administration. The President hoped that other nations too would choose equally qualified persons as their representatives in the North Atlantic Council, so that these would have the authority to speak on matters coming before the Council. He understood that this had not always been the case.

The Chancellor agreed that the level of the North Atlantic Council had to be raised in all respects. In closing, Secretary Rusk suggested that the afternoon meeting might perhaps be devoted to discussing the non-Western problems now facing the West and to an evaluation of how both the United States and Germany viewed Communist strategy in that area.

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1961 DATE: 4 April 12, 1961

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SUBJECT:

Meeting between the Secretary and the German Chancellor and Foreign Minister at the Department 4:00 p. m. S/P 5:30 p. m. April 12, 1961 -- BERLIN

PARTICIPANTS:

United States

German Delegation

German Embassy

- The Secretary
- Mr. Bowles
- Mr. Ball
- Mr. McCloy
- Mr. Harriman
- Mr. Bohlen
- Mr. Dowling
- Mr. McGhee
- Mr. Kohler
- Mr. Nitze
- Mr. Hillenbrand
- Mr. Fessenden
- Mr. Freshman
- Mr. Cash
- Mrs. Lejins

- The Chancellor
- Dr. Von Brentano
- Mr. Von Eckardt
- Dr. Carstens
- Dr. Von Etzdorf
- Dr. Harkort
- Mr. Barth
- Mr. Limbourg
- Mr. Von Hase
- Dr. Osterheld
- Mr. Sahm
- Mr. Hoffman
- Mr. Reinkenmeyer
- Mr. Balken
- Mr. Weber

- Ambassador Grewe
- Mr. Krapf
- Mr. Schnippenkoetter
- Mr. Straetling

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In introducing the subject of Berlin, the Secretary said that the new Administration had not said a great deal publicly concerning Berlin not because of lack of interest, but because it was felt that as long as the Soviets were leaving this issue relatively quiet we should not stir it up by throwing out a challenge. It would have been noted, he continued, that during the first period of the new Government there had been an absence of strong language in public exchanges. This was part of an attempt to restore the channels of communications between the United States and USSR. This did not mean that any problems had been solved, or that we were under any illusions that they had been. The Soviets would raise the issue of Berlin at some point, and we would like to have the Chancellor's opinion in this regard. Without equivocation this new Administration--as did its predecessors--took its obligations concerning Berlin very seriously and expected to meet any test with great firmness and clarity.

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The Chancellor began by saying that there was, as everyone knew, a party congress in the Soviet Union in October. He did not know, he continued, whether it would be good for Mr. Khrushchev to be having open difficulties with the Western Governments at that time. He did not believe that Khrushchev would want a crisis in September or October. In Geneva, the Soviets are trying to determine the position of the new Administration. He did not think they would allow a new Berlin crisis to disturb those talks. The end of May might see some developments in the Geneva talks. This would leave the period from May until September, and we must expect some trouble then. This was not certain, but it might happen.

Everyone must understand, the Chancellor added, that the new Administration would try to talk with the Soviets. The way it had handled Berlin had been quite correct, and he fully understood. The new Administration had spoken very clearly on Berlin.

The Chancellor said that two questions arose. Were the stocks in Berlin sufficient for an emergency? Were the three Western Powers prepared to take action so that the Russians would realize that they must not go too far?

The Secretary said that with regard to the Geneva talks he did not believe the United States was so sure that the Soviets attached too much importance to them as a test of Soviet-United States relations. Laos was, however, a real testing point. In our discussions with the Soviets, we had said little on Berlin, but we had been quite specific on Laos. We had told the Soviets that we could not accept a Soviet-dominated Laos, but we did not yet know whether a neutral Laos could be negotiated. Mr. Khrushchev had said he wanted an "Austrian" Laos, and with this the United States would be content. However, the question was whether or not we and the Soviets meant the same thing in this regard. He said his question was whether serious trouble over Laos would increase or decrease the danger for Berlin.

At this point Mr. McCloy, who was asked to comment by the Secretary, said that he agreed that the discussions in Geneva were not comparable with those concerning Laos. He said he did not think the Soviet Union was so anxious for a test ban agreement that it would hold off a crisis in Berlin. He thought they might stall in Geneva in order to transfer those talks into general disarmament discussions. He did not believe that the Soviets would hold back in Berlin because of what was going on in Geneva. On the other hand, he said, it might be significant that in every conversation he had had with the Russians concerning the Geneva talks, they had brought up Berlin and had given him a certain sense of immediacy. The Soviets had taken the position that they had to have three-party inspection control with each having a veto, which, of course, was the very negation of inspection. They had tied this position in with their position at the United Nations, and this would make it difficult for them to change it. If they held to this position, we might have to break off the Geneva talks, and in the resulting serious situation the Soviets might counter in Berlin. He thought they would continue to stall in Geneva in order

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to get into general disarmament talks while keeping the present test moratorium in effect. This might prove to be intolerable for the United States. Therefore, the May-September period might indeed be a critical time.

The Secretary said that when Prime Minister Macmillan was in Washington the United States had discussed Berlin with him. An agreement had been reached that tripartite and quadripartite contingency plans should be reviewed and renewed so that improvisation would not be necessary.

The Chancellor said he believed that the problem was that no one could say with any degree of certainty what the Soviets would do in May, June, and July. He agreed that we must be prepared for anything. He said that the United States had stated quite firmly that it was ready to act, and that Mr. Macmillan had made a similar statement if somewhat less firm. He said he did not know whether the French had made such a statement. He believed that this was most important.

The Foreign Minister said that it was quite clear that the Soviets would not attack directly. He said we must expect the conclusion of the "separate peace treaty" with a simultaneous denial by the Soviets of any responsibility for access to Berlin. They would point out that any difficulties that arose subsequently in this area would have to be worked out with the so-called "GDR." They would then undoubtedly instruct the "GDR" to behave and only proceed step-by-step. At first they would probably interfere only with German civilian access rather than Allied access, and this would be difficult to deal with. The question was when do we react? This must be considered, as well as how we should react, and the Federal Government would like to be in on the discussions in order to have an opportunity to express its opinion. The Three Powers had certain specific responsibilities concerning Berlin, and their contingency planning was, therefore, logical. However, the Federal Government was at least as much concerned as were the Three Powers. Certain reservations had been raised in the past--not by the United States but by others--concerning the Federal Government's participation in Berlin contingency planning. This did not do justice to our relations.

The Secretary said he fully concurred, and that although the Three Powers had primary responsibility, reaction must be at least quadripartite or even broader. Contingency planning, he continued, must be strengthened and dealt with as more than merely a planning exercise. It must be more carefully considered at higher levels of government. The most difficult situation to deal with would be that of the "separate peace treaty" without immediate interference with access. As the Germans knew, there was now before the four Governments a report on certain measures to be taken to deal with this situation.

The Secretary then asked what points the Germans wish to take up in the meeting the following day.

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The Chancellor said that the problems of development assistance and Berlin were very important, and having discussed them, the meeting had achieved much. He would like to develop further at subsequent meetings the question of the reorganization of NATO and make some additional points concerning Berlin.

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