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HEADQUARTERS
BERLIN COMMAND
Office of the AC of S, G2
APO 742 US FORCES

G2 DIVISION, BERLIN COMMAND
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
261600 Sep 61-312400 Oct 61
(ISUM #13)

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Chief Clerk	

1. (S) SOVIET FORCES:

a. The US Military Liaison Mission received its 9th temporary travel restriction of the year, which was effective 2 - 12 Oct. The limits imposed were divided into eight areas.

b. Reference USAREUR OBIT 3692. Major activity was Warsaw Pact CPX conducted in restricted area of East Germany. Majority of sightings were in 3rd Shock Army area, with highest concentration of Polish and Soviet command and support vehicles. Participants included elements of possibly five Army Headquarters of GSFG as well as GSFG itself, headquarters elements from NGF and USSR, Polish Headquarters elements, and elements of East German Army. Presence of command and small vehicles bearing VRN's associated with units of Western Military District could have indicated Moscow supervision or possible direction of the exercise. Movement to field positions started on 2 October with elements from East of the ODER/NEISSE River crossing into East Germany at GUBEN (UT 8056), FRANKFURT/ODER (VT 6999), and probably SZCZCIN (VW 7020). Although there have been a few sightings of tactical elements, there is no indication of tactical troop participation to any great extent.

This exercise was apparently a CPX starting with movement to position, play of the CPX, and then a general movement to the East on 10 and 11 October. The movement to the East was at first thought to be in preparation for the FTX phase of the exercise; however, it was probably end of the exercise with movement back to home stations. Sightings on 12 and 13 October indicate the exercise probably terminated on 10th or 11th October.

This Command Post Exercise probably conducted to achieve necessary command and communication training vital to control of future field training exercises. There is no firm evidence that the anticipated field training exercise will occur at this time. Accrued training benefits (coordination and liaison between Pact members) probably must be assimilated and necessary corrective action taken before a full

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scale maneuver will take place. Expected level of GSFG training at this time of training year would normally be achieved. Highly possible Warsaw Pact fall maneuver may be delayed until late fall and early winter, or maneuver as such may not occur. Possibly a joint GSFG and EGA maneuver may be conducted.

c. Continued deployment of elements of 12th Guards Army. These sightings occurred at locations which were occupied by divisions of this army when they were deployed around Berlin after 13 August.

83rd MTZ Rifle Regt and 68th Guards Tank Regt held in East Berlin, plus one and possibly two additional Motorized Rifle Regiments may form possible Soviet Berlin Command Headquarters. This command may be located in Installation 4163.

Additional elements noted in 12th Guards Army area could be reinforced for this army, or for possible Soviet Berlin Command if it is subordinated directly to GSFG.

Information at this time permits statement only that Soviet Forces in the immediate vicinity of Berlin have been strengthened by from one to three Regiments. Whether these elements came from within 20th Guards Army is unknown at this time.

2. (S) EAST GERMAN ARMY FORCES:

a. Reference WISC 39. Sightings last week indicate last elements EGA tactical units have completed withdrawal from East Berlin.

b. Two sources confirm that the 28th & 29th Motorized Rifle Regiments, the 9th Guards Tank Regiment, and the 8th Motorized Rifle Division from Schwerin were located in East Berlin during the Berlin operation. This is further indication that all tactical units which moved into East Berlin were organic to the 8th Motorized Rifle Division.

3. (S) EAST GERMAN GARRISONED SECURITY FORCES:

a. Reference DISC 165. Subordination of Border Security Police (BSP) to Ministry of Defense was formally announced during ceremony at BSP Headquarters PAETZ (VT 0988) on Sep 15. "BORDER COMMAND" (BC) is new designation.

COMMENT: National Peoples Army (NVA) included East German Army, Navy and Air Force and now includes Border Command. NVA does

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not include Garrisoned Security Forces. Reports confirm subordination of BSP to Ministry of Defense and redesignation as Border Command. USAREUR accepts Border Command (BC) as separate military force under Ministry of Defense on same level as East German Army, Navy and Air Force. This is Order of Battle change.

b. Reference DISC 172. Security Alert Police (SAP) defector stated 16 Sep that units "Internat Eins", Installation 4222, Berlin/Koepenick were inactivated 2 Aug 61 and 17 Aug 61. Approximately 300 District Alert Police (DAP) personnel from Installation 4154 were returned to their last stations and 4 or 5 companies were activated from remaining personnel installation 4154 and 4222. Companies were referred to as "Grenz-Controll" (Border-Control) companies. Some companies were transferred to Installation 4223, Berlin/Rummelsburg. Remainder of DAP personnel from Installations 4154 and 4222 were formed into 3 companies and unit designated 3rd SAP Bn with estimated strength of 350 and headquarters in Installation 4154. Unit subordinate to 1st Border Guard Bde, BASDORF (UU 9543). (F-3)

Two defectors from 14th Border Security Police Regt, (BSP) Gross Glienicke (UU 7215) stated that 5th BSP Bde, Gross Glienicke redesignated 2nd Border Bde and subordinate to SAP.

c. Reference WISC 42. Defector reports received confirm inactivation of "Internat Eins" and formation of 3rd Security Alert Police (SAP) Bn in Installation 4154, Berlin/Mitte, subordinate to SAP Bde, Berlin. 5th BSP Bde, Gross Glienicke, Installation 2141, is now accepted as 2nd Border Bde.

4. (S) ACCESS SITUATION:

a. Railways:

(1) During the period, several occasions arose where incoming and outbound military traffic was detained as much as 3 hours, however technical difficulties constituted the delays in all cases but one, which appeared to be an attempt by East Germans to interfere with railway operations. This attempt resulted in two separate incidents.

(a) Between 2030 and 2100 hours, 9 Oct, a US officer, Train Commander, while inspecting his train in Potsdam, enroute to West Germany, was harassed by an East German Transportation Policeman, (TRAPO), who ordered him to board the train. He refused and asked a Soviet EM standing nearby to get a Soviet officer. The Soviet EM refused, saying this was between him and the TRAPO. He was then told by the

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TRAPO to get inside the station house. He again asked the Soviet EM for a Soviet officer and was again refused. At this time the TRAPO grabbed hold of the US Officer and attempted to make him board the train. He was shock off. The locomotive arrived, and the US officer boarded the train and departed.

(b) Upon departing Magdeburg about 0322Z hrs, this same train was diverted by railroad traffic personnel to OBISFELDE, (PD 3510), 40 km NW of Magdeburg. Upon arrival at Oebisfeld, the Train Commander was told that no Russian processing personnel could come to process his train. At this point the locomotive departed. The train returned to Magdeburg at 1139Z hours and departed for Marienborn at 1220Z hours. At 1445Z hours the train finally reached Helmstedt, and continued on into West Germany.

COMMENT: As of yet, no plausible reason has been found for this diversion, with the exception of possible US Military Train interference with Soviet or East German Military movements along this line. Another possible reason is that this harassment was employed to test our reaction to this situation.

b. Autobahn: During this reporting period there were three attempts by East Germans to interfere with Autobahn travel between Berlin and Helmstedt.

(1) On 25 September, a US Airman travelling the Autobahn between Berlin and Helmstedt with his wife and daughter, was stopped by an East German roadblock 6 miles from the Dreilinden checkpoint. The East German Police were stopping all traffic and fining motorists for alleged speeding. The airman, who was in civilian clothes, refused to present his identity documents and demanded to see a Soviet officer. The airman was refused a Soviet officer and told to return to Berlin, which he did. The airman was issued a new set of travel orders upon return, and set out for Helmstedt later that day. His second attempt went without incident.

(2) On 18 Oct, a US Army officer, travelling in civilian attire in his POV, accompanied by his wife and daughter, was stopped by a VOPO near the first EG barrier in Babelsburg. The VOPO opened the car door and asked for documents, which the officer refused to show. After being detained for approximately 2 to 3 minutes the US officer asked to see a Soviet officer. At this time a US Military Police Autobahn Assistance Team arrived and the officer and his family were released.

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Apparently the presence of the Assistance Team effected his release. This was the 11th incident of this nature on the Autobahn this year.

(3) 29 Oct, the Soviets refused entry through Babelsburg checkpoint for US Forces Military Assistance Teams.

c. Air Corridors:

(1) It was reported on 3 October, by French authorities, that a group of French journalists had reported that a French plane based at Tegel Airfield was shot at by East Berlin Police on 29 Sep. The French authorities were unable to confirm this at the time. Later, however, two East German Policemen who defected, related that members of their unit did fire on the French plane, and that those who did fire were punished. The defectors stated that their unit was moved from duty on the sector-zonal boundary as a consequence.

(2) At 201605 October, a Border Security Police Guard (BSP) put a hole in the bubble of a US Army helicopter, with a sling shot. The helicopter was flying a routine border reconnaissance inspection in the vicinity of the sector-sector and sector-zonal boundary junction at Berlin-Rudow. The pilot immediately returned to Tempelhof Airfield, where inspection of the plane revealed a hole in the bubble about 2 inches in diameter which was made by a bolt. While no one was injured, this attack did not appear to be spontaneous in nature. This is probably another form of East German harassment which is likely to be contributed to "horse-play".

(3) On 26 Oct, the Soviet representative in the Air Safety Center announced that safety for Military aircraft flying in the 20 mile ring could no longer be guaranteed. Since that date, however, there have been no incidents involving air access in the 20 mile ring surrounding Berlin. It is believed that this announcement was made in protest to US Military aircraft flying over East Berlin. From 25-28 Oct numerous helicopter flights were made over East Berlin without incident.

(4) 301500 Oct, a Soviet, 2-engine jet (type unknown) flew over Tempelhof Air Base at an altitude of approximately 1000 feet.

d. East Berlin:

(1) At 110900 Oct, a Berlin Command Reconnaissance Patrol vehicle was brought to halt in the vicinity of Elsenstrasse in East Berlin, when a SAP fired 6 to 8 rounds over the reconnaissance vehicle.

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The patrol leader immediately demanded to see a Soviet officer and demanded to know the name of the person who had fired the shots. At 1005 hrs a SAP officer told the patrol leader that a Soviet officer would not appear. The patrol leader was informed that if he wanted the name of the man who fired the shots he would have to get it from the Soviet Kommandantura. The patrol leader is of the opinion that this was not an actual attempt at a detention, as the man who fired the shots appeared excited and unaware of what else to do upon seeing the patrol. As further evidence, the patrol stopped of its own volition and passage was not blocked until the SAP officer appeared, at which time he placed a SAP EM in front of the vehicle. The attitude of the SAP officer was one of regret. He agreed with the patrol leader that this was an unfortunate incident, and that the man who fired the shots was a "dumkopf" and should not be allowed to carry arms.

(3) On 22 October, Mr. E. E. Lightner, USBER, drove his USAREUR licensed POV through the Friedrich Strasse crossing point into East Berlin. Upon reaching the East German checkpoint he was denied entrance until he showed his identity documents, which he refused to do. After a delay, Mr. Lightner was escorted through the East German checkpoint by US Military Police in jeeps and on foot. Since this incident there have been 12 attempts by BC personnel dressed in civilian attire, driving privately owned vehicles to gain access to East Berlin through the Friedrichstrasse crossing point. All attempts but one have resulted in a Military Police escort.

(3) Since Mr. Lightner's incident on the 22nd of October, the right of free entry by Allied Forces into the East Sector of Berlin has been challenged by VOPO's each time an Allied Forces member tried to enter the sector in civilian attire. The right of free entry came to a head on the 26th of October, when the VOPO's took a US Military member dressed in civilian clothes to VOPO Headquarters, when he refused to show his identification card. At this time a silent and tense atmosphere became evident at the Friedrichstrasse crossing point, and both the para-military forces of the East side, and the Allied Forces began reinforcing their forces within that general area.

On 26 October, Allied personnel in civilian attire were again denied entry into the East sector. US Forces then moved a tank task force into the area during the afternoon, which were withdrawn in the late afternoon hours. In retaliation of the US action, the Soviets moved approximately 13 T-54 tanks and supporting vehicles into the ruins at Bebel's Platz. In all probability this unit is subordinate to the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment located in the Karlshorst area.

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At 271655 October, a Soviet tank column, consisting of 10 T-54 tanks began departing the Bebels Platz area in route to the Friedrichstrasse crossing point, where they were employed on Friedrichstrasse between Schutzen and Kreuzen Strasse, until 281050 Oct, at which time they were pulled out and returned to their Bebels Platz staging area. In addition to the Soviet tanks, there was also 2 GAZ 69's (SAP), 5 BTR 40's (SOVIET), 2 BTR 152's (SOVIET), and 1 SK2 (SAP). These additional vehicles stayed within the general area for approximately 2 days after the tanks pulled back.

280001 October, 20 T-54 tanks and supporting vehicles moved into the SAP III Compound. In all probability this unit was also part of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment.

On 28 October an aerial reconnaissance flight was flown over the East Sector which revealed the following equipment:

	<u>BEBELS PLATZ</u>	<u>SAP III</u>
T-54	18 (Poss 3 more in sheds)	20
BTR 152	2	1
ZIL 150	6	2
GAZ 51		11
GAZ 69	2	

Since the 28th of October, the situation at the Friedrichstrasse crossing point has quieted, as no major incidents have been reported.

(4) During this reporting period there have been 3 probes made by Berlin Command vehicles in attempts to test the access of crossing points not authorized for Allied use. None of the attempts has proved successful to date.

e. Canals: During this reporting period there were no changes in canal traffic or attempts by East German authorities to interfere with canal traffic.

f. Telecommunications: Omitted.

g. U-Bahns, S-Bahns: East Germans continued to remove tracks, and to improve the barrier system to include anti-personnel barriers on sector/sector border and the sector/zonal border.

5. (C) HOSTILE RECONNAISSANCE: Hostile reconnaissance patrols continue to maintain surveillance of installations in West Berlin. The

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approximate average of 4 Soviet vehicles per day as previously reported has been increased recently to double this figure. It was reported that a Soviet reconnaissance vehicle drove right into a CP area during a recent Berlin Command exercise in the Grunewald.

6. (C) REFUGEES: During this reporting period an approximate average of 30 refugees per day were processed at the Marienfelde Refugee Center.

7. (C) POPULATION ATTITUDES: The attitude of East Germans observed in the vicinity of Friedrichstrasse has been one of subtleness and resentment toward the East German para-military forces. This attitude becomes one of fear when applied to Soviet Forces. In the event of incidents in this area involving East German or Soviet Forces in opposition with Allied Forces, the gatherings of curious persons could be expected to dissolve. This is not intended as an analysis of the attitude of the East Germans as a whole, but directed to those persons who observe the actions of the US Forces and Soviet Forces in the vicinity of CP Charlie.

Majority of East Berliners approve recent US shows of force on Sector borders, feeling that these have clearly demonstrated to Sov/EG authorities that Western Allies are determined to stand fast on their rights. Average East Berliner appears to hold opinion that present difficulties generate new tensions in the West Berlin question. East Berliners feel that should US agree to allow East Berlin personnel to conduct ID checks on US personnel desirous of entering East Berlin, the EG will attempt to initiate such checks on US personnel on land routes between West Germany and West Berlin. US helicopter overflights of East Berlin on 25 October were heartily approved by East Berlin residents.

8. (C) PROPAGANDA:

Reference DISC 175. East German radio has been broadcasting English language propaganda program specifically to US Forces in Berlin for past two months. Recent report indicates East German Communist Party (SED) recognizes that programs have been too simple and crude to achieve desired effect. Future programs to consider basic elements of "US mentality" and place emphasis on futility of dying for Berlin. Broadcasts will quote liberally from US and Allied newspapers and leading personalities advocating negotiation on Berlin question. (B-2)

COMMENT: US sources confirm poor quality of past broadcasts. Proposed improvements appear logical, particularly use of quotes from respected Western sources. However, Communist propaganda directed at US personnel has consistently been too obvious and unconvincing to exert influence.

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9. (C) OBSTACLES AND BARRIERS: The East Germans have continued to improve this system by digging new trenches, adding new obstacles of various types on road exits, reinforcing walls, and putting up additional barbed wire. (See Inclosure 1)

10. (C) NEW MATERIEL IDENTIFICATIONS: No new materiel identifications were made during this reporting period.

11. (C) NEW UNIT IDENTIFICATIONS: No new units have been identified during this reporting period, with the exception of those reported in paras 1, 2, & 3 above.

12. (C) STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS: During this reporting period, there were 60 ground reconnaissance patrols dispatched to East Berlin; 217 staff tours were made in East Berlin; 30 helicopter flights were made over the sector/sector and sector/zonal borders; 6 C-47 flights were made around the Berlin ring; 30 ground reconnaissance patrols were made of the sector/sector border from the American side; 30 ground reconnaissance patrols were made along the sector/zonal border; and 30 reconnaissance patrols were made of the S-Bahn stations and lines on the Sector/Sector and Sector/Zonal borders.

13. (C) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

BERLIN COMMAND SECURITY PROGRAM:

(1) Hq USAREUR has republished USAREUR Circular 604-8 which governs limited access authorizations for aliens to US classified defense information. The new circular requires that commanders take positive action to insure that alien employees do not have access to classified material without proper authorization, or beyond their authorized access. A "Limited Access Authorization" means exactly what the term implies. Access is to be limited strictly to that information which the employee must know to accomplish his or her assigned duties. Commanders and supervisors will insure that the scope of an employee's duties are not made so broad as to make impossible any real limitation of his access.

For obvious security reasons the number of employees granted Limited Access Authorizations in Berlin Command must be stringently controlled. The new circular also prescribes that all Limited Access Authorizations now in force will expire one year from the effective date of the circular (30 May 1961) unless they are replaced by the issuing authority (G-2, Berlin Command). All future LAA's are to be valid for one year only at which time they must be reviewed to determine whether renewal for continued access is justified. Reinvestigation for limited access purposes must now be conducted every three years. G-2 will maintain a list of all limited access authorizations in effect as required

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by USAREUR Circular 604-8. Division chiefs concerned will be contacted to review current authorizations during the anniversary month of their original issue.

(2) EC Circular 380-5 has been revised and republished effective 1 October 1961. The new circular incorporates numerous pertinent changes in command policy for safeguarding official and classified defense information. All major unit commanders and chiefs of staff divisions are urged to lend their vigorous support to assure the overall effectiveness of this new directive, the "security bible" of Berlin Command.

G-2 Security Branch has presented briefings for the security control personnel of the command on the interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of the circular.

14. (C) MISCELLANEOUS:

a. Steinstuecken Exclave:

(1) US Army continues to maintain a 3-man armed patrol in the West Berlin exclave of Steinstuecken.

(2) 25 refugees have been airlifted out of the area.

(3) Guards around the area have been instructed not to fire on West Berlin Police or West Berlin residents, or on Allied personnel unless they step into East German territory. They were told to fire on East Germans who approached the border only after they have been called to halt and a warning shot was given. They have dispensed with warning shots for persons who are in the process of defecting. Guards were told not to fire on US Army helicopters and to watch closely the activities of the 3-man US Army patrol.

15. (C) SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS:

a. On 22 October, Mr. E. E. Lightner, USBER, drove his USAREUR licensed POV through the Friedrichstrasse crossing point into East Berlin and was denied entry by the East Germans unless he showed his identity documents, which he refused to do. After a delay, Mr. Lightner was escorted through the East German checkpoint by US Military Police in jeeps and on foot. Since this incident there have been 12 attempts by EC personnel dressed in civilian attire, driving POV owned vehicles to gain access to East Berlin through the Friedrichstrasse crossing point. All attempts but one have resulted in a Military Police escort.

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
b. During the period 262200 to 272400 Oct 61, the Russians moved 20 T-54 tanks into the Bebel's Platz area, and 20 into Installation 4154. Indications are that these tanks will remain in these locations for some time.

c. At 271655 Oct, a Soviet tank column, consisting of 10 T-54 tanks were deployed on Friedrichstrasse between Schutzen and Kreuzen Str, until 281050 Oct, at which time they were pulled out and returned to their Bebel's Platz staging area.

d. Since 26 Sep there has been 19 helicopter flights to Steinstuecken. These flights have evacuated 25 refugees, rotated MP patrols and have performed recon missions. All flights have been routine and no problems arose.

e. At 300600 Oct 61, the Military Police Assistance vehicle was not allowed to process through the Russian check point at Babelsburg. The Russian officer read a prepared message from the Soviet Commandant to the effect that the patrol would no longer be allowed.

f. At the present time, G-2, BC, is maintaining 1 recon patrol in East Berlin at all times, and is dispatching 7 staff visits a day to East Berlin.


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1 Incl:
Map, barriers/obstacles

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- 1 - Sp Tps, USAGAR
- 1 - 1st BG, 18th Inf
- 1 - Co F, 40th Armor
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