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October 4, 1961

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Chaves - L
Mr. Hitchcock - D
Mr. Lindley - S/P ✓
Mr. Owen - S/P
Mr. Thurston - S/O
Mr. Furnas - S/AB

From: Gerard C. Smith

Subject: Negotiations on European Security.

It should not require another meeting to agree finally on the attached proposed letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Could you therefore telephone or otherwise communicate any comments you may have to Mr. Kranich, Ext. 3796, by noon October 5, who will coordinate and forward such comments to Mr. McNaughton in Defense.

Attachment as stated.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Negotiations on European Security

By letter of _____ 1961 (copy attached), the Secretary of State has indicated that certain proposals for European security arrangements may arise in connection with prospective negotiations on the Berlin and German problems, and has requested the views of the Department of Defense with respect to the proposals most likely to be discussed.

The Secretary of State has referred to seven types of proposals which might be anticipated. The first five are:

1. Demilitarized zone. A proposal for limitations on nuclear components of weapons systems and/or delivery vehicles in an area or areas of Europe, particularly in Central Europe. This type of plan would embody so-called "deployment" demilitarization (a ban on the production, stockpiling and stationing of nuclear weapons in the zone), and might embody "sanctuary" demilitarization (a ban on use of nuclear weapons against the territory of, or targets in, the zone). The demilitarization might vary from partial measures, such as limitations on, or reductions in, the nuclear weapons in the zone, to a complete prohibition. The area of the zone might vary from a small strip in Germany only, to the addition of other countries to the Poland-Czechoslovakia-Germany area, e.g., Hungary, Denmark and the Benelux countries. One proposal might be that the NATO and Warsaw ^{Pact} powers agree that there be no ballistic missiles with a range of over one thousand miles deployed in a zone which would be defined in terms of geographical coordinates, but which would include Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

2. Limitations on forces. A plan for limitations on, or reductions of, either indigenous or foreign forces, or both, in a European zone or zones.

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The measures might extend to the complete withdrawal of foreign forces from the zone. This, in practice, could involve "deployment" demuclearization of the zone if the nuclear powers were unwilling to leave nuclear weapons in the zone, either for their own use if the agreement broke down or for use by indigenous forces.

3. Inspection zone. An inspection zone proposal in which no demilitarization or demuclearization measures are included. This could involve exchange of information on military forces and installations in the zone, mobile and fixed-post ground inspection, aerial inspection, and overlapping radar installations. The area might vary from a small strip in Germany, to a coverage of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. The inspections would be independent of any inspection arrangements for 1 and 2 above.

4. No nuclear transfers. A proposal for a treaty between the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers, or a group of reciprocal unilateral declarations by those powers, that states owning nuclear weapons shall not relinquish control of such weapons to any NATO or Warsaw Pact nation not owning them and shall not transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture; that NATO and Warsaw Pact nations not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufacture such weapons, attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states, or seek or receive information or materials necessary for their manufacture. (Compare U. S. Program for OGD, Stage I, paragraph C(e).)

5. Advance notification. A proposal that the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations, or certain of them in a European zone, shall agree to give advance notification to the other nations participating in the agreement of major military movements and maneuvers, on a scale as may be agreed, which might give rise to

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misinterpretation or cause alarm and induce countermeasures. The notification would include the geographical areas to be used and the nature, scale and time span of the event. (Compare U.S. Program for GCD, Stage I, paragraph F(a).)

To assist the Defense Department in formulating its views as to these five types of proposals, it is hereby requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze them for their implications in the light of the following policy:

- (a) "Policy Directive Regarding NATO and The Atlantic Nations," which the President approved on 21 April 1961;
- (b) The attached excerpt, entitled "Arms Control," from the so-called "Acheson Report"; and
- (c) The two assumptions that a specific proposal for reunification of Germany (i) will, and (ii) will not, be made by the Western Powers.

In the requested analyses of zonal arrangements, variants (even large variants) of the specified zones, and the substitution of terrain features or mile-measured strips for political boundaries in delimiting a zone, should be considered to the extent that such variants are credible and especially to the extent that they might lead to a significant change in the implications of a proposal. Similar consideration should be given to variations in the measures to be applied within a zone. Proposals or combinations of proposals which might achieve a "balance" in the European area should be highlighted.

In each case, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested to indicate what other measures, if any, in combination with the proposal being analyzed, would make a particular proposal more or less acceptable, and especially which might achieve a "balance" in the European area.

The specific arguments for and against each proposal are desired in

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sufficient detail to be readily understandable to and useable by the U.S. negotiators. To the extent that it can be done, the military implications should be treated separately.

A list of some possible considerations in approaching the analyses of some of the proposals is attached for information and for such use as may be desired.

It is recognized that, in the absence of specific proposals having been made, there is an almost infinite variety of schemes which might be considered. Admittedly, this complicates the accomplishment of the analyses being requested. It is considered essential, however, that an evaluation of the implications of the most probable proposals be initiated without delay, in order that the Department of Defense may make a timely contribution to the negotiating process.

The Secretary of State solicits Defense Department views on two other possible proposals:

6. East-West Commission. A proposal that a commission be established immediately (a) to examine and make recommendations on the possibility of further measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communications (compare U.S. Program for GCD, Stage I, paragraph F(4)); and (b) as provided in the Western Peace Plan, to discuss and negotiate about European security.

7. Non-aggression pact. A proposal that there be a non-aggression pact of some type as provided in the Western Peace Plan.

Your comments on these two possibilities will be welcomed.

Attached, in addition to the documents already mentioned, are two informal papers prepared by a Western Four-Power European Security Special Group. These two papers indicate the scope of the inquiry into the subject now being made by the Four Governments.

Completion of the analyses by December 10, 1961 would be appreciated.

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EXCERPT FROM "ACHESON REPORT"

"2. Arms Control. NATO strategy should enhance, not reduce, the chances of arms control arrangements designed to increase the security of the NATO countries. A strategy which is excessively dependent upon nuclear initiative, or which will increase the chances of proliferation of nuclear capabilities, or which is not strongly based on conventional strength would make arms control negotiations more difficult. On the other hand, a NATO strategy which is designed to create a stable military environment, and which can tolerate a fairly high level of tension and violence without automatically dissolving into general nuclear war, should make it easier to direct arms control measures to the same goal. These considerations should not, of course, preclude measures which are otherwise essential to the military and political strength of NATO."

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